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Abstract
The thesis explores different aspects of shocks transmission and spillovers in a global en-
vironment. Chapter 1 assesses the effect of participation of countries in IMF programs
on their vulnerability to external shocks. The analysis uses vector autoregressive models
(hereafter VAR) to construct a proxy for the exposure to external shocks. The article then
examines how this impact depends on the participation of a country in IMF programs and
finds that a higher rate of participation in IMF arrangements is associated with a smaller
vulnerability to external shocks.
Chapter 2 focuses on the variation of connectedness among countries with the state of
the economy. The connectedness of real output, inflation and financial variables for seven
advanced economies is measured via a Bayesian Threshold VAR model. It is reported that
the global connectedness is sizable and business cycle dependent, with higher values during
recessions.
Chapter 3 quantifies the role of monetary and fiscal shocks in advanced and emerging
economies using a panel VAR with hierarchical structure. The policy contribution on GDP
growth is assessed by means of a structural counterfactual analysis based on conditional
forecasts. Results show that global GDP growth benefited from substantial policy sup-
port during the global financial crisis but policy tightening thereafter, particularly fiscal
consolidation, acted as a significant drag on subsequent global recovery.
The final chapter investigates the effects of domestic uncertainty shocks in emerging
economies. A new Bayesian algorithm is developed to estimate proxy panel VAR models
with hierarchical structure. To identify exogenous uncertainty shocks in the fifteen EMEs,
fluctuations in global uncertainty are used as a proxy for domestic uncertainty shocks.
The main findings suggest that uncertainty shocks cause severe falls in GDP and stock
price indexes, have inflationary effects, depreciate the currency and are not followed by a
subsequent overshoot in activity.
The replication files for the four chapters of the thesis are available at the following pub-
lic link: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/3psfj4qhabp3ooz/AAAxgeKADbeaRExI332iWDN1a?dl=0
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Introduction
This thesis investigates the transmission of economic shocks within and between countries
from an empirical perspective. Specifically, evidence is presented on issues related to the
international dimension of the business cycle, which have recently gained considerable
attention from both policymakers and academic research. These include questions about
the role of IMF programs on the external exposure of a country, the variation of a cross-
country spillover index across business cycle phases, the contribution of monetary and
fiscal policy to the GDP growth in advanced and emerging economies and the effects of
uncertainty shocks in a group of emerging countries.
The methodology employed relies on structural VAR models, which have become a key
econometric tool to asses the effects of shocks from an empirical perspective. To estimate
the models, in this work a Bayesian approach is preferred for its flexibility in dealing with
non-linearity and hierarchical models while addressing the “curse of dimensionality”.
There are four main research themes in this thesis which are organized in four distinct
chapters as follows:
IMF programs and sensitivity to external shocks
The role of IMF program participation and the sensitivity of countries to external shocks
will be discussed in Chapter 1. Currently, one of the primary purposes of the IMF is
to ensure global stability. As such, the Fund has the responsibility of advising member
countries on the financial and economic policies that promote stability, helping to avoid
crises and smoothing the adjustment to exogenous shocks. Applying a bilateral Structural
VAR model to a panel of 165 countries, the analysis isolates a set of external shocks,
estimates their impact on the economy of each country in the sample and uses this estimate
as a proxy for the exposure to external shocks. The article then examines how this impact
depends on the participation of a country in IMF programs and finds that a higher rate
of participation in IMF arrangements is associated with a smaller vulnerability to external
shocks. These results are of considerable interest since shocks and crises are a systematic
feature of the global economy which affects both developing and developed countries.
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This chapter brings two main contributions to the literature. First, we provide new ev-
idence on the impact of IMF intervention on the vulnerability of countries to non-domestic
shocks focusing on almost all countries of the world. Second, taking advantage of the large
data-set employed we formally quantify the impact of IMF participation on the external
vulnerability of a country in a cross-section analysis.
Connectedness and spillovers in recession and boom
We will investigate the variation across business cycle phases of the connectedness among
countries in Chapter 2. Enhanced correlation of GDP growth rates across countries during
the global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest of policymakers and academics in
the international business cycle and the cross-country co-movements in economic activity.
The literature supports the evidence of commonality in macroeconomic fluctuations across
countries, particularly for advanced economies (Kose et al., 2003; Canova et al., 2007;
Diebold and Yilmaz, 2013; Antonakakis et al., 2016) as well as the idea that the business
cycle is asymmetric, with recessions and expansions characterized by swings of different
magnitude (see Neftci, 1984; Morley and Piger, 2012;Vavra 2013; Bloom, 2014). On these
grounds, in this chapter we investigate the state dependency of the connectedness across
countries. To this purpose, we apply the Diebold-Yilmaz index in a non-linear framework.
Via a Threshold VAR model, we measure the connectedness in recessions and booms of
industrial production, inflation and financial variables for seven advanced economies. The
global connectedness is shown to be sizable and business cycle dependent. Specifically, the
results suggest that higher values are recorded during recessions. Financial and nominal
connectedness display different dynamics relative to the connectedness in industrial pro-
duction. In addition, while Europe appears to be vulnerable to shocks originated in USA
and Japan, the US is unaffected by shocks occurring elsewhere. Results are robust to an
alternative state-dependent modelling of the parameters and our model fit outperforms
both the linear VAR and the Smooth Transition VAR.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, we investigate
the regime-dependency of macroeconomic connectedness of seven industrialized countries.
Second, the empirical setting employed captures the sign asymmetry of shocks as well, and
we show that negative innovations increase connectedness more than the positive ones.
Finally, we extend the benchmark model featuring IP as real activity variable to also
include financial and nominal ones. As such, we provide novel evidence on the composition
of the global connectedness index and its variation over the business cycle.
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The contributions of fiscal and monetary policy since the global
financial crisis
We will provide evidence on the role of monetary and fiscal policy on GDP growth in
advanced and emerging economies in Chapter 3. Strong policy support was necessary
to reignite the economic recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis. In part reflecting
different economic conditions and challenges, the policy response across advanced and
emerging market economies (EMEs) was somewhat heterogeneous. Up to now, very little
attention has been paid to analyzing the differences (or similarities) in the role played
by policy support in advanced economies and EMEs. A deeper understanding of how
policy contributed across both groups of countries would benefit to both policymakers
and academics. To this end, we use a model with a hierarchical structure to capture
the variability of GDP response to policy shocks both between and within the groups
of advanced and emerging countries. We provide evidence that fiscal policy effects are
heterogeneous across countries, with higher multipliers in advanced economies compared
to emerging markets, while monetary policy is found to have more homogeneous effects on
GDP. We then quantify the policy contribution on GDP growth in the last decade by means
of a structural counterfactual analysis based on conditional forecasts. We find that global
GDP growth benefited from substantial policy support during the global financial crisis but
policy tightening thereafter, particularly fiscal consolidation, acted as a significant drag on
the subsequent global recovery. In addition we show that the role of policy has differed
across countries. Specifically, in advanced economies, highly accommodative monetary
policy has been counteracted by strong fiscal consolidation. By contrast, in emerging
economies, monetary policy has been less accommodative since the global recession.
While a vast literature has focused on the effects of either monetary or fiscal policy
on individual countries, we evaluate and compare the effects of policy across a range of
advanced and emerging market economies, and we look at the effects of fiscal and monetary
policy in combination. To discern the effect of fiscal and monetary policy on GDP growth
we use counterfactual scenarios in the spirit of Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al.
(2012) but we differ by relying on the structural form of the model, attributing outcomes
for policy specifically to the relevant monetary and fiscal shocks identified in our model.
Moreover, we study the interaction and interdependency of the two branches of macroeco-
nomic policy over the past decade by asking questions such as: how might monetary policy
have behaved if fiscal policy had been conducted differently?; and how strong would fiscal
support have needed to be, had monetary policy been less accommodative?
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Uncertainty shocks in emerging economies
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of domestic uncertainty shocks in emerging economies. Fol-
lowing the 2008 global financial crisis an extensive literature focused on the concept of
uncertainty and its role in driving the business cycle. Although there is no single theory
describing the effects of uncertainty, substantial evidence associates higher uncertainty with
recessions. Despite the fact that extensive research has been carried out on the topic of
uncertainty, little is known about the effects of uncertainty shocks in emerging economies.
This lack of evidence can be largely attributed to the limited availability and accuracy of
data for these countries. In this chapter we propose a new Bayesian algorithm to estimate
proxy panel structural vector autoregressive models with hierarchical structure. We then
construct a global uncertainty indicator as well as country uncertainty measures for fifteen
relatively small emerging economies. To identify exogenous uncertainty shocks in the fif-
teen EMEs we use fluctuations in global uncertainty as a proxy for domestic uncertainty
shocks. We find that uncertainty shocks cause severe falls in GDP and stock price indexes,
depreciate the currency and are not followed by a subsequent overshoot in activity. More-
over, our results are consistent with a “supply side” type uncertainty shock generating an
increase in consumer prices and an ambiguous reaction of the monetary policy. Finally, we
show that there is heterogeneity across economies in the response to uncertainty shocks
which can be (in part) explained by country characteristics.
This chapter makes three important contributions. To begin with, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the effects of domestic uncertainty
shocks in emerging economies, while accounting for the potential co-movement between
uncertainty and the real activity. Second, from a methodological point of view we develop
a novel Bayesian algorithm to estimate an extended version of a panel VAR with random
coefficients. Finally, from an economic perspective, we propose the use of global uncertainty
fluctuations as an instrument for domestic uncertainty shocks.
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Chapter 1
IMF programs and sensitivity to
external shocks
1.1 Introduction
The last two decades have seen a profound acceleration of international transactions. The
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the increased salience of global capital flows pushed the
IMF to undertake much wider and weighty interventions in global domestic politics. Today
the Fund is one of the most important international organization in the global system and
it exerts greater influence than practically any other international organization in history.
Until recently, around four out of five members of the Fund have used its resources at least
once.
As specified in the IMF official site, one of the main purposes of the Fund‘s lending
activity is to insure global stability helping member countries to prevent crisis and to
smooth the adjustment to various shocks. In a world where shocks and crises have increased
their frequency, the need for countries to protect themselves from external shocks has
become more urgent. As such, addressing the external exposure of countries has turned
into one of the main aspects of the IMF‘s agenda.
Although researchers have shown a growing interest in analyzing the role of IMF lending
on the financial stability of member countries (Kireyev 2010, Dreher and Walter 2010, Papi
et al. 2016), very little is known about the Fund‘s efficiency in helping countries to protect
themselves against non-domestic shocks. A likely explanation for this lack of evidence is
that there are no well established measures for the sensitivity of a country to external
shocks. The purpose of this paper is to address this research gap evaluating the impact of
IMF programs on the sensitivity of a country to non-domestic shocks. The methodology
employed builds on Canova (2005) and Loayza and Raddatz (2007) who apply vector
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autoregressions to isolate external shocks, estimate their impact on domestic variables and
use it as a measure for the external vulnerability. Following their approach we construct an
unbalanced panel of 165 countries ranging from 10 to 55 years of quarterly observations.
A bilateral VAR consisting of a domestic and an external block is estimated for each
country and the average effect of external shocks on the domestic economy is used as a
proxy for the external exposure. The impact of IMF programs on the external exposure of
countries is then examined in a cross section analysis. The endogeneity issue is addressed
by instrumenting the participation in the IMF loans with the size of the IMF quota in the
spirit of Barro and Lee (2005).
The main finding of the paper is that IMF program participation decreases the sen-
sitivity of borrowing countries to non-domestic shocks. A number of robustness checks
reinforce the validity of the empirical results.
Our paper brings several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowl-
edge, Kireyev (2000) is the only study that has analyzed the impact of IMF intervention
on the vulnerability of countries to non-domestic shocks. However, he restricts his at-
tention to 18 Arabic countries while we include in our sample almost all countries of the
world. Second, we adopt a different empirical approach. Instead of a Panel VAR model
with Cholesky decomposition, we estimate a Bayesian VAR (hereafter BVAR) model with
shocks identified through sign restrictions. The Bayesian methods deal in a more efficient
way with the high heterogeneity in the data quality and availability, hence are an attrac-
tive choice for the purposes of this article. In addition, we use the outcome of the BVAR
analysis to build a proxy for the external exposure. Finally, taking advantage of the large
data-set employed we take a further step in our study and we formally quantify the impact
of IMF participation on the external vulnerability of a country in a cross-section analysis.
There are several channels through which IMF arrangements can help a country improve
its capacity of absorbing the external shocks. One good example is the IMF program itself
which consists of a given amount of financing and a set of economic policy adjustments
(i.e. “conditionality”) that the borrower must implement. The money should alleviate
restructuring the economy (even if not always verified in practice) and boost the reserves,
thus reducing the likelihood of currency speculative attacks (Dreher and Walter 2010).
The conditions to be implemented and the policy advice that IMF staff provides to the
borrower should reinforce the economic resilience and decrease the risk of external shocks.
In addition, the presence of an IMF program acts as a “seal of approval” that the country is
undertaking measures to address the macroeconomic imbalances; this fact should restore
the investor’s confidence and decrease the risk of currency attacks. On the other side,
IMF lending could also induce moral hazard since the loan acts as an income insurance
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against adverse shocks. The insurance cover could incentivize the borrowing countries to
lower the precautions to such shocks deepening the economic and financial fragility (Vaubel
1983). Even if there are strong reasons to believe that IMF programs should impact on the
external exposure of a country, the theoretical arguments do not provide a clear answer on
the sign of this effect. This article attempts to shed some light in this direction.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the existing
literature. Section 3 and 4 introduce the methodology and the data. In section 5 we use
the results derived from the BVAR analysis to construct an index of external vulnerability.
In section 6 we use this measure in a cross section analysis where we investigate the effect
of participation in IMF programs on the member sensitivity‘s to non-domestic shocks.
Robustness checks to the model heterogeneity, the identification strategy and the choice
of external variables are available in the appendix.
1.2 Related literature
Kireyev (2000) employs a Panel VAR to examine the effect of external and domestic shocks
on macroeconomic dynamics of the Arabic countries. He then compares the impact of these
shocks on countries while under IMF program and not. He finds that on average, countries
are less vulnerable to adverse exogenous shocks while under IMF program.
Building on Kireyev (2000) and the previous literature, we propose a BVAR model in
the spirit of Canova (2005) and we test the difference in the sensitivity to exogenous shocks
for countries under IMF arrangement and not. We then check the statistical significance
of our results in a cross-section analysis.
Our paper brings contributions to two broad strands of the literature. In particular,
we add to the studies that evaluate the effects of IMF programs. As suggested by Haque
and Khan (1998), an important question often raised in relation to the Fund programs is
whether such programs are efficient in terms of improving the current account balance,
increasing international reserves, lowering inflation, raising the growth rate and mitigating
the financial instability. The results of most of the cross-country empirical studies are
rather mixed. They point out that IMF programs lead to improvement in the current ac-
count balance and the balance of payment but they have a negative impact on output in the
short run. Binder and Bluhm (2014) find that positive effects of IMF loans on growth are
coupled with progress in institutional quality. Several studies indicate that inflation falls
for countries under IMF arrangements, but this result is mainly not statistically significant
(Conway 1994, Barro and Lee 2005, Easterley 2005, Dreher 2006). IMF‘s role in catalyz-
ing private capital flows has also received considerable attention in the literature (Bird
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and Rowlands 2002). A key element of IMF mission is precisely to restore the investor‘s
confidence. Still, the empirical results are mixed. For example, Edwards (2006) shows
that IMF programs generate net outflows of portfolio while Jensen (2004) finds similar
effects for foreign direct investments. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) provide evidence that
IMF lending decreases bond spread while Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) claim that there
is no such effect. Dreher and Walter (2010) find that the existence of an IMF-supported
program in the previous five-year period reduces the probability of a future currency cri-
sis. Regarding the banking sector, Papi et al. (2016) show that countries participating in
IMF-supported arrangements are less likely to experience a banking crisis.
Our paper is also related to the research area concerned with the business cycle fluc-
tuation and their sources. Scholars have tried to shed some light on the question of which
source (external vs internal) contributes more to the cyclical fluctuations. For example,
Ahmed and Park (1994) examine the impact of external and country-specific shocks on
output, inflation and trade balance of each of the seven OECD countries. Using VAR
models, Loayza and Raddatz (2007) examine how domestic characteristics influence the
external vulnerability. Kim (2001) finds that US expansionary monetary policy shocks
lead to booms in the non-U.S. G-6 countries. Canova (2005) analyzes whether and how
US shocks are transmitted to eight Latin American countries and he finds that US dis-
turbances explain a large share of the Latin America variability; he also claims that the
monetary channel plays a more important role compared to the trade channel. Georgiadis
(2015) assesses that global spillovers from identified US monetary policy shocks have rel-
evant output effects to the rest of the world and the magnitude of these effects depends
on country characteristics such as the trade integration, financial openness, exchange rate
regime, labor market rigidities, etc.
In a globalized world where shocks and crises are frequent events, evaluating the per-
formance of an important global actor (such as the IMF) in helping countries to protect
themselves against adverse exogenous shocks is a subject of topical interest and relevance.
1.3 Methodology and model specification
In order to study the sensitivity to external shocks for a large number of countries, a
multi-country model is preferred as the contemporaneous and lagged inter-dependencies
among countries are accounted for. In the current analysis, this task is not possible for
different reasons. First of all, the quality and availability of data among the 165 countries
analyzed are highly heterogeneous. Second, many countries in our sample experienced
episodes of hyperinflation, exchange and currency crises and modeling the corresponding
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domestic time series is hardly possible.
1.3.1 Empirical model
Following Canova (2005) we proceed on a bilateral basis, with the fixed (among countries)
external block on one side and one domestic country at a time on the other. The external
block includes 3 US variables (US GDP, US CPI inflation and Federal Reserve Interest rate)
and the world oil price inflation; while the domestic block includes from 2 to 6 variables
(GDP, CPI inflation, Trade, Interest rate, Reserve, Exchange rate) depending on the data
availability. In this way, we simplify a lot the model; yet the correlation between the US
and the domestic country is expected to be unidirectional and any sort of possible feedback
within countries, others than US is excluded from the analysis.
In order to test our hypothesis that participation in IMF arrangements reduces the
external vulnerability we set up a model for the domestic economies, taking as exogenous
the external block shocks.
Therefore we consider a bivariate block VAR model:
 yt
wit
 =
B(L)11 0
Bi(L)21 B
i(L)22
 yt−1
wit−1
+
et
it
 (1.1)
where yt represents the external block of variables and wit represents the domestic
variables of country i, and (et t )’:(0, Σi), Σi ={Σe, Σ}.
Finally, let the model be described in a compact form by the underlying formula:
Yi = BiXi + uit (1.2)
where Yi =
 yt
wit
, Bi =
B(L)11 0
Bi(L)21 B
i(L)22
, Xi =
 yt−1
wit−1
 and the subscript i
denotes the country specific variation of the domestic block.
1.3.2 Identification strategy
To identify the VAR model correctly and allow for meaningful interpretation of the vari-
ance decomposition we need to assign a number of restrictions on the coefficients. The
strategy we adopt is to combine sign restrictions method (for the external block) with the
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Table 1.1: Sign restriction summary. The ‘x‘ indicates that there is no restriction on the
response of a variable to a shock, while ‘+/-‘ indicates positive/negative response
Y pi R oil oil-pi
Non-oil supply side - + x x -
Real demand + + + x x
Monetary policy - - + x x
Oil - + x x +
Cholesky decomposition (for the domestic block). Sign restrictions allows us to disentan-
gle the ’supply’, ’demand’, ’monetary policy’ and ‘oil ‘ shocks and are imposed on the
contemporaneous impact matrix.
Following Barnett et al. (2010) we assume that a real oil price shock decreases the US
GDP, increases inflation and increases real oil price inflation while a negative supply shock
generates an increase in US inflation, decreases US output and leads to a fall in real oil
price inflation. This last effect is caused by the fact that this shock is assumed to push up
the general price inflation more than the increase in the nominal oil price inflation because
the negative supply shock implies a decrease in production capacity which in turn depresses
the demand for energy. We also assume that a demand shock moves output, inflation and
interest rate in the same direction while a restrictive monetary policy leads to a rise in the
interest rate and a decrease in both output and inflation. The domestic block variables are
identified through Cholesky decomposition. Causal ordering of the variables used in this
work as in 1.3, stems from Canova (2005) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). 1

GDPUS(log ∗ 100)
CPIUS(%)
RUS
OilInflation(%)
GDPdomestic(log ∗ 100)
CPIdomestic(%)
Tradedomestic(log(Exp/Imp) ∗ 100)
Rdomestic
Reservedomestic(log)
Exchangedomestic

(1.3)
To obtain the impact matrix we start by calculating the Cholesky decomposition of the
(10x10) Σ matrix. We then take the QR decomposition of a 4x4 random matrix which we
1Although the domestic shocks are not of direct interest in our analysis, the identification of such shocks
is necessary for a meaningful interpretation of the forecast error variance decomposition which is essential
in our study.
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append on Q, a 10x10 identity matrix. Finally, we multiply the modified Q matrix with
the Cholesky decomposition of Σ and we check the sign compliance as in Table 1.1
1.3.3 Model estimation
We estimate the empirical model using Bayesian methods. In particular, we employ Gibbs
sampling to simulate draws from the posterior distribution (Kim and Nelson 1999; Blake
and Mumtaz 2012).
In Bayesian VAR analysis, the choice of the prior may be problematic. We impose
small open economy restrictions which imply that shocks to the domestic economy do
not affect the external variables. For this purpose, an appropriate prior is the Independent
Normal Inverse Wishart prior. This prior involves setting the prior for the VAR coefficients
and the error covariance independently. The independent Normal-Wishart prior allows us
to incorporate these restrictions into the VAR model by imposing a prior mean for all
coefficients equal to zero and the covariance of this prior as a diagonal matrix which takes
value 1 for all elements except for the elements corresponding to B12 = 0 in 1.1. The
elements corresponding to these coefficients are set to a very small number, therefore, the
prior mean of zero is imposed tightly for them.
Following Banbura et al. (2010), for the remaining coefficients we impose a natural
conjugate prior for the parameters via dummy observations:
YD,1 =

diag(γ1σ1...γNσN)
τ
0N×(P−1)×N
...................
diag(σ1....σN )
...................
01×N

; XD,1 =

JP⊗diag(σ1....σN )
τ
0N×NP
........................
01×NP
0NP×1
0N×1
c
 (1.4)
where γ1 to γN denotes the prior mean for the coefficients on the first lag, τ is the
tightness of the prior on the VAR coefficients and c is the tightness of the prior on the
constant terms. The prior means are determined as the OLS estimates of the coefficients
of an AR(1) regression estimated for each endogenous variable using a training sample.
The σi scaling factors are chosen using the standard deviation of the error terms from the
preliminary AR(1) regressions.
The posterior distributions for our VAR parameters as per 1.2 are:
p(Bi | Σi):N(B∗i , Σi ⊗ (X∗′i X∗i )−1) (1.5)
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p(Σi | Bi):IW (S∗i , T ∗i ) (1.6)
B∗i = (X
∗′
i X
∗
i )
−1(X∗
′
i Y
∗
i ) (1.7)
S∗i = (Y
∗
i −X∗i bj)′(Y ∗i −X∗i bj) (1.8)
with Y ∗i = [Yi;YD,1], X
∗
i = [Xi;XD,1] and bj is the draw of the VAR coefficients B
reshaped to be conformable with Xi∗ while Ti∗ is the number of rows of Yi∗.
Given the quarterly frequency of the data, in choosing the lag-length we test the system
for a lag length up to four. The model selection procedure involves the estimation of models
with L= 1,....4 and λ= 0.1,....0.5. We then select the VAR with the highest marginal
likelihood, where L is the number of lags and λ is the parameter governing the overall
prior tightness.
Several countries have more than one IMF arrangement over the course of time. This
phenomena is known in the literature as “recidivism” and path dependency, meaning that
countries with a longer history with the IMF are also more likely to receive programs in
the present (Bird et al. 2004). In order to account for this effect we distinguish between
two regimes, specifically under IMF program and not. We split the data accordingly and
we estimate a model for each regime obtaining two indexes of external exposure. The
difference in regimes is caused in a deterministic way by a known dummy variable equal to
1 if the country is under IMF program in a certain period and 0 otherwise. For countries
that have only one regime the estimation is straightforward. Among the 165 analyzed
countries, 77 have both regimes, 45 have only IMF regime and the remaining 43 have only
the NO-IMF regime (see the appendix for a detailed list of the country-model structure).
The high heterogeneity in data availability and quality, required the adjustment of the
model for each country. Therefore the range of time and the number of variables vary
among countries. We aimed at preserving the baseline model as much as possible; however
where data was poor the number of domestic variables was reduced and the oil shock was
excluded from the external block. The choice of removing the oil variable is justified by
our aim of maintaining the identification of the US supply, demand and monetary policy
shock. Out of 165 countries, 70 countries have the complete model with 4 shocks and 6
domestic variables, while for the rest of countries we employed models with 3 shocks (US
shocks) and 2 to 4 domestic variables, depending on the data quality and availability.
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1.3.4 Index of external exposure
Given the heterogeneity in the model-structure, in order to obtain comparable results across
countries we build the index of external exposure using pieces of variance decomposition
as follows: (1) for each variable, we sum the share of forecast error variance explained by
the external shocks; (2) we average this sum across domestic variables.
To control for the effects of the heterogeneity in the model specification, we conduct
two additional sub-sample analyses. In the first one we restrict the regression exercise to
countries with complete model while in the second one we consider the effect of external
shocks on domestic GDP/IP.
1.3.5 Bilateral VAR vs alternative model specifications
In this section, we discuss two alternative approaches to our baseline model that are suitable
for modeling data-sets with a large number of variables, namely the factor models and the
global VAR (GVAR) model.
Factor models can be interpreted as shrinkage methods where a small number of es-
timated factors effectively summarize large amounts of information about the economy.
The estimated factors can be used together with a standard structural VAR in a Factor
Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model (Bernake et al., 2005; Stock and Watson, 2005;). The
main advantage of using the FAVAR methodology in our application is that more plausible
estimates for the external shocks could be obtained if they were extracted as factors of
the entire data-set. However, we account for this effect in the sensitivity analysis when we
replace the US variables with World variables in the external block.
On the other side, there is a quickly expanding literature on spillovers estimated by
GVAR models. Briefly, GVAR models can be summarized as a two-step approach. In the
first step, small scale country-specific models are estimated conditional on the rest of the
world. In the second step, individual country models are stacked and solved simultaneously
in a unique global VAR model (Chudik and Pesaran, 2014). Nevertheless, there are two
reasons we consider the bilateral VAR a more appropriate choice for our empirical exercise.
First, GVAR models are very useful for modeling the links between countries while taking
into account how the rest of the world behaves but this goes beyond the purpose of our
study. The second reason is that to the best of our knowledge there are no GVAR applica-
tions that accommodate unbalanced panels and trying to provide such an extension could
be technically challenging. This represents an important restriction for our analysis since
many of the countries that are highly indebted with the Fund have poor data availability.
Focusing on limited, balanced data could lead to a loss in relevant information for the
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Table 1.2: Summary of countries by income group
Income group N.
High-income: non-OECD 20
High-income: OECD 32
Low-income 24
Lower middle-income 44
Upper middle-income 45
objective of our paper.
1.4 Data
For this empirical application, we construct an original time series database of quarterly
observations for 165 countries from 1957 to 2014 employing three different sources. For the
external block series, we used the Federal Reserve Economic data while for the domestic
variables we combined Global Financial Data with International Financial Statistics. The
sample period differs across countries depending on data availability and it typically covers
the last 45 years for developed countries, the last 20 years for most of the developing
countries and the last 10 years for few countries with poor data availability.
The observations are divided in two categories, the external block and the domestic
block. The external data contains a measure of the real activity (log of US GDP), US CPI
inflation (%), the Federal Fund Rates (%) and the oil price inflation (%). The domestic
economy dynamics are captured by the log of real activity (GDP or Industrial production
index), CPI inflation (%), a trade measure (log of the exports/imports ratio), interest
rate (%), reserves (log) and exchange rates. Following Canova (2005), all the series are
detrended and seasonally adjusted (except for the interest rates series). The income group
classification of the countries in our sample is presented in Table 1.2.
1.5 Comparative analysis results
In order to conduct the empirical analysis, we estimate the model separately for each of
the 165 countries in the sample. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods, thus
the vulnerability index is constructed using the mean of the distribution of the variance
decomposition.
In Table 1.3 we provide preliminary results for income-based groups. From the World
Bank income classification we obtain 5 categories of countries: High-Income OECD, High
income Non-OECD , Low-income, Lower-middle income and Upper-middle income. The
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Table 1.3: External vulnerability index by country group
Q Country group NO IMF IMF
1 High-Income:OECD 7.81269 11.76528
8 High-Income:OECD 12.66859 8.59872
40 High-Income:OECD 11.61318 8.54161
1 High-Income:non-OECD 8.6763 11.58385
8 High-Income:non-OECD 8.37996 9.68091
40 High-Income:non-OECD 8.20721 8.98475
1 Low -income 9.06413 3.64066
8 Low-income 4.72437 3.66155
40 Low-income 4.66688 3.47926
1 Lower middle-income 7.08792 5.3954
8 Lower middle-income 10.23458 6.12104
40 Lower middle-income 9.62306 5.62749
1 Upper middle-income 9.50927 7.35017
8 Upper middle-income 13.32759 9.95218
40 Upper middle-income 12.44774 9.64606
advanced OECD countries have a smaller mean for the IMF group, except for the first
quarter while in the non-OECD group the opposite effect is observed. One possible ex-
planation for this higher macroeconomic vulnerability for advanced Non-OECD countries
while under IMF loan could be the self-selection issue as countries recur to IMF programs
when they already face economic difficulties. This effect is enhanced in the case of advanced
economies which are, in general, less likely to ask for IMF loans, except for situations of se-
vere economic conditions. Focusing on the Low-income group, the IMF results are slightly
smaller for all time-horizons, but the values in both groups are much below the average.
One would expect low-income countries to display higher vulnerability. However, the ex-
posure to external shocks depends, among other things, on the country‘s openness, trade
intensity and financial development. Hence, a low-income country less integrated into the
global financial markets will be less exposed to the external shocks (Georgiadis 2015). Re-
garding the middle-income countries (upper and lower), the sensitivity to external shocks
is smaller for the group under IMF arrangement. The difference goes from 2% in the first
quarter and stays around 3-4 % in the medium and long-run horizons. It is interesting
to see that for the upper-middle income group the values are systematically greater than
for the lower middle-income one. This effect may be explained by the higher financial
integration (of the upper-income group) which is associated with stronger spillover effects
(Edwards 2007a).
In Figure 1.1, we report the single country results. For countries that have both regimes,
IMF and NO IMF the average of the two indexes of vulnerability is reported. The IMF
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intensity index accounts for the weight of each regime.. In order to keep track of the impact
of IMF programs on the vulnerability to external shocks, in the first map, Figure 1.1 plots
the intensity of participation in IMF‘s lending programs (average over time). Since the
range of time differs across countries, hence this map should not be considered as a general
distribution of the IMF loans over time, but related to this specific exercise. The second
and the third map present the vulnerability to external shocks after 1 and 8 quarters. The
results for 40 quarters ahead are not reported for ease of exposition; however similar to the
findings related to Quarter 8. The magnitude of the results is indicated in the legend. From
the first map, we learn that African countries, Turkey, Pakistan and some East European
countries are the most indebted with the Fund, followed by Latin America, China, Russia,
and India, while almost all the developed countries have small or null participation in the
IMF arrangements.
It is easy to visualize the negative relation between the IMF intensity and the vul-
nerability to external shocks by noticing the inverse relation of the color intensity in the
first two maps. Some of the most affected countries by shocks to US economy and crude
oil price are Canada, Russia, the Baltic countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and
Oman. The results are in line with our expectations since these countries are the major
oil exporters while the US is one of the most important oil importers. Therefore, shocks to
US economy and to the oil price affect these countries through both the price and the level
of the oil export. For Canada, the geographic proximity to the US also plays an important
role. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Canada have null participation in IMF pro-
grams while Russia and Afghanistan present a large exposure but medium participation
into the Fund‘s programs. The African countries have a high rate of IMF participation
and a very small sensitivity to the external shocks. The low external sensitivity might be
linked to the fact that low-income countries are less integrated into the global market thus
less exposed to exogenous shocks. Regarding the Latin America countries, a medium-high
participation in IMF programs corresponds to a medium-high exposure to shocks. Consid-
ering the geographical proximity and the tight links of these countries to the US, without
IMF presence we might have observed a much higher external vulnerability.
From the second and the third map we can say something more about the contempo-
raneous and medium term impact of the external shocks. There is a consistent increase
in the magnitude of the spillovers effects when we move from short to medium term as
external shocks need time to propagate in the domestic countries. Apart for the value
increment, there are small differences regarding the African and Latin America countries,
while Canada and China have completely absorbed the shocks after 8 quarters. The op-
posite effect is observed for India and South Africa who experienced a small effect of the
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Figure 1.1: Vulnerability to external shocks and participation into IMF programs
17
shocks on impact but they are much more affected in the medium term.
The results of the BVAR model estimation confirm our hypothesis that on average
countries under IMF program show a smaller external vulnerability.
1.6 Correlation vs. causation in the IMF program participa-
tion
The analysis conducted in the previous section leads to the conclusion that a smaller
sensitivity to external shocks is observed for countries under fund-supported programs.
Not much can be said about the direction of causality of the previous results. In order
to refine our conclusions and shed some light on the effects of the IMF programs on the
external vulnerability, in this section, we consider a cross-sectional regression approach in
the spirit of Loayza and Raddatz (2007), Bianchi and Civelli (2014) and Georgiadis (2015).
1.6.1 Empirical model
We estimate the following model:
vhi = α+ β1Xi + β2IMFi + εi (1.9)
where vhi is the index of external exposure for country i, over the forecasting horizon
h which can take the values of 1, 8 and 40. For countries that have both regimes, with and
without the program, we use the average across regimes of the vulnerability indexes. The
weight of each regime is captured by the intensity of IMF participation. The variables on
the right hand side of 1.9 are averages over time for the sample for which data is available
for each individual country. Specifically, Xi is a vector of control variables considered to
be determinants of the external vulnerability (Loayza and Raddatz, 2007, Briguglio et al.
2009, Georgiadis 2015) and includes GDP per capita, FDI (% of GDP), trade (% of GDP)
and Chinn-Ito index (KOPEN) of financial openness. Data on Chinn-Ito index comes
from web.pdx.edu, while all the other variables are taken from World Bank official site.
To capture the IMF participation we propose two different specifications. In the first one,
IMF is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the country i has ever been under IMF
program and 0 otherwise. In the second specification, IMF is a measure of the intensity
of participation in Fund‘s supported arrangements and is calculated as the percentage of
time spent under IMF program in the sample available for each country; it can take values
from 0 (no IMF program at all) to 1 (under IMF program for the entire time horizon
considered). We are left with 161 observations for each of the 5 time horizons considered.
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1.6.2 IV identification scheme
In order to assess whether participation in IMF loans decreases the vulnerability to external
shocks of member countries, we have to sort out the direction of causality. The presence of
the Fund in a country is more likely during periods of turmoil which can be associated with
higher vulnerability to non-domestic developments; thus the OLS model can be biased due
to potential endogeneity of IMF programs. Therefore in addition to the linear regression
model we estimate also an IV model.
In the spirit of Barro and Lee (2005) we instrument IMF participation with the size
of a country‘s quota at the IMF. The quota is the basis for determining voting power
and also matters directly for the amount of lending available to a member. The quota is
currently calculated as a weighted average of variables such as GDP, openness, international
reserves and macroeconomic variability measured as volatility of current receipts and net
capital flows to an economy. We argue that within the Fund, members are divided in two
main categories, debtors and creditors. The advanced countries hold around 50% of the
quotas and are the creditors, with almost no use of IMF‘s resources since 1978. Therefore,
higher quota should imply a higher probability of being in the category of the creditors
and consequently a smaller participation in IMF arrangements. Moreover, small (often
underrepresented) countries are more likely to receive access to IMF resources because the
amount of resources involved is less costly for the membership and less likely to lead to
crowding out of access to funds. As such, we expect our instrument to be relevant with a
negative sign in the first stage regression 2.
There could be a question on the exogeneity of the IMF quota instrument as it ap-
plies to external exposure instead of GDP growth rates. One could argue that advanced
economies get higher quotas, are less likely to participate in IMF programs but they are
also more interconnected and hence more sensitive to US shocks compared to the less
developed countries. As mentioned in Georgiadis (2015) the impact of higher trade inte-
gration on spillover effects is ambiguous while financial integration can be associated with
higher probability of contagion. However, developed countries have also stronger macroe-
conomic determinants therefore a higher ability to filter the external shocks; this later
type of endogeneity would bias results against the negative impact of IMF interventions
on external exposure. Moreover the preliminary results presented in section 5 show that
2Barro and Lee (2005) employ the size of the IMF quota as an instrument for IMF participation
suggesting a positive impact of the IMF quota on the probability of receiving the loan but they present
a completely different scenario. First of all, they use a panel data hence they account for the evolution
over time of the participation into the Fund‘s programs. Second, they model the participation in an IMF
program as a joint decision between a member country and the IMF, hence, they control for the economic
difficulties experienced by countries that determine the need of the loan, such as banking crises, currency
crises, etc. They finally claim that if a loan is needed, a higher IMF quota implies a higher bargaining
power , hence a greater probability of receiving the loan.
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both developed and developing countries are exposed to external shocks, therefore there
is no clear relation between the level of development of a country and its vulnerability
to shocks captured by our index. Additionally the quotas do not necessarily capture the
economic relevance of members in a clear and objective way. The initial quotas of the
original members were determined at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and they
are quite persistent over time; although quotas are revised in general terms every 5 years,
there are still IMF members with unusually high or low current quotas relative to their
economic size. For example, Barro and Lee (2005) find that the most over-weighted quotas
are United Kingdom, France, Russia, Venezuela while the most under-weighted ones are
China and South Korea. Finally, we are not aware of any evidence supporting a direct
linkage between IMF quota and the external exposure of a country.
1.6.3 Results
Table 1.4 presents the results of the linear regression model for the two different measures
of the participation into IMF programs, namely IMF and IMFintensity. The dependent
variable is the log of the external vulnerability index, for each of the three forecast horizons.
We recall that IMF is a dummy taking value 1 if the country has ever had an IMF loan
and 0 otherwise while IMFintensity captures the amount of time spent under an IMF
program in the range of time considered for each member. Except for the first quarter,
the IMF dummy variable is always negative and significant at 95% level suggesting that
countries that had at least 1 IMF loan are less sensitive to external shocks. In the second
specification, the IMFintensity coefficient is negative and significant all the time at 99%
level for all horizons. Hence, a longer period under IMF programs corresponds to a smaller
sensitivity to non-domestic shocks.
These results support the idea that the IMF arrangements act as a shield against
non-domestic shocks. In line with the previous literature, in the control group, the most
important variables are the index of financial integration (KOPEN), positive and signifi-
cant and the trade intensity (Trade) which is negative and significant. Giorgiadis (2015)
points out that trade integration is a crucial determinant of the business cycle synchroniza-
tion and spillovers, but it could also dampen the effects of exogenous shocks by rendering
current account reversals in response to adverse US monetary policy shocks less probable,
or it could mitigate the effects on growth once the current account reversal took place.
Moreover, if the expenditure effect associated with a rise in exports to the US in response
to the appreciation of the US currency, prevails on the expenditure-reducing effect caused
by an increase in the global interest rate, more integrated economies in global trade should
be less sensitive to spillover effects. Financial integration (here captured by the financial
openness) is associated in the literature with more sudden stops and current account re-
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Table 1.4: OLS regression results
(Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMF 0.0829 -0.337** -0.323**
(0.106) (0.165) (0.161)
KOpen 0.00453*** 0.00223 0.00230
(0.00105) (0.00171) (0.00167)
logGDP 0.0424 -0.0213 -0.0279
(0.0458) (0.0652) (0.0621)
logTrade -0.184*** -0.0834 -0.0812
(0.0426) (0.0622) (0.0601)
logFDI 0.0507 0.0140 0.0340
(0.0441) (0.0734) (0.0695)
Constant -2.774*** -2.279*** -2.405***
(0.344) (0.508) (0.489)
Observations 161 161 161
R-squared 0.179 0.061 0.064
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMFintensity -0.258** -0.551*** -0.558***
(0.123) (0.186) (0.180)
KOpen 0.00316*** 0.00165 0.00164
(0.000960) (0.00172) (0.00169)
logGDP 0.0436 -0.00545 -0.0123
(0.0428) (0.0644) (0.0607)
logTrade -0.168*** -0.0604 -0.0576
(0.0428) (0.0643) (0.0619)
logFDI 0.0783* 0.0290 0.0507
(0.0422) (0.0747) (0.0702)
Constant -2.668*** -2.424*** -2.539***
(0.339) (0.502) (0.481)
Observations 161 161 161
R-squared 0.199 0.089 0.096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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versals (Edwards 2007a; Calvo et al. 2008). The negative consequences are more severe in
financially integrated and open economies, hence financial integration may be associated
with greater contagion effects as reflected in our results (Edwards 2004, 2007a). Regarding
the control variables, only two of them are significant and just for the first quarter, showing
that these variables affect the ability of a country to avoid and filter the exogenous shocks,
but not the capacity to recover once the adverse effects occurred, while the IMF intensity
has a negative and significant impact in all horizons.
Nevertheless, the previous results do not account for the bias due to potential endo-
geneity of the IMF programs. In Table 1.5 we present the results of the IV regression where
IMF participation variable is instrumented by the size of the IMF quota. In the first stage
regression the IMF quota is always significant at 95% for the IMF dummy specification
and at 99% for the IMF intensity specification; hence the relevance of the instrument is
verified. Following, the IV regression results reinforce our hypothesis that IMF arrange-
ments enhance the capacity of members to protect themselves against external shocks.
The sign of the coefficients is mainly unchanged. IMF and IMFintensity are significant at
95% and respectively 99% level and as expected, we gain a lot in the magnitude of the
point estimates. If in the linear regression model, a 1% increase in the IMF participation
decreases the sensitivity to external shocks by approx. 0.3% for the first specification of the
IMF participation variable and respectively 0.5% for the second one, in the IV regression,
a 1% increase in the IMF participation intensity reduces the external exposure by 3% and
respectively 2.5%.
1.6.4 Robustness to the model heterogeneity
Due to the heterogeneity in data availability and quality, we estimated different country-
specific VAR models and this approach might raise the question whether the external
exposure indexes are comparable across countries. In order to address this issue we conduct
two different checks reported in Table 1.6.
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Table 1.5: IV regression results
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMF Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMF -1.279* -3.361** -3.321**
(0.716) (1.692) (1.688)
KOpen -0.00420*** -0.00166 -0.0115 -0.0113
(0.000779) (0.00380) (0.00872) (0.00871)
logFDI 0.0617 0.167* 0.272 0.290
(0.0442) (0.0988) (0.242) (0.237)
logTrade 0.0163 -0.155** -0.0197 -0.0179
(0.0373) (0.0636) (0.123) (0.120)
logGDP -0.0325 0.00756 -0.0986 -0.105
(0.0300) (0.0608) (0.125) (0.124)
IMFquota -0.0678**
(0.0299)
Constant 0.876*** -1.792*** -0.0981 -0.243
(0.280) (0.653) (1.436) (1.438)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R-squared 0.215
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMFintensity Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMFintensity -0.968*** -2.542*** -2.512***
(0.373) (0.878) (0.875)
KOpen -0.00338*** 0.000445 -0.00598 -0.00585
(0.000712) (0.00199) (0.00433) (0.00432)
logFDI 0.0481 0.135** 0.187 0.206
(0.0411) (0.0643) (0.155) (0.148)
logTrade 0.0481 -0.130** 0.0480 0.0489
(0.0314) (0.0521) (0.0996) (0.0965)
logGDP 0.00390 0.0529 0.0206 0.0132
(0.0327) (0.0458) (0.0971) (0.0931)
IMFquota -0.0897***
(0.0246)
Constant 0.382 -2.542*** -2.070*** -2.191***
(0.241) (0.383) (0.705) (0.684)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R-squared 0.224 0.021
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: IV results. Model heterogeneity
Real activity vulnerability
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMFintensity Real activity (log) Real activity (log) Real activity (log)
IMFintensity -0.676 -1.224* -1.217*
(0.558) (0.740) (0.698)
KOpen -0.0045*** 0.00141 -0.00237 -0.00239
(0.00126) (0.00415) (0.00558) (0.00536)
logFDI -0.0042 0.0701 0.0185 0.0803
(0.04009) (0.0692) (0.127) (0.107)
logTrade 0.0609 0.0158 0.0462 0.0493
(0.0406) (0.0824) (0.101) (0.0897)
logGDP 0.03111 0.169* 0.149 0.110
(0.0245) (0.0875) (0.109) (0.0984)
IMFquota (log) -0.1044***
(0.0245)
Constant 0.1542 -3.331*** -2.527*** -2.732***
(0.2285) (0.450) (0.610) (0.548)
Observations 101 101 101
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Complete model
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMFIntensity Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMFIntensity -0.0932 -1.213* -1.237*
(0.327) (0.700) (0.690)
KOpen -0.00446*** 0.00315 -0.00235 -0.00235
(0.000551) (0.00236) (0.00531) (0.00526)
logFDI -0.00418 0.0856* 0.0492 0.0895
(0.0175) (0.0438) (0.108) (0.104)
logTrade 0.0609*** -0.0666 0.0458 0.0505
(0.0177) (0.0447) (0.0913) (0.0869)
logGDP 0.0311** 0.0220 0.124 0.107
(0.0147) (0.0505) (0.102) (0.0965)
IMFquota (log) -0.104***
(0.0107)
Constant 0.154 -2.793*** -2.622*** -2.773***
(0.0997) (0.238) (0.545) (0.525)
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.278 0.120
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the first exercise we restrict the cross section regression to a sub-sample of countries
that contain GDP/IP in their model and we calculate the index of external exposure as
the share of the variance decomposition of domestic GDP/IP explained by non-domestic
shocks. The sample includes 101 observations out of which 70 have the complete 4x6 model
(4 external shocks and 6 domestic variables), 19 have 3x4 models and the rest have 3x3 or
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3x2 models. Mainly, IMFintensity is still negative and significant at 90% level3.
In the second check we reduce the sample to a set of economies for which the model
specification is sufficiently homogeneous, i.e. we consider only the individuals with 4x6
and 3x4 models. The sub-sample contains 101 observations with 70 complete models and
31 with 3x4 models. IMF intensity is always negative and significant in the medium and
long run horizon.
To sum up, the main conclusion of this analysis is that a higher participation rate in
IMF programs significantly decreases the sensitivity to external shocks. The magnitude of
the estimates increases when the endogeneity of IMF intervention is addressed. Finally,
the results are robust to the heterogeneity in model specification.
1.7 Summary
IMF has been a relevant actor in shaping the global economy since the end of the World
War II and its role and objectives evolved together with the global system. Nowadays,
one of the Fund‘s primary purposes consists in “advising member countries on economic
and financial policies that promote stability, reduce vulnerability to crises, and encourage
sustained growth and high living standards”4. However, very little empirical literature
analyzed the efficiency of the Fund in helping countries to reduce their vulnerability to
external shocks. Trying to fill part of this gap, we address this explicit, although less often
studied goal of the IMF programs.
We proposed a bilateral BVAR model considering a sample of 165 countries with a
varying range of time among countries due to the data availability and quality. We built
a measure of external exposure with pieces of variance decomposition, focusing on the
average effect of external shocks on domestic variables.
The BVAR results showed that countries under Fund-supported loans have a smaller
sensitivity to external shocks compared to countries without IMF program.
We then ran a cross section analysis to test the effect of participation in IMF programs
on the external exposure. We controlled for the potential endogeneity instrumenting the
IMF participation with the size of IMF quota. We found that IMF participation signifi-
cantly decreases the external vulnerability of member countries. A number of robustness
checks reinforced our results.
Although several studies claim that IMF interventions tend to have adverse economic
consequences, this analysis showed that the Fund is efficient in helping member countries
to smooth the adjustment to non-domestic shocks.
3See the appendix for OLS results of this exercise
4www.imf.org
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Chapter 2
Connectedness and spillovers in
recession and boom.
2.1 Introduction 1
Enhanced correlation of GDP growth rates across countries during the global financial crisis
has spurred renewed interest of policymakers and academics in the international business
cycle and cross-country co-movements in economic activity. The literature supports the
evidence of commonality in macroeconomic fluctuations across countries, particularly for
advanced economies (Kose et al., 2003; Canova et al., 2007; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2013;
Antonakakis et al., 2016), with two main explanations put forward. The first one focuses
on the role of global common shocks that hit different countries simultaneously while the
second is based on the observation that specific shocks that originate in one country spill
over to foreign economies via trade and financial linkages.
The changing behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates in good and bad times is a fur-
ther issue that has attracted the attention of scholars. In particular, the theoretical liter-
ature supports the idea that the business cycle is asymmetric, with recessions and expan-
sions characterized by swings of different magnitude (see Neftci, 1984; Morley and Piger,
2012;Vavra 2013; Bloom, 2014). Other studies instead focused on analyzing the changes
in the effects of monetary and fiscal policy during recessions and booms (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2011; Mumtaz and Surico, 2015; Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016). Within
this, an emerging strand provides theoretical background to the increased cross-country
co-movement in recessions (see Perri and Quadrini, 2017; Dedola and Lombardo, 2012).
Despite these findings, there is little empirical evidence on why and the extent to
which state dependency of international synchronisation manifest itself in practice. This is
1This chapter has been published as Miescu, M.S., 2018. Together in bad times? Connectedness and
spillovers in recession and boom. The Manchester School.
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in part due to the fact that most of the existing empirical research is based on linear models
which, by construction, do not account for state dependency of the parameters. As such,
the main objective of this study is to provide evidence on the asymmetry of synchronization
in economic activity in developed countries across different phases of the business cycle.
To this end, we calculate an index of global economic connectedness for seven advanced
economies, in line with what proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) (hereafter DY index)
and gauge its behaviour in a regime switching framework.
In addition to this, recent studies have also heightened the importance of financial
shocks and their impact on real activity (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012; Jermann and
Quadrini, 2012; Gertler and Karadi, 2011) while other researchers investigated the reasons
behind international co-movements in inflation (see Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010; Mumtaz
et al., 2011; Mumtaz and Surico, 2012). As emphasized in Cotter et al. (2017) disregarding
the linkages between the real, financial and nominal sides of the economy would provide
an incomplete picture of the structure of spillovers and consequently of the co-movement
in economic activity. In particular, negative conditions in financial markets can have clear
adverse effects on the real side of the economy through a reduction in the willingness of
financial firms to provide credit causing a tightening in the financial conditions which in
turn reduces corporate investment (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Similarly, macroeco-
nomic adverse conditions can affect financial markets by increasing corporate defaults or
suppressing firms’ equity values. Regarding the interdependence in nominal and real vari-
ables, Mumtaz et al. (2011) jointly identify global factors in inflation and output and find
that the world factor is more important in explaining the nominal dynamics than the real
ones while Wang and Wen (2007) suggest that cross-country correlations in inflation are
higher than cross-country correlations in output. On the theoretical side, Henriksen et al.
(2009) have proposed a theory of international comovement in nominal variables based on
technology spillovers. However, up to now the literature has not examined the asymmetry
of the connectedness in financial and nominal variables across business cycle phases neither
their interactions with the real side of the economy. Trying to fill this gap, in an extension
of the baseline model, we adopt a mixed-variables approach in the spirit of Greenwood et
al., 2015. Therefore, we draw further conclusions on the connectedness in financial and
inflation variables and their interactions with the real side of the economy.
Our regime-switching model suggests that global connectedness is substantial and state-
dependent, displaying significantly higher values in times of economic depression relative
to upturns. This holds true particularly in the case of real variables such as industrial
production. In contrast, while financial and inflation swings also tend to be highly syn-
chronised across countries, they exhibit little variation with the business cycle. Instead,
27
connectedness of inflation fluctuates over the forecasting horizon, displaying higher values
in the long run and in boom periods; this finding is in line with the long-run objectives of
the monetary policy which are better achieved in normal times when the central bankers
do not have to undertake policies aimed at counteracting recessionary gaps. From a the-
oretical view, one potential explanation for our results comes from Perri and Quadrini
(2017) who show that a global liquidity shortage caused by credit shocks can generate
co-movement in real and financial variables across countries.
Our setting also allows us to (partly) analyse the drivers of cross-country co-movements
in macroeconomic indicators. We find that shocks to financial variables tend to explain a
large fraction of the connectedness observed in IP across advanced economies especially in
times of recession. Finally, we obtain insightful country results. For example, we find that
while Europe is more sensitive to spillovers from US and Japan, the opposite does not seem
to hold true. In addition, a counterfactual simulation performed against real economic data
shows that connectedness might have had a very important role in driving country specific
economic fluctuations over the past. In a counterfactual world where shocks to US are
switched off, IP growth of the remaining countries is more than 4% higher in recessions
and 2-3% smaller in booms. Another message delivered by the counterfactual exercise is
that accounting for the asymmetry across business cycle phases provides more accurate
estimates of the impact of increased connectedness on IP variables.
There are several advantages of using a regime switching model relative to the rolling
window approach often encountered in the DY connectedness literature. First of all, the
regime switching setting explicitly models the state-dependency of the parameters while
the rolling window technique captures the time variation in the parameters; as such the
two methodologies provide different perspectives of the same phenomena. Second, the
non-linear model allows for the endogenous switch in regimes, making it suitable for the
analysis of the sign asymmetry of shocks while the linear framework implies symmetric ef-
fects of positive and negative shocks. Third, in the regime switching framework the periods
of booms and busts are estimated within the model instead of being exogenously deter-
mined as it is the case in the rolling window scenario. Finally, although the rolling window
approach has the advantage of being simple, it requires the choice of the window length
which can affect the accuracy of the results if parameters are sensitive to the window‘s
width; in change this choice is not required in the regime switching model. Neverthe-
less the non-linear framework comes at the cost of capturing only static state-dependent
connectedness.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is threefold. First, by using a Threshold
VAR model (hereafter TVAR) we account for the regime-dependency of macroeconomic
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connectedness of seven industrialized countries. Second, allowing for an endogenous switch
in regimes, we capture the sign asymmetry of shocks and we show that negative innovations
increase connectedness more than the positive ones. Finally, the Bayesian methodology
employed in our empirical exercise is particularly attractive for estimating high-dimensional
models. As such, we extend the benchmark model featuring IP as real activity variable
to also include financial and nominal ones. With this extension we go beyond previous
findings in the literature as we investigate the composition of the global connectedness
index and its variation over the business cycle.
Given the large cross-country macroeconomic and financial linkages, knowing the ex-
tent to which cross-country connectedness is state-dependent and understanding better
its sources and composition is not only relevant from an academic perspective but it also
has important policy implications. Our results indicate that at times of economic down-
turn synchronization across countries increases significantly; thus more policy coordination
might be necessary to better deal with such events. Additionally, our findings suggest that
the nature of shocks (real or financial) matters to a large degree, and a better understand-
ing of its relative implications could help policymakers to tailor their measures to account
for the size, composition and behaviour of co-movement in economic activity. This would
represent an important input for these policy instruments aimed at offsetting the impact
of foreign shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss in depth
the DY connectedness index. In sections 3 and 4 we present the methodology and the data
used in the empirical exercise. In section 5 we illustrate our results and in section 6 we
examine additional robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. We relegate to the appendix
further details of the TVAR and Smooth Transition VAR models estimation and various
directional and sensitivity analysis results.
2.2 DY connectedness index
Although connectedness represents a key concept in the understanding and measuring of
risk, it is rather poorly measured (mainly through correlation-based measures) and incom-
pletely defined. Building on Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), in this paragraph we introduce
the DY index, a measure of connectedness grounded in modern network theory, linked also
to the systemic risk literature.
DY approach consists in measuring the connectedness across different units using shares
of forecast error variation due to shocks arising elsewhere. This definition is closely related
to the econometric notion of variance decomposition which is a prominent tool in interpret-
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Table 2.1: Connectedness table
x1 x2 · · · xN From Others
x1 d11 d12 d1N
∑
d1j , j 6= 1
x2 d21 d22 d2N
∑
d2j ,j6= 2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
xN dN1 dN2 · · · dNN
∑
dNj ,j6= N
To Others
∑
di1, i6= 1
∑
di2,i6= 2 · · ·
∑
diN , i 6= N 1/N
∑N
i,j=1dij ,i 6= j
ing estimated linear or non-linear VAR models and it indicates how much of the forecast
error variance of each variables in the model can be explained by shocks to other vari-
ables. Specifically, the H-step forecast error variance dHi,j is the fraction of the i‘s H-step
ahead forecast variance due to shocks in variable j. The full set of variance decompositions
produces the connectedness table.
In Table 2.1, the N x N upper-left block contains a full variance decomposition matrix.
In addition, the rightmost column contains row sums, the bottom row contains the column
sums while the bottom-right element contains the grand average, in all cases for i 6= j.
For example, d21 indicates how much of the forecast error variance of variable x2 is
explained by shocks in variable x1. In the “To Others” row,
∑
di1, i6= 1 shows how much
of the variation in variables other than x1 is explained by shocks in x1, while in the “From
Others” column,
∑
d1j , j6= 1 shows how much of the variation in x1 is explained by shocks
occurring elsewhere. These values are defined as total directional connectedness from and
to others. If we consider the difference between To and From others for a certain variable
xi, we get the Net directional connectedness which identifies whether the variable xi is a
shock “transmitter” or a shock ”recipient”. Finally, the global connectedness is given by the
grand total of the off-diagonal entries in the variance decomposition matrix and gives a
measure for the system-wide connectedness.
The methodology developed by DY is particularly appealing in the context of our anal-
ysis as it allows us to analyse how shocks in one country impact on other countries, both at
pairwise and aggregate level. In the case of a standard linear VAR, the model estimation
produces one connectedness table in the static analysis, or a time varying connectedness in-
dex if a rolling window approach is used. Alternatively, with the threshold model we obtain
a variance decomposition matrix for each regime. As such, the main novelty introduced
by our approach consists in estimating a state-dependent connectedness index.
2.3 Non-linear VAR models
Here we describe the econometric models used in the empirical exercise and the identifica-
tion strategy.
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2.3.1 Empirical models
Our analysis tests the hypothesis that there is a shift in the behaviour of macroeconomic
variables across different phases of the business cycle. This makes using a constant param-
eter model an unsuitable option. One way to deal with the variation of parameters across
expansions and recessions is by the mean of a “regime-switching” model, such as the TVAR
or Smooth Transition VAR (hereafter STVAR). These models allow for different values of
the parameters in each of a fixed number of regimes which is usually not observed by the
econometrician.
TVAR model
Following Alessandri and Mumtaz (2017) in this section we introduce the TVAR model
defined as:
Yt =
c1 + P∑
j=1
B1,jYt−j + Ω
1/2
1 et
 1E(S)t+
c2 + P∑
j=1
B2,jYt−j + Ω
1/2
2 et
 (1−1E(S)) (2.1)
for j=1..N and the change in regime is described through the indicator function 1E(S)
of the event S as follows:
1E(S) =

0 ⇐⇒ Zt−d ≤ Z∗
1 ⇐⇒ Zt−d > Z∗
(2.2)
Yt={IP(US), IP(Japan), IP(UK), IP(Germany), IP(France), IP(Italy), IP(Spain)} is
the T ×N matrix of endogenous variables. We allow for regime-dependent heteroschedas-
ticity captured by Ω1 and Ω2. Given the monthly frequency of data we choose a lag length
p of 13. We have two additional specifications in which we combine IP with Stock Price
Index (hereafter SPI) and IP with PPI. The model accommodates for two regimes deter-
mined by the level of the threshold variable Zt−d relative to an unobserved threshold level
Z∗. In our analysis the threshold variable is assumed to be the dth lag of the weighted
average of IP growth while the delay d is unknown. Since the IP weights as a share of
global IP are available from 1991 only while our sample starts in 1962, in constructing
the threshold variable we propose two specifications (see Table 2.2). In the first one the
weights reflect the relative GDP share in the world GDP which are available for the time
period under analysis; in the second specification we use the country IP weights since 1991.
The weights are normalized to sum to 1 in both specifications.
The threshold variable is assumed to cause the switch across regimes in an abrupt way
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and this might be considered a tight restriction. As an alternative we also examine a
Smooth Transition VAR which allows for a gradual transition between the high and low IP
growth regimes. The regimes identified by this specification are recessions and expansions.
The high number of the parameters to be estimated favors the choice of Bayesian meth-
ods for the estimation strategy. In the spirit of Banbura et al. (2010) and Sims and Zha
(1998), we impose a natural conjugate prior for the parameters via dummy observations:
YD,1 =

diag(γ1σ1...γNσN)
τ
0N×(P−1)×N
...................
diag(σ1....σN )
...................
01×N

; XD,1 =

JP⊗diag(σ1....σN )
τ
0N×NP
........................
01×NP
0NP×1
0N×1
c
 (2.3)
where γ1 to γN denotes the prior mean for the coefficients on the first lag, τ is the
tightness of the prior on the VAR coefficients and c is the tightness of the prior on the
constant terms. The prior means are determined as the OLS estimates of the coefficients
of an AR(1) regression estimated for each endogenous variable using a training sample.
The σi scaling factors are chosen using the standard deviation of the error terms from
the preliminary AR(1) regressions. As is standard in the literature, we set the overall
tightness parameter τ to 0.1 (see Alessandri and Mumtaz, 2017; Robertson and Tallman,
1999). Finally the prior on the constant is imposed to 1. Additionally we introduce a prior
on the sum of the lagged dependent variables by adding the following dummy observations:
YD,2 =
diag(γ1µ1....γNµN )
λ
; XD,2 =
(
(11×P )⊗diag(γ1µ1....γNµN )
λ 0N×1
)
(2.4)
where µi denotes the sample means of the endogenous variables calculated using the
training sample. As in Banbura et al. (2010) the tightness on the sum of coefficients is set
to λ = 10τ . Given the natural conjugate prior the posterior distribution takes the form:
p(Bi | Σi, Yt, Z∗):N(vec(B∗i ), Σi ⊗ (X∗′i X∗i )−1) (2.5)
p(Σi | Bi, Yt, Z∗):IW (S∗i , T ∗i ) (2.6)
where
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Table 2.2: Threshold variable weights
Country\Variable GDP weights IP weights
US 0.51 0.41
Japan 0.15 0.22
Germany 0.10 0.13
UK 0.07 0.07
France 0.07 0.05
Italy 0.06 0.07
Spain 0.04 0.05
B∗i = (X
∗′
i X
∗
i )
−1(X∗
′
i Y
∗
i ) (2.7)
S∗i = (Y
∗
i −X∗i bj)′(Y ∗i −X∗i bj)
for i=1,2 denoting the two regimes ; Y∗=[Y t; Y D,1;Y D,2], X∗ =[Xt; XD,1; XD,2] where
Xt = (1, Y
′
t−1, ..., Y ′t−j)’ is the K×1 vector of regressors, with K = (N × j + 1), , Bi =
vec ([c;B1;B2; ..Bj ]) , bj is the draw of the VAR coefficients Bi reshaped to be conformable
with X∗i while T
∗
i is the number of rows of Y
∗
i . We impose a normal prior for Z
∗∼ N(0, 10).
Considering the scale of the threshold variable used in our paper, this represents a quite
loose prior. We assume a flat prior for the delay parameter d but we limit its values
between 1 and 12.
To simulate the posterior distribution of the unknown parameters we employ Chen
and Lee (1995) Gibbs sampler with a Metropolis - Hastings step (see Algorithm 1 in the
Appendix for details). Finally, we validate the choice of the empirical model in a model
comparison analysis and a convergence diagnostic test. Results are reported in Table S3
and respectively Figure S17.
STVAR
The advantage of the TVAR models consist in their ability to capture changes in both
volatility of the parameters and the strength of the shock propagation mechanism across
different states of the economy. However, the TVAR imposes quite tight restrictions on
the relation between the threshold variable and transition across regimes. Specifically, the
threshold variable is assumed to cause the switch across regimes in a deterministic way.
Therefore, an alternative to the TVAR model is represented by the STVAR as follows:
Yt =
c1 + P∑
j=1
B1,jYt−j
+
c2 + P∑
j=1
B2,jYt−j
pit + εt (2.8)
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εt∼N(0,Ω)
The Transition function Π is defined as
pit = [1 + exp(−λ× (Zt−d − Z∗)]−1 (2.9)
where λ > 0 is the smoothness parameter, Z is the threshold variable defined as in 2.2
and Z∗ is the unobserved threshold level.
The STVAR is very similar to the TVAR model but it allows for gradual transition
between the two different regimes as determined by the transition function pi(λ,Zt−d,Z∗).
The regime is determined by the level of the threshold variable Zt−d in the transition
function pi with the delay d, relative to the unknown threshold level Z∗.
For estimation aims, the STVAR model can be rewritten as:
Yt = B1Xt + [B2Xt]pit + εt (2.10)
where Xt = (1, Y ′t−1, ..., Y ′t−j)’ is the K×1 vector of regressors, with K=(Nj + 1) ; Bi
=[ci, Ai,1, ..., Ai,j ] is the N×K matrix of coefficients and i=1,2 are the regimes.
In order to draw the state-dependent parameters we use the following formulas:
Y1t = B1Xt + εt (2.11)
Y2t = B2Xtpi + εt (2.12)
where Y1t= Yt-[B2Xt]pi and Y2t= Yt-[B1Xt];
The algorithm used to estimate the STVAR model, the priors and initial values are
similar to the TVAR model. We have the additional prior for the smoothness parameter
λ∼gamma (25,0.2) and the MH step now consists in drawing two parameters, respectively
the threshold level Z∗ and the smoothness parameter λ (see Algorithm 2 for details)2 .
Results of the STVAR model are discussed in the sensitivity analysis section. Specifically,
Figure S4 reports the difference in the global connectedness across regimes, while FigureS5
, Figure S6 and Figure S7 describe the results for each of the three model specifications.
2This prior for λ insures that the regimes identified by the STVAR are consistent with the TVAR model.
The Gamma distribution is consistent with the requirement of λ being positive.
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2.3.2 Generalized identification
Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) show how the introduction of non-linearity in the model
can cause the intrinsic linear properties of shocks and history dependence to be lost. Hence,
traditional impulse response functions, which are neither shock (when suitably scaled) nor
history-dependent are inappropriate in a non-linear framework such as ours; the General-
ized Impulse Response Functions (hereafter GIRF) should be used instead. Specifically,
these responses are defined as follows:
GIRFSt = E(Yt+k | Ψt, Y St−1, µ)− E(Yt+k | Ψt, Y St−1) (2.13)
where Ψt denotes all the parameters and hyper-parameters of the model, k is the
forecasting horizon under consideration, S= 0,1 denotes the regime and µ is the shock.
Equation 2.13 characterizes the GIRF as the difference between two conditional expecta-
tions, one in which we condition on the shock µ (the first term of 2.13), and the other term
in which we assume the shock to be equal to zero. The estimation of the conditional ex-
pectations in 2.13 requires Monte Carlo simulations across a number of replications which
in the current analysis is set to 35. Therefore, for each draw the impulse responses for each
regime are calculated as the difference between the average across replications of the two
conditional expectations. We define the shock as:
µsj = Σsvj/
√
Σs,jj (2.14)
where s identifies the regime (low or high output growth), j is the endogenous variable
on which we apply the shock while vj is a 1 × N selection vector with its jth element
equal to unity and zeros elsewhere. Unlike the orthogonalized impulse response functions
obtained with Cholesky decomposition, the GIRF are unique and are not affected by the
reordering of the variables which is an appealing characteristic for our application.3
Another advantage of the GIRF is that they allow for endogenous switch of the regime.
In particular, a big positive shock occurring in recession, through its impact on the thresh-
old variable can determine the switch to expansion, while the opposite effect can be ob-
served for big negative shocks happening in expansions. Therefore the generalized identifi-
cation is well suited to analyze the sign asymmetry, i.e. the different impact that positive
and negative shocks have on the DY index. However, it is worth mentioning that the
endogenous switch in regime depends not only on the size of the shock but also on the
threshold variable Z. For example, when the economy is in a very deep recession, a cer-
3The Generalized variance decomposition is preferred in most of the DY index applications for its
invariance to the ordering of variables.
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Table 2.3: Global Financial Data symbols
Country/Variable IP SPI PPI
US USINDPROM SPXD WPUSAM
Japan NDJPNM TOPXD WPJPNM
UK NDGBRM FTASD WPGBRM
Germany NDDEUM GDAXIPD WPDEUM
France NDFRAMN CACTD WPFRAM
Italy NDITAM BCIID WPITAM
Spain NDESPM SMSID WPESPM
tain sized positive shock would not push the economy to expansion; in change when the
recession is shallow, the same shock would push the economy into the expansion state.
In the generalized framework the shocks are not necessarily orthogonal. As such, in
order to validate our results we run a robustness analysis in which we append the Cholesky
decomposition to the GIRF in 2.13. The results are qualitatively similar. Global connect-
edness is always higher in recessions. As expected, the directional connectedness is slightly
smaller in magnitude, but consistent with the benchmark results.4 Figure S8 describes the
difference in the global connectedness across regimes with this alternative choice of the
shock identification, while Figure S9, Figure S10 and Figure S11 present the correspondent
results for each of the three model specifications employed in the baseline analysis. We
relegate to the appendix for further details.
2.4 Data
In this paper we investigate the behaviour of the connectedness index illustrated above
in seven advanced economies: USA, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and
Spain5. For each country, we use monthly data from February 1963 to January 2015 for
seasonally adjusted Industrial production (IP), Stock Price Indexes (SPI) and Producer
Price Index (PPI). The IP index comprises the categories of mining, manufacturing, elec-
tricity, gas and steam and water; waste management. Similarly the producer Price Index
covers the prices of the characteristic products of agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining,
quarrying manufacturing and electricity, gas and water supply. All variables are considered
in year on year log growth rates and are taken from Global Financial Data database. Table
2.3 reports the Global Financial Data symbols for each variable.
4The GIRF are equivalent to a Cholesky strategy in which the shocked variable is always ordered first.
In such a framework the standard recursive strategy is a lower bound of the generalized identification.
5Initially we focused on G7 countries. Because of the high correlation between industrial production
index in USA and Canada we replaced Canada with Spain.
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Figure 2.1: Global recessions. The lines represent the monthly IP growth series for each
country in the sample. The gray bands identify periods of global recessions estimated by
the TVAR model.
2.5 Results
In this section we describe our main results. We start with the benchmark model which
features country IP growth rates as endogenous variables. Further to this, in two extensions
of the baseline model, we add financial and nominal variables to the benchmark model.
The main finding of this analysis is that global connectedness is state-dependent with
significantly higher values during recessions. This result is robust across all three different
model specifications.
2.5.1 Benchmark model
In the benchmark specification we estimate the TVAR model using IP for the seven coun-
tries in the sample as endogenous variables. In this setting, the connectedness index is
calculated from two sets of Generalized IRF, one for each regime. The shocks are generic
growth surprises, hence we refrain from interpreting the transmission mechanism. We use
the variance decomposition obtained with the draws saved after the burn-in period to
calculate the connectedness index in each regime6.
6The difference of the two indexes (recession less boom) is treated as a random variable in the Gibbs
sampling algorithm. We plot its median over the forecast horizon together with the 68% credibility bands
(see Figure S3) and we asses the statistical significance of the results. The choice of the credibility bands
follows Sims and Zha (1999). More recent references regarding the inference in VAR models include
Inoue and Kilian (2013) and Inoue and Kilian (2016). In the first one the authors suggest a novel way
of calculating error bands in a sign identified model estimated with Bayesian methods and the empirical
exercise reports 68% high probability bands. In contrast, Inoue and Kilian (2016) take a frequentist
perspective and propose to construct confidence sets for structural impulse response functions based on
inverting a Wald test statistics. They report both 68% and 95% significance level since this confidence levels
correspond to one and two-standard pointwise error bands under normality. However, in an additional
check we show that our results hold also with 95 and 99% high probability bands (see Figure S18).
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Before showing the results we describe the features of the regimes identified by the
TVAR model described by equations 2.1-2.2 . The regimes are introduced in Figure 2.1.
The gray area represents the median estimate of 1 - St which is equal to 1 when the
threshold variable Zt is below the estimated threshold level (see 2.2). Since the threshold
variable is constructed as a weighted mean of the IP growth in the seven countries under
analysis, we refer to this regime as the “global recession” regime. The global economy
enters in recession during the two oil crises, the early 1990s recession, the dot-com bubble
and the 2008 global financial crises.
Next, we present the values of the connectedness index in good and bad times while
considering shocks of different size and sign. In Figure 2.2, each bar represents the me-
dian of the connectedness index under different shock specifications. The index is higher
in recessions and it captures a substantial share of the total variance of the model. Ex-
ternal shocks explain from 40% to 50% of the forecast error variance decomposition in
downturns and from 30% to 40% in expansions. These results are in line with part of
the previous findings claiming that due to globalisation, business cycle has become more
synchronized with co-movements in economic activity found to be higher in periods of
contraction (Canova at al., 2007; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2013; Klößner Sekkel, 2014). From
a theoretical perspective, our findings are also consistent with Perri and Quadrini (2017)
who employ a two-country model with occasionally binding financial constraints and show
that with endogenous credit shocks a global liquidity shortage induced by pessimistic self-
fulfilling expectations can lead to sharp and syncronized contractions in both real and
financial variables across countries. They also suggest that with higher financial integra-
tion the crises are less frequent but when they occur they have bigger effects and generate
high co-movement across economies. In contrast, Stock and Watson (2005) claim that the
co-movement in the macroeconomic aggregates dropped during the globalization era while
Doyle and Faust (2005) find no evidence of increased synchronization in output growth-rate
correlation for the G-7 countries.
However, our analysis goes beyond earlier findings as we also analyze the sign asymme-
try of shocks. In this application, the size and sign of shocks matter through their impact
on the threshold variable. Hence for small shocks of 1 SD (1st to 4th bar) results are
unchanged across different sign specifications of shocks. Figure 2.2 (5th to 12th bar) shows
that the sign of big shocks is also relevant for the connectednes; if large positive shocks
decrease the connectedness, large negative shocks have the opposite effects, especially if
they hit economies in booms. Therefore, big negative shocks drag countries into recession
and this explains the higher connectedness generated by big negative shocks.
So far we have presented results regarding total connectedness; however, directional
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Figure 2.2: Industrial production connectedness index in recessions and expansions. Shocks
of different size and sign are considered.
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Figure 2.3: Directional results in recession and boom over 1 year forecasting horizon
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results bring some very interesting insights as well. In Figure 2.3 we present three sub-
indexes of connectedness, including “Connectedness To Others” or “Give”, “Connectedness
From Others” or “Receive” and “Net connectedness” or “Net”.
As expected, the US is the most important source of country connectedness with the
highest value of “Give” index, followed by Japan. European countries in contrast are
net shock recipients independently of the state of the economy. These findings are in
agreement with Monfort et al. (2003) who claim that Europe has become more sensible
to shocks originating in North-America, while US remains insulated from developments in
Europe. The negative values of “Net connectedness “ index for European countries might
be explained also by the regional connectedness on top of US spillovers; shocks occurring
in Europe might not affect much the US or Japan, but they all have an impact on the other
European countries. Even if Germany has been the biggest economy and manufacturing
39
force of Europe, it is also the major shock recipient among the analysed countries. In
line with Diebold and Yilmaz (2013), these results point to an important role of the trade
channel in the shock transmission7.
Among European countries, Spain is the main transmitter of business cycle shocks.
Analogous findings are provided by Antonakakis et al. (2016). The conclusions are quali-
tatively similar across business cycle phases, but we obtain higher values for the directional
indexes in recessions. Regarding the sign asymmetry, negative shocks originating in the US
have higher spillover effects than positive ones, especially if they occur in good times. In
the long run the differences in directional connectedness across the states of the economy
are negligible (see Figure S13).
In a robustness analysis we have replaced IP indexes with quarterly GDP. The results
reported in Figure S12 reinforce the findings obtained in the baseline specification.
2.5.2 Financial and inflation connectedness
Up to now the paper has provided evidence of higher connectedness of real variables in
recessions compared to booms. However existing empirical literature attributes an in-
creasingly important role to financial spillovers and several studies suggest that real and
financial variables have become more and more interconnected. For example, Chauvet et
al. (2015) are concerned with the interactions between financial and real variables and
show that financial sector has a significant effect on real economy. Cotter et al., (2017)
employ the DY index and analyse the spillovers between real and financial sides of US
economy. They find that financial markets are net shock transmitters to the real variables.
On the other side, several studies have examined the international co-movement of infla-
tion documenting the fact that movements in inflation rates across advanced economies is
highly synchronized (Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010; Mumtaz et al. 2011; Mumtaz and Surico,
2012; Henriksen, et al., 2013).
So far though, the empirical literature has not investigated the asymmetry of the con-
nectedness in financial and nominal variables across business cycle phases, neither their
state-dependent interactions with the real side of the economy. Trying to fill this gap, in
this section we propose two additional specifications. Building on Cotter et al. (2017)
and Park and Shin (2017), in the first model we mix financial and real variables while in
the second one inflation and IP variables are combined8. Therefore the final model is a
7Germany is the most important exporter of manufacturing goods to France, UK and Italy and second
or third to US and Japan and it makes sense for Germany to have a higher connectedness from others.
8Incorporating different types of variables in the baseline model has two main advantages. First, it
allows for the identification of global recessions and booms, which requires the IP variables. Second, the
mix-variables approach facilitates the analysis of real-financial and real-inflation spillovers in addition to
the connectedness of financial and inflation variables across business cycle phases.
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multi-country multi-variable model featuring 14 endogenous variables.
From a practical perspective, in order to ease the interpretation of the results we rely
on Greenwood et al., (2015) and Park and Shin (2017) and we introduce an intermediate
level of aggregation based on the type of variable. The aggregation scheme is described in
the Appendix S4. The financial variables used in this exercise are the annual log growth
rates of the Stock Price Index for each country, while inflation is calculated as the year on
year log growth rate in the Producer Price Index.
Figure 2.4 corresponds to the first specification, thus it presents the dynamics of real
and financial connectedness over the phases of the business cycle. A clear benefit of the
mixed-variables specification is that it allows for the analysis of the composition of the
global connectedness index. Specifically, the global index is obtained as the sum of 4 sub-
indexes, namely RR, RF, FR, FF, in which RF and FR capture the interactions between
real and financial side of the economy9, while RR and FF show the connectedness in real
and financial variables driven by their own shocks (see Appendix S4 for details). As can be
seen from Figure 2.4, the introduction of financial variables in the model does not alter the
main conclusions obtained in the baseline analysis. Global connectedness is much higher
in recessions than in expansions, with negative shocks having a larger impact compared
to positive ones. However, we find that the level of overall connectedness is around 10%
higher than the one obtained in the benchmark model featuring only real variables. The
results also suggest that shocks to financial variables are very important in explaining
connectedness across countries.
In addition, from the decomposition of the total index in sub-indexes we learn that
real and financial indexes have very different dynamics. Specifically, connectedness among
financial indicators generated by shocks to these variables (FF index) explains the bulk
of total connectedness and is constant across business cycle, time horizon and different
shock specifications. It follows that cross-country connectedness in financial variables is
dominated by its own shocks. In contrast, real shocks have a smaller effect on the con-
nectedness of financial variables. One interpretation for this result is that financial shocks
are the most powerful exogenous impulse in the system. Indeed, financial shocks have
quantitatively large effects on IP connectedness (FR index) with greater values displayed
during recessions and in the case of negative shocks. Thus, during crises shocks hitting the
financial sector are transmitted to the real variables in a virulent way. The connectedness
in real variables generated by its own shocks is relevant but with less variability than ex-
pected. These results are unsurprising since financial markets are generally thought to be
the leading indicators of economic activity (Abbate et al. 2016; Prieto et al. 2016; Cotter
9For example RF capture the financial connectedness generated by generic shocks to real variables.
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Figure 2.4: Financial and IP connectedness. R and B at the bottom of each bar stays for
recession and boom. The RR, RF, FR and FF in the legend indicate the type of variables,
i.e. real and financial.
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Figure 2.5: Inflation and IP connectedness. R and B at the bottom of each bar correspond
to recession and boom.
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et al., 2017).
Figure 2.5 presents the results obtained from the model that combines real and nom-
inal variables. Our findings reinforce the hypothesis of a strong co-movement in inflation
rates. Rogoff (2006) claims that the increased synchronization in nominal variables across
countries could be caused by the fact that global factors drive inflation because global
excess capacity has become progressively more relevant than domestic excess capacity in
forecasting cyclical domestic inflation. In addition, the results suggest that inflation con-
nectedness (purple bars) captures a substantial share of total connectedness, it is higher
than IP connectedness generated by IP shocks (blue bars), and it varies with the state of
the economy, with larger values in booms compared to recessions. A mechanism to explain
the higher synchronization in nominal variables compared to the real ones has been put
forward by Henriksen et al. (2013) and is based on cross-country spillovers from technol-
ogy shocks which are transmitted into nominal variables through an interaction between
Taylor-type rules and domestic nominal bonds; this makes nominal variables depend on
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expected movements in domestic GDP and the return on domestic capital in all future pe-
riods, which are more connected than current GDP because of the cross-country spillovers.
In addition, co-movements in inflation exhibit some differences over the forecasting hori-
zon with greater values in the long run. These results are consistent with the long term
objectives of monetary policy which seem to be better achieved in tranquil times (higher
inflation connectedness in boom). 10 Concerning the indexes capturing the interaction be-
tween nominal and real variables, we notice some differences across business cycle phases
and forecasting horizon, with higher values in recession and in the long run while the
PPI shocks generate more co-movement in IP variables than the other way around (higher
green bars than red bars). In this regard, Mumtaz et al. (2011) suggest that external
developments are the main driver of the countercyclicality of prices after WWII as a result
of increased competition in goods and labor markets as well as of migration. For example
if firms can off-shore activities to economies with lower wages, domestic workers have less
bargaining power in pushing for higher wages when unemployment is low, leading to a
smaller sensitivity of prices to movements in real variables.
2.5.3 Results using IP weights.
The results reported up to now are based on the specification of the threshold variable
based on GDP weights since they are available for the whole sample period. However,
the significant differences in the share of industry in GDP across countries might raise
concerns on the appropriateness of using GDP share weights in defining the threshold
variable. In this section we report results obtained using Global IP share as weighting
since 1991. Figure 2.6 suggests that the previous findings are little affected by the change
in the threshold weights.
2.5.4 Counterfactual analysis
So far this paper has discussed the state-dependent behavior of cross-country connected-
ness and we have shown that countries tend to be more connected in recessions than in
booms. However, not much has been said about the relevance of these results from an
economic point of view. In order to shed some light on this, we conclude this section with
a counterfactual exercise aiming at obtaining a model-based narrative on the role that
synchronisation has played historically. Our results pointed out that shocks originating
from the US are the most important source of connectedness across advanced economies;
as such, in the context of this paper, an interesting counterfactual would be one where
10One of the candidate explanations of international inflation co-movement in the literature is the im-
provement in the effectiveness of monetary policy across several developed countries in the last decades.
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Figure 2.6: Results obtained using IP weights in constructing the threshold variable.
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Figure 2.7: Counterfactual scenario. The figure shows the difference between the IP series gener-
ated by two models under the counterfactual assumption and the actual data. The red lines are the
median obtained from the Threshold VAR model and the brown lines indicate the correspondent
68% confidence bands. The black lines are generated from a linear VAR model. The gray bands
identify the estimated recessions by the Threshold VAR model.
US related shocks are removed. The methodology which we employ to perform this is the
following: for each saved draw of the estimated parameters we reconstruct the structural
shocks using the Cholesky decomposition with the US ordered first11; we then set distur-
bances coming from the US to zero and use these modified shocks to simulate the data
in a counter-factual scenario. The new series can be interpreted as the realization of the
data that would have been observed had the connectedness been decreased by switching
off shocks in the US. As we do not change the values of the parameters, the Lucas’ critique
is not important in this exercise (Benati, 2010).
Results from this exercise are presented in Figure 2.7. The benchmark model (red
line) is compared to a linear VAR (black line). For each model and country (except for
the US) we plot the difference between IP series generated by the two models under the
counterfactual assumptions and the actual data. It can be noticed that recessions are
associated with positive IP values; specifically, if countries were completely immune to
US disturbances, their IP growth in downturn periods would be more than 4% higher.
The opposite effect is observed in expansions when US related shocks bring a positive
11By ordering US first we assume that US IP is the most exogenous variable in the system which in the
current context in is not a very restrictive assumption
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contribution to growth in IP outside the US itself. We have qualitatively similar effects
for the no-threshold model but with a much smaller magnitude (marked by the difference
between the red and the black line). These findings are in line with our expectations given
the higher connectedness in recessions depicted by the threshold model. The linear model
which does not account for state-dependency, underestimates the relevance of US shocks.
Summing up, Figure 2.7 shows that the connectedness is important from an economic point
of view and accounting for its state-dependent behaviour is essential in order to effectively
capture its effects on the real economic activity.
2.6 Robustness analysis
There are several concerns raised by our analysis and we try to address them performing
additional robustness checks. More details on the sensitivity tests discussed in this section
can be found in the appendix to the paper. As a first check, we re-estimate the model
using the Smooth Transition VAR instead of the TVAR and we show that results are
robust to a less restrictive specification of the transition function. Since in the generalized
identification shocks are not necessarily uncorrelated, in order to validate our findings we
replicate the empirical exercise using the Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks.
Results are qualitatively similar with slightly smaller magnitude than in the generalized
framework.
Moreover, the directional results in section 5.1 have shown the centrality of US shocks
as drivers of the global connectedness in both recessions and expansions. However, US
share dominates the threshold variable and this might raise questions on the implications
of the US dominance in the threshold variable on the results showing the importance of
US as a shock transmitter. In order to check whether the US dominance in the threshold
variable has an influence on the directional results we run the following robustness analysis:
we identify the states of the economy solely based on Germany and then we estimate
the directional results and the importance of German shocks to US and US shocks to
Germany. Figure S19 shows that directional results are little affected by this adjustment
in the threshold variable while Table S4 reports a low influence of German shocks on US IP
and a high relevance of US shocks in explaining the forecast error variance decomposition
of the German IP independently of the way the threshold variable is constructed.
Additionally, we check the sensitivity of our estimates to the size of big shocks and to the
prior tightness. Furthermore we re-run the model replacing the real activity and inflation
variables from the baseline specification, i.e IP and PPI, with GDP and respectively with
the Consumer Price Index. All these tests further support the robustness of our conclusions.
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2.7 Summary
We estimated the connectedness in IP for seven advanced economies; using a nonlinear set-
ting we focused on analysing its asymmetry over the business cycle. We then extended our
analysis and we included financial and inflation variables in order to get a deeper under-
standing about the composition of the connectedness index. The methodology employed
consisted in the estimation of a Threshold VAR model via Bayesian methods. The choice
of the econometric model was validated by performing a model selection and a sensitivity
analysis.
Our findings suggest that during recession countries tend to be more connected and
the estimated difference is large and statistically significant. In addition, negative shocks
are found to have higher impact on the connectedness index compared to their positive
counterparts. We also show that financial and inflation shocks are important determi-
nants of global connectedness, and that connectedness indexes for these variables have a
different behaviour compared to the real activity ones. Specifically, both inflation and
financial connectedness are large and less state-dependent than the IP index. Financial
shocks are important drivers of the cross-country connectedness in real variables, especially
during recessions, while the opposite effect is not verified. These results reinforce the idea
that movements in financial markets could lead economic activity. Cross-country inflation
connectedness is higher in the long run, which is consistent with the shared long term
objectives of monetary policy makers. Among the analysed countries, the US and Japan
are the main “shock givers” while European countries tend to be more shock “takers”. A
counterfactual exercise illustrates how relevant connectedness is from an economic point
of view and the necessity to account for its state-dependent behaviour.
Moreover, a better understanding of the cross-country spillovers it is important also
from the policy perspective. That said, the finding that connectedness is asymmetric across
the business cycle suggests that standard linear models might not be appropriate for the
policy analyses of cross-country spillover. Finally, policymakers should learn that not all
spillovers are the same as their relevance depends on the nature and the origin of the shock.
In general, shocks originated in the US matter from a global perspective more than shocks
originating in other regions.
There are several issues that this paper has left unanswered, including for example the
causes of increased connectedness during recession and the main channels of transmission
of shocks across borders. We intend to consider these questions in future work.
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Chapter 3
The contributions of fiscal and
monetary policy since the global
financial crisis.
3.1 Introduction 12
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the design of an effective policy response
became the main priority around the world. Spurred by policy commitments at the 2009
G20 London Summit, central bank and government interventions addressed macroeconomic
instability and slumping demand with substantial policy support including (standard and
non-standard) monetary policies and fiscal stimulus (Figure 3.1). Since then, debate has
raged over the efficacy, efficiency and appropriateness of the response. To name but a few,
the topics have covered the role of the mix between fiscal and monetary policies (Krugman,
2015); the benefits of unconventional monetary policies (Borio and Zabai, 2016); and the
long-term consequences of the policy response (IMF, 2017a).
In recent years, however, priorities have gradually changed. Growth in global activity
has revived over the past two years as the cyclical upswing gathers strength (IMF, 2017b).
Spare capacity across many economies has narrowed substantially and policymakers have
turned their attention towards policy normalisation. Albeit gradually, the ‘long decade’
of policy accommodation is apparently drawing to a close. Yet, as policymakers edge at
different speeds towards the stages of policy withdrawal, it is crucial for them and us to
understand the extent to which the global economy is still dependent on policy support.
1This chapter is coauthored with Ursel Baumann and David Lodge, ECB. The paper is available in the
ECB working papers series as: Baumann, U., Lodge, D. and Miescu, M.S., 2019. Global growth on life
support? The contributions of fiscal and monetary policy since the global financial crisis (No. 2248).
2The content of this chapter should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central
Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
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Figure 3.1: Policy intervention. Stylized facts.
(a) Key policy interest rates (percent)
(b) Cyclically adjusted primary balances (per-
cent of GDP)
Too quick a withdrawal could force the economy into a sharp reversal; too slow could
store up future troubles. This paper aims to understand the role of policies in supporting
activity over the past decade.
Up to now, very little attention has been paid to analysing the differences (or similar-
ities) in the role played by policy support in advanced and emerging economies. This is
an important topic for research and policymakers. The global financial crisis affected ad-
vanced and emerging economies differently and required tailored policy responses. Facing a
severe turmoil in their financial markets many advanced economies confronted a deep and
long-lasting slowdown in activity. Some faced the challenges of operating monetary policy
at the zero lower bound; in subsequent years, others were confronted with market-driven or
politically necessitated fiscal consolidation. By contrast, partly because emerging market
economies rebounded more quickly in the immediate aftermath of the global recession, the
policy response differed (ECB, 2016). A deeper understanding of how policy contributed
across both groups would benefit both policymakers and academics.
This paper aims to contribute to this growing area of research by exploring the het-
erogeneity in policy effects across groups of countries. Using structural panel VARs in
the spirit of Jarocinski (2010) we examine the joint role of fiscal and monetary policies
in shaping global growth since the global financial crisis in both advanced and emerging
economies. As Caldara and Kamps (2008) note, vector autoregressive (VAR) models have
become a key econometric tool to assess the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks.
Our paper is therefore related to the wide literature on the identification of monetary and
fiscal policy shocks, which are well summarized in Ramey (2016).
The contribution of our work to the literature is fourfold. First, we estimate and
compare the effects of policy across a range of advanced and emerging market economies
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(EMEs). We estimate structural panel VARs for a set of large advanced and emerging
economies (US, euro area, UK, Japan, Brazil, China, India and Russia), which together
represent over half of global GDP (at purchasing power parity).
While the literature on the effects of either monetary or fiscal policy in individual
countries is vast (see Ramey, 2016), fewer papers have provided comparisons of policy
transmission across countries. For monetary policy, Jarocinski (2010) compares the re-
sponses of monetary policy shocks in the east and west of Europe, while Mandler et al.
(2016) examine the heterogeneity across countries within the European Monetary Union.
There has been more limited investigation into the effects of monetary policy in EMEs.
Mallik and Sousa (2012) analyze responses in large emerging markets. Perez-Forero (2015)
compares the transmission of monetary policy shocks in Latin America using a hierarchical
panel VAR. On the fiscal side, Burriel et al. (2009) compare the responses of the United
States and euro area to fiscal shocks. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that the output effect of an
increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries.
Second, we look at effects of fiscal and monetary policy in combination. Particularly for
studies using VARs, the literature has tended to examine fiscal and monetary policies in
isolation. The Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Handbook of Macroeconomics
chapter, for example, concentrates on the identification of monetary policy shocks, while
Ramey (2016) devotes separate sub-sections to the topics of fiscal and monetary shock
identification. Other leading types of externally identified monetary policy shocks such
as the Romer and Romer (2004) narrative method, or the high frequency identification of
Gertler and Karadi (2015) also focus narrowly on the question of understanding monetary
policy effects. The picture is similar for fiscal policy: for example, Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) focus only on the role of government spending and tax shocks. In examining the
role of fiscal shocks in the United States, Caldara and Kamps (2008) include interest
rate variables within the VAR specification but report only the economic responses to
government spending and tax shocks under a variety of identification approaches. The
policy response to the global crisis required monetary and fiscal action in an effort to
boost the demand. Separating monetary and fiscal policy overlooks the potential policy
interactions. Our study aims to understand the combined role of both forms of policy.
Third, to discern the effect of fiscal and monetary policy on GDP growth we use
counterfactual scenarios in a structural setting. We compare model forecasts conditioned
on actual policy developments with forecasts conditioned on a counterfactual policy path.
We judge the impact of policy on activity by assessing the difference in projected paths for
GDP growth in the two scenarios across our sample of countries. In effect, we ask: what
would have happened to the economy without the observed policy easing? Kapetanios
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et al. (2012) and Lenza et al. (2010) conduct similar exercises in examining the role of
monetary policy in the UK and the US, euro area and UK respectively. However, both
approaches rely on the reduced-form model to inform the conditional scenarios used. Our
counterfactual exercise takes a different approach by relying on the structural form of the
model, attributing outcomes for policy specifically to the relevant monetary and fiscal
shocks identified in our model. A particular advantage of our approach, in using structural
conditional forecasts, is that it captures the variability in the GDP response to shocks
(through identification of shocks).
Finally, we study the interaction and interdependency of the two branches of macroe-
conomic policy over the past decade. A number of recent papers (Bianchi and Ilut, 2017;
Bianchi and Melosi, 2017; Corsetti et al, 2016; Jarociński and Maćkowiak, 2018) empha-
size the relevance of analyzing the policy mix for economic outcomes. Our contribution
is to use counterfactual scenarios to understand the role of different policies in the recent
period, asking the questions: how might monetary policy have behaved if fiscal policy had
been conducted differently?; and how strong would fiscal support have needed to be, had
monetary policy been less accommodative? In asking these questions we aim to provide
an understanding of the interdependencies of policies and the effect on activity over the
past decade.
In analysing monetary and fiscal transmission across countries, we employ an economet-
ric technique that allows us to analyze countries jointly within panel models. We estimate
separate models for the two groups of advanced and emerging economies and, following
Jarocinski (2010), use Bayesian estimation. The approach employs so-called hierarchical
priors which have the assumption that parameters are drawn from a common mean across
each group, but allow for heterogeneity in the coefficients via the hierarchical prior which
is endogenously determined and governs the degree of heterogeneity across individuals. In
doing so, it makes efficient use of available data. In particular, for EMEs for which time
series are relatively short, this is a considerable advantage. A further benefit is that the
approach can reveal heterogeneity in the propagation mechanism within each group and
also between different policy tools.
Our main results can be summarised thus. Consistent with previous studies we find
that fiscal multipliers are mostly higher in advanced economies compared to EMEs. We
also show that in the last two decades AEs have conducted an active monetary policy
which has tended to offset the effects of expansionary government spending measures. In
contrast we see less strong reaction of monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks in EMEs.
The response of GDP in EMEs to monetary policy shocks is also broadly in line with the
literature, with activity in emerging economies affected somewhat more strongly than in
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advanced economies following a contractionary monetary shock. Moreover, we find that
the GDP response to fiscal shocks is more heterogeneous (between and within groups) than
the response of GDP to monetary policy shocks.
Turning to the conditional scenarios, we find that GDP growth in our sample of coun-
tries benefited from substantial policy support during the global financial crisis but policy
tightened thereafter, particularly as fiscal consolidation in advanced economies acted as a
significant drag on the subsequent global recovery. Since 2016, policies have become more
supportive overall. That is consistent with the observed improvement in global activity
in that period although it also emphasizes that the global recovery has been reliant on
policy support and underscores the need for a gradual and calibrated withdrawal of policy
accommodation. In addition we show that the role of policy has differed across countries.
Specifically, in advanced economies, highly accommodative monetary policy has been coun-
teracted by strong fiscal consolidation since 2011. By contrast, in EMEs, monetary policy
has been less accommodative since the global recession.
Finally, our results emphasise an important interdependence between monetary and
fiscal policies. Counterfactual scenarios undertaken for the United States suggest that
without the fiscal policy reaction, monetary policy would have needed to be significantly
more accommodative during the financial crisis. Thereafter, however fiscal consolidation
has required monetary policy accommodation for longer. Indeed, without the fiscal consol-
idation undertaken after 2011, interest rates could have risen above the zero lower bound
already in 2013. This also implies that without monetary policy support the strong fiscal
consolidation would not have been possible without causing a significant slowdown in US
growth. .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodology and the data.
Section 3 reports the results. Additional robustness checks are conducted in section 4 while
section 5 concludes.
3.2 Methodology and data
This section introduces the empirical model, the data and the identification strategy.
3.2.1 Empirical model and the data
We estimated the following reduced form VAR model for country c:
Ytci =
l∑
p=1
Yt−p,ciβ
p
ci + ZtΦt + utci (3.1)
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utci ∼ N(0,Ωci) (3.2)
where i denotes the group of countries (advanced vs. emerging economies), c= 1,2,...M
is the number of countries in each group and t=1,2,...T is the sample size. For the esti-
mation purpose we rely on a hierarchical panel VAR framework in the spirit of Jarocinski
(2010); a separate model is estimated for each group using Bayesian Methods.
Yc is a T × 5 matrix of endogenous variables for country c and includes a proxy for
government spending, GDP, inflation, tax and a monetary policy instrument. Government
spending measures real government consumption and investment – i.e it excludes the ele-
ments such as transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits) which would depend on the business
cycle; we also exclude interest payments.3 Government revenues are measured as taxes less
transfers and (where possible) interest payments. The monetary policy instrument is the
policy interest rate.4 For the advanced economies we address the additional restrictions
caused by the zero lower bound (ZLB) using a shadow interest rate for the period from
the end of 2008 (Wu and Xia, 2014 and Lemke et al. 2017). One concern that might arise
is that the ZLB regime could imply a change in the model parameters. However, several
studies that analyze the effects of unconventional monetary policy seem to suggest that
model parameters have remained broadly stable despite the introduction of unconventional
measures (Gambacorta et al. 2014; Wu and Xia, 2016; Hachula et al. 2016).
To account for the world developments, we add Zt, a T×5 matrix of exogenous variables
common to all countries containing the VIX index of equity volatility, world GDP, non-oil
commodity prices, oil prices and a constant. It is worth noting that the exogenous variables
in Z enter the model at time t while all the other regressors represented by a T × 5 × l
matrix are lagged values of the endogenous variables Yc. All variables are transformed in
year on year growth rates, with the exception of the monetary policy instrument. The
data we use is at quarterly frequency and runs from 1998 to 2016 for AEs (US, euro area,
Japan and UK) and from 2000 to 2016 for EMEs (China, Brazil, India, Russia). The lag
length l is set to 5 for AEs and 6 for EMEs 5. We relegate to the Appendix a detailed
description of the data.
3For EMEs group, due to the lack of data on government investment we rely on government consumption
to proxy the government spending.
4For the EMEs group, where the conduct of monetary policy has changed over time we add also the
monetary aggregate M2. This helps alleviate the price puzzle. A sensitivity analysis shows that this
adjustment has a rather limited impact on GDP response to policy shocks.
5Both the marginal Likelihood and Deviance Information Criteria (see Table S6) estimated separately
for each country prefer models with a number of lags greater than 4. We adopted 6 lags for EMEs since
it alleviates the price puzzle. For AEs the model with both 5 and 6 lags provides IRFs with correct sign
and similar magnitude but in the model with 6 lags GDP response to monetary policy shock display some
persistence which might have undesired effects on the counterfactual scenario. As such for AEs we prefer
a model with 5 lags. The sensitivity section addresses the robustness of results to the lag length.
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A key feature of this model is that it allows the β coefficients to vary across individual
countries as opposed to the standard pooled estimator which ignores cross section hetero-
geneity. The unit specific coefficients are obtained by imposing a hierarchical structure to
the model. Specifically, it is assumed that the prior distribution for the VAR coefficients
βc is defined as follows:
p(βci | β¯i, λ) ∼ N(β¯i, λΩi) (3.3)
where β¯i are cross sectional average coefficients updated during the sampling procedure.
Ωi is a Minnesota type variance which reflects the scale of the variables and adjusts for the
relative size of coefficient6. The crucial parameter in this setting is λ which controls the
degree of heterogeneity in the model. As λ → ∞ the coefficients collapse to the country
specific VAR values while for λ = 0 the model is equivalent to the pooled estimator. Ideally,
λ should reflect a good balance between individual and pooled estimates. In a standard
Bayesian framework β¯i and λ are calibrated parameters while in the current context they
are treated as random variables and have their own distribution.
In brief, equation 3.3reveals the prior knowledge that country coefficients are assumed
to be drawn from a common distribution centered around the cross sectional mean but
are allowed to deviate from this mean at a higher or lower degree dictated by the value of
the endogenously determined parameter λ which is common across units. Therefore, the
posterior of βc is a weighted average of the country OLS estimates and the prior mean
defined in 3.3.
The hierarchical structure of the model offers two key advantages that are relevant to
our study. First the group specific average impulse response function can be computed
using the mean model coefficients β¯i to obtain the estimates. This allows the comparison
of the GDP response to policy shocks in advanced versus emerging economies as a group.
Moreover, β¯i contains information from the whole panel (and not only one country time-
series) and is updated during the sampling procedure; these features are likely to improve
the estimation precision. In addition, the hierarchical prior tends to shrink the country
specific coefficients towards the common mean leading to a more efficient use of the data
and more precise estimates of the unit specific coefficients.
3.2.2 Priors
Following the approach suggested in Dieppe et al. (2017), standard diffuse priors are
assumed for β¯i and Σci while Ωci is designed in a Minnesota type fashion. Regarding λ, a
6As per Litterman 1986, what matters for the size of a coefficient is the relative size of unexpected
change in the variable.
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traditional choice for the prior distribution is an inverse Gamma distribution with shape
parameter s0/2 and scale v0/2. Jarocinski (2010) and Gelman (2006) show that results
can be sensitive to the choice of the values for s0 and v0. As such, they suggest the use of
a uniform prior with s0 = -1 and v0 = 0 for models where the number of units is greater
than 5; or to make the prior weakly informative by using low values for s0 and v0 (less
than 0.001) which is the strategy adopted in this paper. A sensitivity analysis shows that
results are little affected by the use of a uniform prior for λ instead.
3.2.3 Gibbs sampler
We rely on a Gibbs sampler to draw from the marginal posterior of the parameters. The
algorithm is based on Jarocinski (2010) and Dieppe et al. (2017) and it draws from the
following conditional posterior distributions:
• At iteration i draw β¯i from a multivariate normal distribution:
N(βi−1m , N−1Σib) with:
βim=N−1
∑N
c=1 β
i−1
c
Σib=
(
λi ⊗ Iq
)
Ω where q is the number of coefficients to be estimated for each unit.
• At iteration i, draw λi from an inverse Gamma distribution :
λi∼IG( s¯2 ,
v¯
2 ) with:
s¯=h +s0 where h is the number of coefficients to be estimated for all units.
v¯ = v0 +
∑N
c=1
{(
βi−1c − β¯i
)′ (
Σ−1c
) (
βi−1c − β¯i
)}
Draw Σib=
(
λi ⊗ Iq
)
Ω
• At iteration i, draw βic for each country c from a multivariate normal distribution:
βic ∼ N (M,V ) with:
M =V
[((
Σi−1c
)−1)
yi +
(
Σib
)−1
β¯i
]
V =
[(
Σi−1c
)−1 ⊗X ′iXi + (Σib)−1]−1
• At iteration i, draw Σic for each country c from the inverse Wishart distribution:
Σic ∼ IW (Sc, T ) with:
Sc=
(
Yc −Xcβic
)′ (
Yc −Xcβic
)
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We use 15000 replications as burn in sample and we save 10000 draws for inference,
discarding 99 draws for each one saved draw. 7
3.2.4 Identification strategy
We base our empirical results on the identification of two structural shocks, namely a
government spending shock and a monetary policy shock. The identification strategy
follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Caldara and Kamps (2008) and it relies on the
recursive identification approach which implies timing restrictions on the contemporaneous
impact across variables. The simplicity of this approach is particularly attractive for our
analysis since it is easily applicable to both advanced and emerging countries.
The variables enter the model in the following order: government spending, GDP, infla-
tion, tax and the monetary policy instrument. As such, in line with Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) it is assumed that government spending decisions are not affected contemporane-
ously by domestic business cycle developments8; therefore reduced form innovations to
the first equation coincide with our identified government spending shock. Turning to the
monetary policy shocks, to achieve identification we order the monetary policy instrument
last and we allow for a contemporaneous reaction of the central bank to fluctuations in
the other variables; this choice can be justified on the grounds of a central bank following
a Taylor rule in determining the interest rate. Although we control for developments in
government revenues, we do not aim at identifying a tax shock. If scholars seem to agree
on the exogeneity of the government spending decisions, there is less consensus on whether
the tax variable should be ordered before or after the GDP, making the identification of
such shock problematic in a recursive framework.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Model evaluation
To assess the reliability of the estimated panel model, we first consider the model properties.
The focus is on the response of GDP growth to innovations in both fiscal and monetary
policy variables. We report the fiscal multipliers from both the mean model and the
individual country estimates while for the monetary policy we show the mean model IRFs
in the main text and the country results in the Appendix (Figure S24). The mean model
results allow for the comparison of the IRFs in the two groups of countries, while the single
7The estimation is conducted using a modified version of the BEAR toolbox of Dieppe et al. (2017)
which accomodates for mean model results estimation and convergence diagnostic test using inefficiency
factors.
8We do, however, control for the contemporaneous developments at world level through the exogenous
variables.
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unit estimates tell us something more on the heterogeneity within group of GDP response
to policy shocks.
For government spending we convert the impulse response functions into fiscal multi-
pliers to be able to compare them to the literature. Fiscal multipliers measure the average
change in real GDP from one unit (measured in national currency) increase in government
spending. Specifically, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and we define multipliers as
the ratio of the output response at a particular horizon to the impact effect of the shock on
the government spending. However, different countries reach the peak response at different
horizons, therefore in order to obtain comparable results across countries we consider the
average GDP response over the first three years. Since data is in growth rates, we first
convert the growth rates impulse responses to log-levels IRFs; we then calculate multipli-
ers by multiplying the log-level IRFs by the average ratio of government spending over the
sample period. Table 3.1 reports the fiscal multipliers, averaged over the first three years,
derived from the IRFs.
The mean model results suggest that fiscal multipliers are higher in AEs compared to
EMEs. This finding is consistent with previous studies such as Ilzetzki et al. 2013 and
Kraay, 2012 who suggest that the degree of development is a critical determinant of the
size of the fiscal multiplier. They show that in developing countries, the response of output
to government consumption is often negative on impact and not statistically different from
zero.
Regarding the country specific estimates, the government spending multipliers have
the expected sign, though differing across countries. In the United States, the spending
multiplier is 1.3, in line with findings from the literature. For example, Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) report a US spending multiplier in the range 0.9 and 1.3, while Ramey
(2011a and 2011b) points to a value between 0.6 and 1.2. In Japan, the government
spending multiplier is within the ranges reported by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2014).
The government spending multiplier for the euro area is found to be quite small9. In
comparison, estimates of fiscal multipliers provided by Kilponen et al (2015) derived from
a large number of simulated structural models suggest a spending multiplier in the euro
area close to, but below 1. Turning to the United Kingdom, our spending multiplier is
higher that the findings of Glocker et al (2017) who report an average (two-year cumulative)
government spending multiplier of 0.4, with, however, a significant variation over time.
The literature provides fewer insights on fiscal multipliers in EMEs. The limited em-
pirical literature suggests that fiscal multipliers in EMEs are smaller than in advanced
9The low multiplier for euro area is driven by the initial (counterintuitive) negative response of GDP
to a spending shock.
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Table 3.1: Government spending multipliers in the first three years (average)
US Japan UK EA AEs China Brasil India Russia EMEs
1.3 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
economies and often are not significant or even negative on impact (Ilzetzki et al. 2013,
Kraay, 2012). This finding is confirmed also by our results with the exception of Brazil
where the spending multiplier is 1.2. One potential explanation for this finding is that
Brazil’s economy is relatively closed, which tends to magnify the effectiveness of its fiscal
policy. Finally, for China, it is worth noting that our measures may miss important as-
pects of China’s fiscal policy. In particular, data do not allow us to capture off-balance
sheet spending by local governments which was a very important component of government
spending after the global financial crisis.
Turning to the response of GDP growth to monetary policy shocks, the impulse re-
sponses for monetary policy are also broadly in line with the literature. Figure 3.2 shows
the mean model IRFs for advanced and emerging countries to a 100 basis points increase
in the monetary policy interest rate in each country10. The contractionary measure has
the expected negative effect on GDP growth for all countries. In advanced economies, the
peak impact is reached after around 4 quarters, but the effect exhibits some persistence
in the first three years. In emerging economies, the peak impact is slightly larger than for
advanced economies, but the response is less persistent. Note, however, that our model
may not fully capture monetary policies in all EMEs. For example, during the sample
period China used a combination of quantity and price tools to enact monetary policy.
In particular, the use of window guidance to bolster credit growth following the global
financial crisis, would not be captured.
Contrary to some of the literature for small-scale VARs (see Ramey, 2016), we do not
find evidence of a ‘price puzzle’ for advanced economies, as the response of inflation to a
monetary policy shock is negative (see Figure S22 in the Appendix). Overall, this provides
some comfort that our monetary policy shocks are correctly identified in our VAR. By
contrast, for EMEs, there is evidence of a mild, short-lived price puzzle which sees the
inflation rise temporarily after a contractionary monetary policy shock.
It is worth noting that GDP response to fiscal shocks displays more heterogeneity
(between and within group) compared to the GDP response to monetary policy shocks11.
Regarding the monetary policy finding, our results are in line with Jarocinski (2010) and
Mojon and Peersman (2001) who show that the effects of monetary policy tend to be
10The country specific IRFs for monetary policy are similar to the mean model estimates and are not
reported in the main text for ease of exposition. They are available in the Technical Appendix.
11We refer to heterogeneity of one policy relative to the other since the parameter λ governing the model
heterogeneity is common across units of the same group
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even across groups with substantial structural differences. In contrast, other studies such
as Cecchetti (1999) and Mihov (2001) find asymmetries in monetary transmission among
countries.
On the other side, the variability of fiscal multipliers is not new in the literature. Several
studies suggest that fiscal multipliers depend on the economic conditions or on the specific
sample analyzed. In particular, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) claim that fiscal multipliers depend
on the degree of openness of a country, on the level of debt, the exchange rate regime
and on the level of development. Corsetti et al. (2012) highlight important differences
in the transmission of spending shocks across countries conditional on the exchange rate
regime, the health of public finances and the occurrence of financial crisis. They find
higher multipliers during financial crises and in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes,
while the weakness of public finances is shown to have a negative impact on spending
multipliers. Nickel and Tudyka (2014) focusing on a sample of 17 European countries show
that spending multipliers vary considerably with the debt-to-GDP ratios, and can even
turn negative at higher levels of debt. Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) reveal increasingly
smaller effects of fiscal shocks as the economy is further above its potential (as fiscal
measures tend, in these circumstances, to crowd-out rather than crowd-in the private
sector). Whalen and Reichling (2015) distinguish specific multiplier ranges for when the
economy has an active monetary policy. They point out that: (i) multiplier values are lower
under more active monetary policy, which offsets the effects of the fiscal policy measures,
stabilising the economy; and that (ii) more credible and/or longer lasting measures usually
imply greater effect on output. Coenen et al. (2012) corroborate some of these findings
in a structural model with an accommodative monetary policy. Finally, studies focusing
on non-linearities such as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Mumtaz and Sunder-
Plassmann (2017) report higher multipliers in recession compared to boom.
3.3.2 Conditional forecasts to evaluate the role of policy support
To discern the effect of fiscal and monetary policy on GDP growth, we compare model
forecasts conditioned on actual policy developments with forecasts conditioned on a coun-
terfactual policy path. The exercise consists of construction of conditional forecast for GDP
growth under two counterfactual scenarios: an actual policy scenario and a counterfactual
policy scenario:
1. Under the actual policy scenario we produce a path for GDP conditional on the
actual realizations of policy variables.
2. In the counterfactual policy scenario, the actual values of the policy variables are
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks. Mean model results. Response of
year-on-year GDP growth to a 1pp increase in the monetary policy interest rate
(a) Advanced economies (b) Emerging economies
replaced by their sample averages over the estimation period.
To assess the contributions of policy to economic developments, we then compare the
median outcomes of the two scenarios – i.e. we subtract the conditional path for GDP
growth in the actual policy scenario from the conditional path in the counterfactual policy
scenario.
We first compare the combined impact of fiscal and monetary policies - i.e. we con-
duct a counterfactual policy scenario in both the (shadow) interest rate and government
spending variables are constrained to their sample averages over the estimation period.
We then look at the contributions of fiscal and monetary policies separately. To examine
the contributions of monetary policy, we restrict only the path of the interest rate in the
counterfactual policy scenario. To examine the contribution of fiscal policy, we restrict
only the path of government spending.
The approach is illustrated for the United States in Figure 3.3. The left-hand side chart
shows the actual path of the (shadow) interest rate and the counterfactual policy path (set
to the sample average for the interest rate in the United States). The right-hand side
chart then shows the GDP conditional forecast based of the actual policy rate (blue line)
and the GDP path conditional on counterfactual policy (green line). Both scenarios imply
a deep decline in 2008 and 2009 which reflects the effects of the global factors captured
by the exogenous variables in the VAR. However, gradually differences in the path of
(year-on-year) GDP growth emerge. Those differences (measured in the percentage point
differences of GDP growth) are shown by the gray bars and aim to capture the policy
impact of monetary policy in that period.
Note that we deliberately compare two conditional forecast scenarios – i.e. we compare
the counterfactual policy scenario with another conditional forecast for GDP based on the
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Figure 3.3: United States: Counterfactual scenario for monetary policy
(a) United States: Actual and counterfactual policy
realisation for monetary policy (lines – percent; bars –
percentage point differences)
(b) United States: Actual and counterfactual policy
realisation for GDP growth (year-on-year percentage
changes, lhs; percentage point differences, rhs)
actual realisations of policy variables. Another option would have been to compare the
counterfactual policy scenario with the actual realizations of GDP (i.e. the green line with
the red line in Figure 3.3). But this strategy would have mixed the effects of policy with
other factors that generated fluctuations in real activity over this period. Our method
aims to isolate the policy contributions.
Note also that we employ a structural approach to understanding the contributions of
policy. Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) use a similar approach to analyze
the effects of quantitative easing in the euro area and UK respectively. However, they use
a reduced form approach in which the path of the restricted variable is obtained through
the contribution of all shocks. By contrast, we employ a strategy in which restrictions on
specific structural shocks generate the fixed path of the conditioned variable. For example,
in order to obtain the GDP forecast with the federal fund rate fixed at a predetermined
value, we restrict (only) the monetary policy structural shock in such a way that it generates
the desired fixed path for the monetary instrument (see Doan et al. 1983 and Waggoner
and Zha 1999, Dieppe et al. 2017); no restrictions are placed on the other shocks which
are drawn from their own distribution.12 The main advantage of the structural approach
in conducting the counterfactual analysis is that it captures the heterogeneity (across
countries) of the policy contribution on GDP by taking into account the variability in the
response of GDP to policy shocks as well as in the design of the specific policy measure.
A detailed example of the counterfactual scenario is presented in the appendix.
The estimated overall support from government spending and monetary policy is shown
in Figure 3.4 for the aggregate GDP of the countries in the sample, and at country level
12For example, in case of a recursive identification, an unrestricted shock is drawn from a N(0,1) distri-
bution. See Dieppe et al. 2017 for details.
61
Figure 3.4: Policy contributions to aggregate GDP for eight countries (Percentage point difference
in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual policy scenarios)
Notes: the lines show the differences year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual policy
scenarios (see section 3.2 for explanation). Green line shows the impact of fiscal and monetary policies combined;
red dotted line shows impact of fiscal policy only; blue shows the impact of monetary policy. GDP growth is a
PPP-weighted average of the 8 countries in the sample
in Figure 3.5.13 The results suggest that global activity benefited from substantial policy
support in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as policymakers loosened both fis-
cal and monetary policy to combat the sharp downturn in economic activity. Moreover,
the policy support faded quickly, and by 2011, policy acted as a drag on global activity.
The shift was mostly driven by fiscal policies: while monetary policy remained accom-
modative, particularly in advanced economies, efforts towards consolidation provided a
significant headwind to the global expansion. More recently, macroeconomic policies have
become more supportive for global activity. The drag from fiscal policies consolidation has
gradually lessened, particularly in advanced economies. With monetary policies remaining
highly accommodative in advanced economies and some monetary easing in large EMEs,
the overall contribution of policy to growth has shifted and become less negative.
The extent of policy support has varied strongly across countries and instruments, in
particular after the initial support to the global financial crisis.
Specifically, in advanced economies (Figure 3.6), highly accommodative monetary pol-
icy has been counteracted by strong fiscal consolidation. After the initial support provided
following the Great Recession, the support from fiscal policy in advanced economies faded
quite rapidly, acting as a significant drag on economic activity.
In the United States, federal spending as part of the American Recovery and Investment
Act started to wane, while state and local government spending continued to diminish from
13For ease of exposition we limit our attention to the differences in the medians across the two scenarios.
Figures S30 and S31 in the appendix report the full posteriors for both scenarios for the case of overall
policy contribution.
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Figure 3.5: Policy contributions to GDP growth for advanced and emerging economies
(Percentage point difference in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual
policy scenarios)
(a) Advanced economies (b) Emerging economies
Notes: the lines show the differences year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual policy
scenarios (see section 3.2 for explanation).
Figure 3.6: Policy contributions to GDP growth for advanced economies from monetary and
fiscal policies (Percentage point difference in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and
counterfactual policy scenarios)
(a) Monetary policy (b) Fiscal policy
Notes: the left-hand side chart shows the differences in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and coun-
terfactual policy scenarios in which only the interest rate is restricted in the counterfactual policy scenario. the
right-hand side chart shows the differences in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual
policy scenarios in which only the path of government spending is restricted in the counterfactual policy scenario.
See section 3.2 for explanation.
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Figure 3.7: Policy contributions to GDP growth for emerging market economies from monetary
and fiscal policies (Percentage point difference in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy
and counterfactual policy scenarios)
(a) Monetary policy (b) Fiscal policy
Notes: the left-hand side chart shows the differences in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and coun-
terfactual policy scenarios in which only the interest rate is restricted in the counterfactual policy scenario. The
right-hand side chart shows the differences in year-on-year GDP growth between actual policy and counterfactual
policy scenarios in which only the path of government spending is restricted in the counterfactual policy scenario.
See section 3.2 for explanation.
2011 onwards, reflecting the states’ balanced budget rules. In 2012-13 some fiscal mea-
sures expired (including the Bush income tax cuts for high-income households, the payroll
tax reduction for middle-income households; and the extended unemployment benefits).
More recently, however, policy has provided a more supportive backdrop: the drag from
fiscal consolidation has eased, while monetary policy remained accommodative. In Japan,
fiscal consolidation was delayed by the earthquake in 2011 which necessitated emergency
spending. Monetary policy by the Bank of Japan through its quantitative easing program
has increasingly supported GDP growth over the sample period. In the United Kingdom,
the contribution from monetary policy has been a pillar of growth, but has become more
neutral recently as the Bank of England has started to gradually remove its policy accom-
modation. Meanwhile fiscal policy has also become less of a drag over time after a long
period of austerity. Finally, in the euro area fiscal policy was a major drag on growth. This
can be explained by consolidation needs that arose due to the euro area sovereign debt
crisis. However, the drag from fiscal consolidation has also diminished here. By contrast,
monetary policy in the euro area has supported growth.
On the other side, in EMEs (Figure 3.7), monetary policy has been less accommodative
since the global recession. In China, after the initial policy support during the global
recession monetary policy tightened, with interest rates and reserve requirements remaining
relatively high despite low inflation. Subsequently, as GDP growth slowed during 2014,
lower interest rates and some fiscal support have provided for more supportive policy.
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However, it is likely that our model does not fully capture the role of fiscal policy in China.
IMF (2017c) estimates a significantly larger fiscal deficit than reported by official figures,
suggesting substantially bigger fiscal support. Amongst other EMEs, the experience of
commodity exporting EMEs (Brazil and Russia) has played an important role in shaping
developments. Policy in these countries was broadly supportive for activity until 2014
when sharp terms of trade shocks forced a recalibration of policies. Monetary policy
tightened in both countries to combat currency depreciation and high inflation and inflation
expectations. Fiscal policies were also restrained – by high debt and weak credibility in the
case of Brazil; and by the need to adjust to lower oil revenues in the case of Russia. With
fiscal consolidation remaining a necessity in both countries, policies continue to act as a
headwind to GDP growth, although some monetary easing - as currencies have stabilised
and inflation has fallen - has provided some help.
3.3.3 The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies
The empirical setting used in our analysis is well suited to analyzing the interaction and
interdependencies of monetary and fiscal policies. In this section, we ask two questions: (i)
how might monetary policy (MP) have behaved if fiscal policy (FP) had been conducted
differently? and (ii) how strong would fiscal support have needed to be, had monetary
policy been less accommodative? We illustrate the interactions using the US economy as
an example, being one of the largest economies in our sample. We first assess the role of
fiscal policies in shaping monetary policy since the global financial crisis. Following the
methodology described in section 3.2 we conduct two conditional scenarios. In the first
scenario we restrict shocks to government spending, tax, inflation and GDP to produce a
conditional forecast for interest rates conditioned on the observed paths of GDP, inflation,
tax and government spending. In the second scenario, we restrict the same shocks to obtain
a path for interest rates conditioned on the actual values of GDP, inflation and tax but
keeping government spending at its sample average (Figure 3.8 a). To compensate for the
lack of the fiscal stimulus, the counterfactual paths for policy suggest a sharper reduction in
(shadow) interest rates in the United States. Thereafter, however, fiscal consolidation has
forced continued accommodation from monetary policy. Without the fiscal consolidation
that occurred from 2011 onward, monetary policy would have begun to tighten already in
the United States – indeed, our model suggests that interest rates would have been above
the zero lower bound already in 2013. In other words, the results show how much of the
monetary policy reaction was triggered by the additional effects on output and inflation
generated by the government spending policy.
We next consider the reverse question and ask how fiscal policy might have behaved
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Figure 3.8: Policy interaction scenarios for the United States
(a) Monetary policy (percent) (b) Fiscal policy (year-on-year percentage changes)
Notes: the left-hand side chart shows the actual and counterfactual paths for monetary policy from 2007. The red
line shows the actual (shadow) interest rate path. The blue line shows the conditional forecast for the interest rate,
conditioned on the observed profiles for GDP, inflation and government spending (from 2007 onwards). The green
line shows the conditional forecast for the interest rate, conditioned on the observed profiles for GDP, inflation
(from 2007) and with government spending fixed at the sample average. The right-hand side chart shows the actual
and counterfactual paths for government spending from 2007. The red line shows the actual path of government
spending (in year-on-year percentage changes). The blue line shows the conditional forecast for the government
spending, conditioned on the observed profiles for GDP, inflation and the interest rate (from 2007 onwards). The
green line shows the conditional forecast for government spending, conditioned on the observed profiles for GDP,
inflation (from 2007) and with the interest rate fixed at the sample average.
had monetary policy been different. As before, we conduct two scenarios. In the first
scenario we restrict shocks to GDP, inflation, tax and interest rates to produce a conditional
forecast for government spending conditioned on the observed paths of GDP, inflation, tax
and interest rates (blue lines in Figure 3.8 b). In the second scenario, we restrict the
same shocks to obtain a path for government spending conditioned on the actual values
of GDP, tax and inflation but keeping interest rates at the sample averages (red lines in
Figure 3.8 b). The counterfactual scenarios highlight the role of accommodative monetary
policies in allowing fiscal consolidation in the US after the global recession. In the scenarios
without considerable monetary accommodation (i.e. the red lines), the model suggests that
government spending would have needed to be stronger to support activity.
3.4 Robustness analysis
We perform additional robustness checks aiming to address some of the concerns raised by
our analysis. More details on the sensitivity tests discussed in this section can be found
in the appendix to the paper (Figures S25 - S29). Jarocinski (2010) and Gelman (2006)
show that weekly informative prior for the parameter λ governing the model heterogeneity
can have undesired effects on results, especially for panel with more than 5 units. In order
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to reinforce our results, we re-estimate the model using the uniform prior (with s= -1 and
v=0) instead. Impulse response functions reported in Figure S25 Appendix are almost
unaffected by this change.14
In choosing the lag structure for EMEs, we prefer a model with 6 lags. In addition we
control for the monetary aggregate including M2 before monetary policy instrument. This
model performs better in alleviating the price puzzle. However, for the AEs we adopt a 5
lag structure without M2 and there might be concerns on the validity of the statements
regarding the comparison of policy effects across groups. Moreover, there is not a clear
agreement in the literature on whether M2 should be placed before or after the policy rate.
As such we check the effect of policy shocks on GDP in EMEs in two additional scenarios,
specifically with 5 lags instead of 6 and with M2 ordered last. IRFs of GDP are mildly
affected while price puzzle is a bit more pronounced in both cases. Additionally, since
EMEs have to deal also with the excessive money growth rooted in the government‘s need
to finance itself by seignorage (see Frankel, 2010), we perform a counterfactual check for
EMEs in which monetary policy targets both the interest rate and the monetary aggregate.
Results (see Figure S27) show an increase in the magnitude of the effects of monetary policy
compared to the scenario of only interest rate targeting. We also test the sensitivity of our
results to employing a different shadow rate for AEs in order to account for the ZLB. Figure
S29 shows impulse responses of GDP for advanced economies to a monetary policy shock
using the shadow rate measure proposed by Krippner. Finally, we check the convergence
of the Gibbs sampler reporting the inefficiency factors for the posterior estimates of the
parameters. The convergence diagnostics (Figure S32) are satisfactory with inefficiency
factors values below 5 for all parameters.
3.5 Summary
We used Panel VARs with hierarchical structure to asses and compare the effects of fiscal
and monetary policy to GDP growth in advanced and emerging economies. Our results
suggest that the effects of monetary policy on GDP are similar across the two groups
while the fiscal multipliers are higher in AEs compared to EMEs. We also find that fiscal
policy effects display some within group variation. This effect is not verified in the case of
monetary policy.
We then conducted a counterfactual analysis and we provided evidence that global
GDP growth benefited from substantial policy support during the global financial crisis
but policy tightening thereafter, particularly fiscal consolidation, acted as a significant
14Since the counterfactual scenario is constructed from pieces of IRFs, we are comfortable to assume
that stable IRFs imply stable conditional forecasts.
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drag on the subsequent global recovery. In addition we show that the role of policy has
differed across countries. Specifically, in advanced economies, highly accommodative mon-
etary policy has been counteracted by strong fiscal consolidation. By contrast, in EMEs,
monetary policy has been less accommodative since the global recession.
Finally, our counterfactual scenarios emphasize the important interdependence of fiscal
and monetary policies in shaping each other. The scenarios provide admittedly stark
contrasts but they underscore the interdependence of each branch of macroeconomic policy.
In particular, in United States, we find that fiscal consolidation in the aftermath of the
financial crisis has pushed continued accommodation from monetary policy.
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Chapter 4
Uncertainty shocks in emerging
economies
4.1 Introduction
Following the 2008 global financial crisis an extensive literature focused on the concept
of uncertainty and its role in driving the business cycle. Although there is no consensus
from a theoretical perspective regarding the direction of causality between uncertainty
and business cycle, substantial evidence associates higher uncertainty with recessions and
several explanations have been put forward. If some studies consider uncertainty as a cause
of the business cycle, postulating that higher uncertainty induces precautionary saving of
households or “wait and see” behavior of firms (Bloom, 2009; Basu and Bundick, 2017;
Leduc and Liu, 2017; Bloom et al., 2018), some others propose uncertainty as a consequence
of the lower economic growth assuming that recessions encourage risky behavior or reduce
the information (Bachmann and Moscarini, 2011; Ilut and Saijo, 2016).
The lack of theoretical consensus regarding the direction of causality between uncer-
tainty and business cycle poses important challenges to the empirical studies aimed at
analyzing the role of uncertainty for business cycle. Many of the previous econometric
analyses identify uncertainty shocks using structural VARs with recursive identification
(see, among others, Bloom, 2009; Bachman et al., 2013; Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes
2013; Caggiano et al., 2014; Caggiano et al. 2017; Meinen and Roehe, 2017). However, this
approach has been shown to be inadequate (see Ludvigson et al. 2017) for two reasons.
First, it is not clear whether uncertainty should be placed before or after the real activity
variables. Second, there is no conclusive theoretical reason for ruling out the contempora-
neous co-movement between uncertainty and real activity, which is an implicit assumption
in the recursive structure.
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A recent strand of the literature addresses the “potential endogeneity” of uncertainty
by means of novel identification procedures. Specifically, Mumtaz (2018), Piffer and Pod-
stawski (2017) and Redl (2018) rely on external exogenous instruments to identify uncer-
tainty shocks showing that such shocks can be a source of economic fluctuations. Caldara
et al. (2016) find similar results adoptiong a penalty function approach within a VAR
framework. Carriero et al. (2018) and Angelini et al. (2018) instead exploit the het-
eroskedasticity of macroeconomic variables to relax the timing restrictions embedded in the
Cholesky identification; they show that macroeconomic uncertainty can be considered ex-
ogenous while the financial uncertainty is more an endogenous response to macroeconomic
conditions. In contrast, Ludvigson et al. (2017) mix event constraints with correlation
constraints in a set identified framework to achieve identification for uncertainty shocks.
They claim that macro uncertainty is endogenous while financial markets are a source of
output fluctuations. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2014) propose a common factor approach in a
multi-country setting, placing restrictions on cross-country correlations, and argue that
country-specific volatility shocks play a negligible role in determining the business cycle.
In the light of these contrasting results the endogeneity of uncertainty remains an open
debate.
Another challenge faced by the empirical studies aiming at validating the adverse effects
of uncertainty shocks, is the lack of an objective measure of uncertainty; in fact several
proxies have been employed in the literature. For example, Bloom (2009) proposes the stock
market volatility as a measure for uncertainty, Baker et al. (2016) and Scotti (2016) focus
on news based indicators, Bachmann et al. (2013) rely on business survey data to obtain
uncertainty measures, Villaverde et al. (2011), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013), Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2015), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2018) and Carriero et al. (2017) construct
proxies of uncertainty based on the time-varying volatility of errors. Jurado et al. (2015)
(hereafter, JLN) measure uncertainty as the unforcastable component of large sets of macro
and financial variables, while Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) infer uncertainty by means of
forecast errors.
Although extensive research has been carried out on uncertainty shocks, little is known
about the effects of such shocks in emerging economies. This lack of evidence can be largely
attributed to the limited availability and accuracy of data for these countries.1 However,
the very few attempts made in this direction (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2011; Carriere-
Swallow and Cespedes, 2013; Bhattarai et al., 2018), show that uncertainty shocks have
large and detrimental macroeconomic effects in emerging countries raising the need for a
1Not only the macroeconomic variables in EMEs are available for short samples and they often involve
episodes of high instability, but the uncertainty indicators proposed in the literature are mainly available
for US and few other developed economies.
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deeper understanding of the topic.
This paper explores the impact of uncertainty shocks in EMEs while addressing the
endogeneity concern regarding the relationship between uncertainty and the real activity.
To this purpose, we develop a novel Bayesian framework that combines the panel VAR with
hierarchical structure à la Jarocinski (2010), with the methodology proposed by Caldara
and Herbst (2018) and Rogers et al. (2016) for the estimation of Bayesian proxy SVAR
models2. The model we obtain can be interpreted as a panel proxy VAR with random
coefficients and it offers three key advantages. First, exploiting the cross section dimen-
sion of the data effectively deals with the limitations associated with the short samples.
Second, the proxy extension accommodates the use of an instrumental variable approach
for the shock identification; as such we do not rule out the potential co-movement between
uncertainty and real activity. Finally, the hierarchical structure of the model allows for
cross section heterogeneity which we examine in a regression analysis, to show that part of
the differences across countries in response to uncertainty shocks can be linked to country
characteristics.
The empirical exercise focuses on a group of fifteen EMEs which excludes big emerging
economies aiming to strengthen the exogeneity of the instrument. Following the method-
ology proposed by JLN we construct a global uncertainty indicator, as well as domestic
uncertainty measures for each country in the sample. One advantage of using JLN approach
is that this method captures the predictability of the economy, rather than the volatility,
providing a proxy for uncertainty which is closer (than volatility) to the theoretical no-
tion of economic uncertainty. Another advantage is that using a rich data environment as
advocated by JLN method, reduces the possibility of biases caused by omitting relevant
predictive information.
To identify the domestic uncertainty shock we propose a global to local approach for
identification, in the spirit of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Mumtaz (2018). To
be more specific, we use innovations in global uncertainty as a proxy for domestic un-
certainty shocks. Our identifying assumption is that global uncertainty fluctuations are
uncorrelated with any domestic shock in the model other than the domestic uncertainty
shock. In other words, innovations in the global uncertainty index are not contemporane-
ously affected by domestic shocks occurring in the individual country in the sample3; to
reinforce the instrument exogeneity assumption we deliberately exclude from the sample
2We have recently become aware of Bahaj (2019) who proposes an alternative algorithm to estimate a
proxy VAR with a cross section dimension. The two algorithms have been developed independently and
are different.
3This is similar to ordering the global uncertainty index before the country specific variables in a
recursive framework. Ordering global variables before domestic variables is a fairly standard assumption
for applications related to small open economies.
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big emerging economies and major oil exporters. One concern might arise regarding the
exclusion restriction condition which requires that the only channel through which global
uncertainty innovations affect domestic economies is via their impact on the country un-
certainty index. However, in a VAR setting the exclusion restriction condition is implicitly
validated by the fairly standard assumption that the VAR is well specified4. In order to
support the assumption that the VAR is well specified, we define a model that includes
six endogenous variables with their lags and three global exogenous variables to control
for world developments. Finally, even if the informational sufficiency of the VAR is not
fully believed, the regression coefficients of the GDP residuals on the instrument are close
to zero and non statistically significant for all the countries in the sample which provides
evidence in favor of the exclusion restriction5.
Our identification approach is appealing for two main reasons. First, the proxy SVAR
approach accounts for the potential measurement error in the instrument6; moreover the
shocks we identify can be labeled as domestic uncertainty shocks. The second reason is
related to the quality of our instrument. We rely on fairly standard assumptions to support
the exogeneity of the instrument; furthermore, we show that our instrument is far more
relevant than two other instruments obtained from alternative measures of global uncer-
tainty used in the literature, namely the VIX index of equity volatility and the economic
policy index of Baker et al. (2016).
The main findings of the paper can be summarized thus. We show that uncertainty
shocks, defined as changes in the country specific uncertainty that are exogenous to domes-
tic economic conditions, have significant macroeconomic and financial effects on the EMEs.
Specifically, a one standard deviation uncertainty shock leads, on average, to a persistent
and substantial decline in the level of real GDP of about 1%, sharply decreases the stock
prices with a peak effect of more than 7%, and depreciates the real currency by 0.6%.
The shock generates negative co-movement between GDP and CPI, with an estimated
increase in the price level of around 0.3%; the central bank reaction is ambiguous which is
not surprising, considering the challenges posed by the negative trade-off between inflation
and output. The model detects a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries in the
response to uncertainty shocks which we examine in more detail in a regression analysis.
4A well-specified VAR implies that the VAR residuals are a linear combination of only structural shocks;
as such global uncertainty innovations should affect the reduced form residuals only through their impact
on the local uncertainty structural shock. If this condition does not hold we face an omitted variables issue
and the assumption that the VAR is well specified fails.
5See S7 in the Appendix
6Proxy SVAR models treat the instrument as a partial measure of the structural shock of interest
accounting for potential measurement error in the proxy. A more straightforward alternative is to use the
proxy as a variable in the model in a so-called hybrid VAR; this approach, however, does not account for
the measurement error in the instrument. See Caldara and Herbst, 2018 for a detailed comparison between
hybrid and proxy SVAR approaches.
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From this exercise we learn that countries that are wealthier, more integrated in the global
chains, and with more efficient labor and financial markets are less sensitive to uncertainty
shocks; in contrast, countries with more efficient good markets and a higher trade share
are more affected by uncertainty shocks. Finally, a counterfactual analysis shows that in
the absence of uncertainty shocks, the recessionary effects experienced by EMEs during the
global financial crisis and the European debt crisis would have been substantially lower.
This article makes three important contributions. To begin with, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the effects of domestic macro uncertainty
shocks in emerging economies, while accounting for the potential co-movement between un-
certainty and the real activity. Second, from a methodological point of view we develop
a novel Bayesian algorithm to estimate an extended version of a panel VAR with random
coefficients, which accommodates for the use of proxies for the shock identification. Fi-
nally, from an economic perspective, we propose the use of a global to local approach for
the identification of domestic uncertainty shocks. Compared to the country-to-state level
used in Nakamura ad Steinsson (2014) and Mumtaz (2018), the global-to-country level
approach adopted in this paper implies a potentially less restrictive instrument exogeneity
assumption.
Our paper is related to the large literature that studies the relationship between busi-
ness cycle and uncertainty (see Bloom, 2014 and Ludvigson et al., 2017 for an excellent
review of the literature). In particular, this paper builds on Mumtaz (2018), who uses
variation in country uncertainty to identify state-level uncertainty shocks in US, with two
main departures: first, the methodology we employ is different since we use a proxy SVAR
framework, instead of a single equation IV regression model; second, we are interested in
the effects of uncertainty shocks in a group of EMEs, rather than in the US state level
response to such shocks. World variables have also been used to instrument for local uncer-
tainty by Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2015); however they examine the effect of uncertainty on
structural reforms in a panel framework. We also differ from previous studies analyzing the
effects of uncertainty in EMEs, such as Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) and Bhat-
tarai et al. (2018), in that we account for the potential measurement error in the proxy for
the uncertainty shock; moreover our shock can be labeled as domestic uncertainty shock
rather that global or US uncertainty shock. We share the concerns regarding the appropri-
ateness of the recursive framework for uncertainty shock identification with Cesa-Bianchi
et al. (2014) as well; however we differ in the methodology and scope, since they develop a
common factor model rather than a Panel VAR, and they aim at quantifying the relative
importance of country-specific vs global volatility shocks. From a methodological point of
view, we build on the method of external instruments for SVAR identification introduced
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by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013)7, and on the literature ex-
ploiting the cross section dimension in VAR models (see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013 for a
survey).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
specification and estimation. Section 3 presents the data and the uncertainty measures.
In section 4 we discuss the results obtained from both the VAR model and the regression
analysis. In section 5 we run additional robustness checks while section 6 concludes. We
relegate to the Appendix the detailed description of the data and the algorithm and some
supplementary results.
4.2 Empirical model
In this section we describe the empirical model and we highlight the key points of the prior
distributions and MCMC algorithm; we confine the details to the technical appendix.
4.2.1 The Panel Proxy SVAR with hierarchical structure
We assume that each country can be modeled as an individual VAR and information from
all countries in the sample is then used to perform estimation.
Consider a set of countries c= 1,....,C. For each country we define the following proxy
SVAR:
Ytc = Xtcβc + Ztθ + utc (4.1)
utc = Rcεtc (4.2)
uitc = γicMt + ηitc (4.3)
utc ~ N(0,Σ) are the reduced form residuals for country c, Xtc is the matrix of en-
dogenous variables for country c while Zt is a vector of exogenous variables common to all
countries which enter the VAR equation at time t. For simplicity define Φc = {βc, θ} and
Gc = {Xtc, Zt}.
The reduced form shocks can be related to the underlying structural shocks as per 4.2;
for convenience we call ε1 the structural shock of interest and ε2 the remaining shocks.
The goal is to identify the first column of matrix R for country c.
7A non-exhaustive list of studies using external instruments in SVAR includes Gertler and Karadi
(2015), Carriero et al. (2015), Piffer and Podstawski (2017), Redl (2018), Caldara and Herbst (2018),
Rogers et al. (2016), Mumtaz et al. (2018)
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In a proxy SVAR framework the standard VAR model described by 4.1-4.2 is augmented
by a measurement equation which links the reduced form residuals to the instrument for
the targeted structural shock. Following Rogers et al. (2016) we define the measurement
equation as in 4.3.
ηitc ~ N(0,ω2) are the residuals of the measurement equation, uitc is the ith residual
where i= 1,.....N, represents the number of endogenous variables per country, M is the
instrument for the structural shock ε1.8
From the instrument validity assumptions which require that :
E(ε1M) = α (Relevance condition)
E(ε2M) = 0 (Exogeneity condition)
it can be shown that the instrument identifies R up to a scale and sign. In particular,
the first column of R, assumig a unit shock, can be estimated as follows:
R1c = E(u2tcM)/E(u1cM) (4.4)
Alternative ways of specifying a proxy SVAR model from a Bayesian perspective have
been proposed by Caldara and Herbst (2018), who work with the model expressed in
structural form, and by Drautzburg (2016) who performs inference analogous to inference
in a SUR model transformed to obtained independently normally distributed errors.
The main departure of the model described by 4.1-4.3 from the standard proxy SVAR
approach is that we exploit the cross section dimension of the data and we assume a
hierarchical prior for Φc and γic coefficients as follows:
p
(
Φc | Φ¯, Oc, τ
)
= N
(
Φ¯, τOc
)
(4.5)
p (γ1c | γ¯,Ξc, λ) = N (γ¯,λΞc) (4.6)
where Oc and Ξc are standard Minnesota priors and reflect the scale of the data, Φ¯ and γ¯
are cross sectional average coefficients updated during the sampling procedure. The crucial
parameters in this setting are τ and λ who control the degree of heterogeneity in the model.
As τ and λ → ∞ the coefficients collapse to the country specific VAR values while for τ
and λ = 0 the model is equivalent to the pooled estimator. Ideally, τ and λ should reflect a
good balance between individual and pooled estimates. In a standard Bayesian framework
8Since we do not adopt a recursive identification the order of the variables has no implication for our
object of interest (Impulse response functions).
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Φ¯, γ¯, τ and λ are parameters to be calibrated while in the current context they are treated
as random variables and have their own distribution.
In brief, equations 4.5 and 4.6 reveal that country coefficients are assumed to be drawn
from a common distribution centered around the cross sectional mean but are allowed to
deviate from this mean at a higher or lower degree dictated by the value of the endogenously
determined parameters τ and λ . Therefore, the posterior of Φc and γic are weighted
averages of the country specific OLS estimates and the prior mean defined in 4.5 and 4.6.
The hierarchical structure of the model offers several advantages which are relevant to
our study. First the average impulse response function can be computed using the mean
model coefficients Φ¯ and γ¯ to obtain the estimates. Moreover, Φ¯ and γ¯ contain information
from the whole panel which is likely to improve the estimation precision. In addition,
the hierarchical prior shrinks the country specific coefficients towards the common mean
leading to a more efficient use of the data and more precise estimates of the unit specific
coefficients. Finally, since we model each country as an individual VAR our empirical
framework easily accommodates for (time) unbalanced data.
4.2.2 Prior specification and posterior sampler
Priors
Following Jarocinski (2010) and Dieppe et al. (2017) we assume diffuse priors for Φ¯, γ¯, Σ
and ω2 and Minnesota type priors for Oc while Ξc is an identity matrix. Regarding τ and
λ a common prior choice is an inverse Gamma distribution with shape parameter s0/2 and
scale v0/2. Gelman (2006) shows that results can be sensitive to the choice of the values
for s0 and v0 and suggest the use of a uniform prior with s0 = -1 and v0 = 0 for models
where the number of units is greater than 5 which is the strategy adopted in this paper.
Algorithm
We build on Caldara and Herbst (2018) and Rogers et al. (2016) to draw from the posterior
using a Metropolis Hastings (MH) within Gibbs algorithm.
For ease of exposition we split the parameters Θ in two groups, the VAR parameters
and the IV parameters :
ΘV AR =
{
Φc, Σc, τ, Φ¯,
}
and ΘIV =
{
γ1c, γ¯, λ, ω
2
c , R
}
.
We define the joint likelihood of the VAR data (G) and the instrument data (M):
P (G,M | Θ) = P (G | ΘV AR)P (M | ΘIV ,ΘV AR) (4.7)
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and combining the priors with 4.7 we re-write the posterior as in Rogers et al. (2016):
P (Θ | D) = P (ΘV AR | G)P (ΘIV | ΘV AR, G) (4.8)
where D contains both G and M.
The non closed form conditional posteriors are the Φ and Σ while the rest of the
parameters are standard with a known distribution to draw from.
The algorithm can be summarized thus:
1. Draw P (Φnewc | Θ) and P (Σnewc | Θ,Φnewc ) using an Independence MH step in
which the proposal density for Φ takes the form of the known posterior for
the case of a Panel VAR with hierarchical prior (see Jarocinski, 2010) and the
proposal density for Σ takes the form of the known inverse-Wishart distribution
when classical diffuse prior is assumed. Accept the proposal with probability:
α = min
(
P (Φnewc , Σ
new
c , τ, Φ¯, γ1c, γ¯, λ, ωc)
P (Φoldc , Σ
old
c , τ, Φ¯, γ1c, γ¯, λ, ωc)
× q (Φ
old
c | Φnewc )
(Φnewc | Φoldc )
× q (Σ
old
c | Σnewc )
(Σnewc | Σoldc )
, 1
)
2. Draw γic, ω2c and Ric from known posterior distributions using a Gibbs sampler.
Run Steps (1)-(2) for each country c=1....N
3. Draw Φ¯, γ¯, τ and λ from known posterior distributions using a Gibbs sampler
using the information from all countries.
Please note that the execution of steps (1) and (2) is based on an internal loop which
scrolls across countries. Once completed the internal loop, the parameters specific to the
hierarchical structure are drawn in Step 3 using information from the whole sample of
countries.
We use 35,000 replications and base our inference on the last 15,000 replications saving
one every 5 draws.
A Monte-Carlo experiment which indicates that the proposed algorithm performs well
and some evidence in favor of convergence are presented in the appendix.
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4.3 Data
4.3.1 VAR analysis data
In the empirical exercise we limit our attention to fifteen relatively small EMEs, namely
Argentina (ARG), Chile (CH), Colombia (COL), Croatia (CR), Czech Republic (CZE),
Hungary (HUN), Peru (PE), Philippines (PHI), Poland (POL), Romania (ROM), Singa-
pore (SGP), Slovenia (SLO), South Africa (SAF), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR). We
deliberately exclude from the sample big emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil
and the oil exporter countries; we do so in order to insure the exogeneity of the instru-
ment which requires that economies are small enough to avoid that domestic economic
fluctuations affect the global uncertainty indicator. For each country we construct a VAR
described by equations 4.1-4.3. The matrix of endogenous variables for country c includes
the measure of domestic uncertainty, real GDP, CPI, interest rate (R), real exchange rate
(REER) and a composite stock price index. To account for the world developments which
can potentially affect the business cycle of EMEs, we follow previous studies and we add
Zt, a vector of exogenous variables common to all countries. Zt contains a commodity
price index, the OECD industrial production index as a proxy for world demand, the US
Federal Fund Rate which captures the risk appetite, a constant and a linear trend. The
variables are at quarterly frequency and run from 1997q2 to 2016q4 for nine countries while
the sample span varies for the remaining six EMEs due to constraints arising from data
availability and quality. We highlight that variables enter the model in log levels (apart
from the interest rate which is in levels) and the data is not per-processed before estimation
except for the seasonal adjustment; the uncertainty measures are standardized.
4.3.2 Measuring Uncertainty
We construct measures of uncertainty based on JLN method which captures the deterio-
ration in the agents ability to predict economic outcomes.
In brief, the statistical measure of uncertainty is obtained aggregating over a large
number of estimated uncertainties. Following Ludvigson et al. (2017) we define yCjt ∈Y Ct =
(yC1t ,...yCNCt ) be a variable in category C. Then its h-period ahead uncertainty, U
C
jt (h)
is the volatility of the purely unforcastable component of the future value of the series,
conditional on all information available. Specifically:
UCjt (h) =
√
E
[(
yCjt+h − E
[
yCjt+h | It
])2 | I] (4.9)
where It represents the information available. The time varying forecast error is com-
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puted allowing the prediction error to have time varying volatility; to clean for the predica-
ble component using information from a large dataset, the forecast E
[
yCjt+h | It
]
is taken
from a factor augmented forecasting model. Using a stochastic volatility model, uncer-
tainty is calculated as the conditional expectation of the time varying squared forecast
error. Finally the uncertainty in category C is obtained as the average over the individual
uncertainties of each series in the category.
In order to construct the global uncertainty measure we employ the dataset from Mum-
taz and Musso (2018) which contains quarterly financial and macroeconomic variables from
first quarter of 1960 to the fourth quarter of 2016 for 22 OECD countries. For each country
a number of 20 variables is considered with series ranging from real activity variables, con-
sumer prices, labor market variables, asset prices, interest rates, credit market variables,
money, trade variables and exchange rates. In addition, the data-set includes 20 more
international variables referring to international prices of commodities and some emerging
markets indicators. In total there are 460 time series; the global uncertainty indicator is
obtained as the average across uncertainty measures for each of the 460 series constructed
according to equation 4.9.
Regarding the data used to construct the domestic uncertainty measures the sample
runs from 1996Q1 to 2016Q4; however the sample span and number of series included for
each country varies according to data availability. We complete the data-set prepared for
the VAR analysis with measures of trade (import, export), unemployment, international
liquidity, international reserves and money variables. The domestic uncertainty for each
country is calculated as the average across the 1 period ahead uncertainty measures for
the country specific series.9
Where necessary variables are log differences and seasonal adjusted. A detailed list of
the series used and data sources is available in the Appendix.
4.3.3 Uncertainty estimates
Figure 4.1 reports our estimate of global uncertainty. The measure recorded its highest
peak during the recent financial crisis emphasizing the relevance of the recent recession
for the OECD countries in the sample. The other peaks signaled by this measure coincide
with the fall in the Berlin Wall, the black Wednesday currency crisis, the Asian financial
crisis, the recent Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack and the Greek snap election following the
plummeting of the stock prices at the end of 2014.
In Figure 4.2 we compare our proxy for global uncertainty with alternative measures
9The data-set used to extract the factors for the domestic uncertainties contains all EMEs data aug-
mented by the OECD data from Mumtaz and Musso (2018).
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Figure 4.1: Global Uncertainty Measure
of global uncertainty such as the VIX, the measure proposed by Mumtaz and Theodoridis
(2017) (hereafter M&T) which consists in the common standard deviation of the shocks to
the world factors obtained from a dynamic factor model with time-varying volatility, the
news based index of global economic policy uncertainty of Baker et al.(2016) (hereafter
EPU) and the global geopolitical risk index of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018). Our measure
displays some independent variation compared to the other indices and unsurprisingly it
exhibits the highest correlation of 0.72 with M&T measure (which is also the most similar
conceptually to our measure), followed by VIX and EPU with recorded correlations of
0.64 and 0.45 respectively. There is no correlation (-0.07) between our global uncertainty
index and the geopolitical risk index suggesting that geopolitical events do not necessarily
translate into higher global macroeconomic uncertainty or the other way around. 10
Figure 4.3 shows the estimated country-specific uncertainty measures for the fifteen
EMEs in the sample. It is interesting to note that the domestic uncertainty measure spikes
around the recent global crisis for all countries. Moreover we detect peaks in uncertainty
during events such as:
• recessions: Chile (1999), Czech Republic (1998-2000), Hungary (1998-2000 and 2003),
Slovenia (1997 and 2000), South Africa (and 1997 and 2002), Poland (1998, 2000 and
2004)
• natural disasters: Philippines (typhoons 2011 and 2013), Thailand (tsunami 2004),
Turkey (earthquake 2011)
• crisis: Peru (1999 credit crunch), Philippines (1997 financial crisis), Argentina (2014
10Notice that the geopolitical risk measure is the only one not spiking around the 2009 global financial
crisis.
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Figure 4.2: Alternative measures of Global Uncertainty
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sovereign default)
• political instabilities and elections: Peru (2002 violent protests), Singapore (2015
Parliament dissolved), Thailand (2012 anti-government protests), Poland (2016 anti-
government protests), Romania (2012 resignation of Prime Minister and referendum
for president impeachment), Romania (2014 elections), Argentina (2015 elections),
Chile (1999 elections)
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Instrument validity
Following Stock and Watson (2012) we use the residuals of an AR(2) regression of the
proposed instrument, namely the global uncertainty index, as a proxy for the domestic
uncertainty shock.11 We claim that domestic uncertainty shocks can have a local origin
(such as an earthquake) or a foreign origin (a global crisis). As such, innovations in global
uncertainty index can be seen as a partial measure of the domestic uncertainty shock.
The instrument is considered valid if it is relevant and exogenous, i.e:
E(ε1M) = α (Relevance condition)
E(ε2M) = 0 (Exogeneity condition)
The exogeneity of the instrument in a proxy SVAR framework requires that the proxy
M, is uncorrelated with any structural shock in the model other than the domestic uncer-
tainty shock. Since this condition is not testable, it relies on our identifying assumption
11We choose the length of the AR process using the AIC test.
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Figure 4.3: Domestic Uncertainty
that business cycle fluctuations in small enough EMEs have no contemporaneous impact
on the innovations in the global uncertainty index. In other words, fluctuations in the
global uncertainty are exogenous to shocks occurring in small emerging countries. The
exclusion restriction condition, which requires that global uncertainty innovations affect
business cycle in EMEs only through their impact on domestic uncertainty, is not a con-
cern in a well specified VAR setting in which the omitted variables issue is excluded by
assumption. Moreover, the regression coefficient of the GDP residuals on the instrument
(reported in the Appendix) are close to zero and not significant, reinforcing the validity
of the assumption that global uncertainty is not an omitted variable in the country VAR
model.
On the other side, the relevance of the instrument can be formally tested but it is a
rather challenging task in proxy SVAR models since the instrumented structural shock
is unobserved. Different methods have been proposed in the literature: some researchers
approximate the relationship between the instrument and the structural shock of interest
running F tests on the measurement equation (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Piffer and Pod-
stawski, 2017; Rogers et al., 2016), others report a squared correlation coefficient (Mertens
and Ravn, 2013; Caldara and Herbst, 2018) while Drautzburg (2016) tests the validity of
the instrument computing Bayes Factors under different scenarios.
Since performing a standard F test is not coherent with a Bayesian framework we
address the relevance of the instrument in two ways. We report the posterior median
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estimates of γ1c and 95% HPDI (see Table 4.1) and the ratio between the median estimates
of γ1c and their correspondent standard errors. Results suggest that the hypothesis of γ1c
being equal to zero is rejected for each country; moreover the value of the ratio between
the measurement equation coefficients and their standard errors (Column 4 in Table 4.1)
favors the hypothesis of a strong instrument12. In addition, in Figure 4.8 we show that our
results are little affected when using different proxies, specifically the VIX and EPU, which
have a considerably lower squared ratio compared to the benchmark case (average squared
ratio between median estimate of γ1c and its standard error is 28.84 for the benchmark
model, 7.16 for VIX and 2.51 for EPU).
Finally, in the spirit of Drautzburg (2016), we use a goodness of fit statistic to check
whether the instrument data brings useful information to the model. Specifically, we
compute the Deviance Information Criteria (DIC)13 for the benchmark model, and for a
scenario in which the measurement equation contains a constant only. DIC test suggests
that the benchmark model is preferred to the no instrument case with an average DIC
value of 3227 for the benchmark scenario vs 3404 for the no instrument case. In the light
of these results we are comfortable to claim that our instrument performs well in terms of
relevance.
Table 4.1: Instrument relevance statistics. Benchmark case.
Country Median γ1c 95 HPDI γ1c /SE DIC benchmark DIC No Instrument
1 0.2328 (0.1496 ; 0.3445 ) 5.53 3615.36 3648.88
2 0.2404 (0.1591 ; 0.3329) 5.55 2600.70 2627.92
3 0.2449 (0.1646 ; 0.3424 ) 5.4 3468.10 3748.32
4 0.2258 (0.1334 ; 0.3122 ) 5.16 3864.41 3954.84
5 0.2300 (0.1408 ; 0.3138 ) 5.34 4026.92 4120.37
6 0.2321 (0.1439 ; 0.3196 ) 5.32 3242.27 3340.16
7 0.2373 (0.1391 ; 0.3115 ) 5.34 3561.53 3654.09
8 0.2365 (0.1551 ; 0.3225 ) 5.55 2177.46 2998.72
9 0.2352 (0.1542; 0.3238 ) 5.54 3742.28 3830.24
10 0.2343 ( 0.1470; 0.3241 ) 5.33 3501.69 3552.24
11 0.2363 ( 0.1364 ; 0.3126 ) 5.19 2581.06 3239.13
12 0.2263 ( 0.1377 ; 0.3158 ) 5.17 2757.92 2720.93
13 0.2275 ( 0.1527 ; 0.3261 ) 5.44 3299.37 3309.32
14 0.2315 ( 0.1455 ; 0.3202 ) 5.36 2913.23 3064.44
15 0.2345 ( 0.0673; 0.3262 ) 5.33 3064.63 3255.98
Average 0.2331 5.37 3227.79 3404.37
12In a classical perspective a value of the squared ratio between the measurement equation coefficient
and its standard error, above 10 would suggest a strong instrument. Our estimates indicate a squared
ratio value of 28.84 for the benchmark model.
13We rely on DIC test instead of Bayes factors since diffuse priors are assumed for several parameters
which make the computation of Bayesian odds problematic (see Gelman et al., 2003).
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Figure 4.4: Impulse response to a 1 standard deviation uncertainty shock in the average
emerging economy. 68 and 90 HPDI bands reported
4.4.2 Results for the average emerging economy
We first report the results for an ’average’ emerging economy computed using the posterior
estimates of the average parameters Φ¯ and γ¯. Figure 4.4 presents the posterior median
of the response to a one standard deviation domestic uncertainty shock which increases
the country uncertainty measure by 0.4 standard deviations. GDP does not respond to
the shock on impact but it gradually falls reaching its peak of -1% after 12 quarters and
the estimated effect displays high persistence. A sharp decline is observed in the stock
price index of around -7% on impact and the detrimental effects the shock has on the
financial variables are completely absorbed only after 15 quarters. Moreover the shock
generates negative co-movement between CPI and GDP supporting the idea of a ’supply
type’ uncertainty shock in line with the conclusions reached in Villaverde et al. (2011a),
Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015) and Batharai et al. (2018). If we now turn to the REER
and the policy rate, we observe that following an uncertainty shock the currency depreciates
while the response of the monetary policy is ambiguous. This last result highlights the
fact that these shocks pose serious challenges to the central bankers due to the negative
trade-off between inflation and output.
Table 4.2 illustrates the contribution of the uncertainty shock to the forecast error
variance of the endogenous variables. At short horizons the shock contribution is small
for the macro variables while it explains a high share of around 25% of the financial index
variability at all horizons. However, the shock becomes more important on medium-long
horizons with a contribution to GDP of 12 and 15% after 3 and respectively 5 years while
the contribution to CPI, REER and the policy rate remains small.
Overall our results regarding the impact of uncertainty shocks on GDP and CPI in
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emerging economies fall in the range of previous findings analyzing the effects of such
shocks in US (Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2015; Carriero et al. 2015; Caldara et al. 2016;
Carriero et al. 2018); in change we estimate more severe disruptions of financial markets in
EMEs compared to values reported for developed economies. Interestingly, our results are
also qualitatively similar to Batharai et al. (2018) who instead focus on spillover effects
from US uncertainty shocks in emerging markets suggesting that whether the origin of
the uncertainty shock is domestic or foreign does not have important implications for the
transmission mechanism of the shock.14
In summary, these results show that uncertainty shocks have substantial consequences
in emerging economies leading to disruptions in both real and financial sectors. Moreover
we estimate a negative co-movement in GDP and CPI; this poses additional constraints to
the monetary authorities which cannot easily mitigate this type of shock.
Table 4.2: Variance decomposition for the average country. Posterior median with 68
percent HPDI in parenthesis
Horizon Uncertainty GDP CPI R REER Financial index
4 Q 0.90 0.02 0.03 0.02 0 .03 0.24
(0.87,0.92) (0.01,0.05) (0.01,0.08) (0.01,0.06) (0.01,0.1) (0.17,0.31)
8 Q 0.81 0.08 0.03 0.02 0 .03 0.26
(0.76,0.84) (0.05,0.13) (0.01,0.08) (0.01,0.06) (0.01,0.1) (0.20,0.33)
12 Q 0.73 0.12 0.05 0.02 0 .03 0.26
(0.68,0.78) (0.07,0.18) (0.02,0.11) (0.01,0.06) (0.01,0.1) (0.20,0.33)
20 Q 0.68 0.15 0.05 0.03 0 .03 0.25
(0.61,0.72) (0.10,0.21) (0.01,0.10) (0.02,0.07) (0.01,0.09) (0.19,0.31)
4.4.3 Heterogeneity across countries
Our empirical framework is well suited to compute country specific results as well. In
particular, the unit specific coefficients are drawn from a distribution centered around the
cross section average coefficients Φ¯ and γ¯ with a tightness dictated by the parameters τ and
λ. Given that the empirical literature is mainly concerned with the recessionary effects of
uncertainty shocks, in this section we limit our attention to the response of GDP to such
shocks. Country results regarding the remaining variables are provided in the Appendix.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 plot the GDP impulse responses (scaled across countries to increase
the domestic uncertainty by 1 unit) and respectively the GDP variance decomposition
estimates for each country in the sample. Results show that the model detects a certain
14An analogous result is reported in Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2015 who show that uncertainty shocks
originating in US have similar effects in both US and UK
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Figure 4.5: GDP impulse responses. Posterior median estimate for each country. The
shock is scaled to increase the country uncertainty by 1 unit.
Figure 4.6: GDP variance decomposition. Posterior median estimate for each country.
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degree of heterogeneity which translates into different scale of responses to shocks. Their
shapes however are similar and close to those of the mean model responses, a finding in
line with Jarocinski (2010). In terms of impulse responses, the most recessionary effects
are experienced by Colombia, followed by South Africa, Poland and Turkey while the less
affected economies appear to be Czech Republic, Romania and Croatia. If instead we turn
our attention to the variance decomposition, our estimates suggest that uncertainty shocks
explain a higher share of the GDP variability for countries such as Poland, Hungary and
Colombia while in Argentina and Singapore uncertainty shocks explain a negligible share
of GDP fluctuations.
We further explore the heterogeneity in the effects of uncertainty shocks on GDP in
a regression analysis. Following Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) and Clayes and
Vasicek (2017) we consider regressors such as: the degree of dollarization reported by Levy
Yeyati (2006) to measure the importance of the currency denominated debt, domestic credit
to private sector as a proxy for financial depth, GDP per capita, trade (% of GDP) as a
proxy for country openness and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of product concentration
which is also related to the degree of product diversification. If the theory predicts that the
degree of openness has ambiguous effects on the capacity of a country to absorb shocks,
more diversified economies should be more resilient to adverse fluctuations. We also include
manufacturing value added (% of GDP) as a proxy for integration in the global value chains
and labor market and goods market efficiency indexes to account for economic flexibility.
The sub-set of preferred regressors is chosen via the leaps-and-bounds algorithm of Furnival
and Wilson (1974). The ranking of the relevant regressors is further confirmed by the spike
and slab variable selection algorithm as per Koop (2016) (see Table S8 in the appendix).
IRFs are scaled across countries and represent the response of economy to a shock
that increases the uncertainty measure by 1 unit; GDP cumulative impulse responses and
variance decomposition, twelve quarters ahead, are regressed against the sub set of chosen
regressors.
Table reports the results from the preferred specification for the two dependent vari-
ables, the GDP IRFs (first column) and variance decomposition (second column) corre-
sponding to the uncertainty shock. In line with previous studies our estimates of GDP
impulse responses show that countries that are wealthier, more integrated in the global
value chains and with efficient labor markets suffer less severe GDP losses from uncertainty
shocks while the efficiency in the goods market seems to enhance the recessionary effects
of such shocks. One way of explaining this less intuitive result is that countries with bet-
ter quality of institutions and business regulations attract and rely more on investment
(domestic and foreign) which according to some studies, is one of the most affected GDP
87
Table 4.3: Country characteristics and uncertainty shocks. The dependent variables are
GDP cumulative IRFs and Variance decomposition, 12 quarters ahead.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES GDP IRF GDP vardec
GDPpc (log) 1.571 -0.203
(0.540) (0.0451)
Dollarization 2.341 -0.281
(1.335) (0.0619)
Manufacturing 0.137 -0.0296
(0.0550) (0.00386)
Trade 0.00260
(0.000397)
Credit to private sector -0.00268
(0.000550)
Goods mkt efficiency -1.271 0.211
(0.527) (0.0341)
Product concentration -0.0260
(0.0171)
Product diversification -0.0134
(0.00744)
Labor mkt efficciency 1.877
(0.568)
Constant -38.94 2.004
(6.047) (0.482)
Observations 14 14
R-squared 0.751 0.953
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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component following an uncertainty shock.15 A similar message is delivered also by the
variance decomposition specification.16 In addition, from the second regression we learn
that countries with more developed financial sectors and with a higher degree of dollarisa-
tion are less sensitive to uncertainty shocks, while a greater trade share corresponds to a
bigger vulnerability to such shocks.
However possible bias in the findings of the regression analysis might arise due to the
small sample size; therefore these results should be interpreted with caution.
4.4.4 Counterfactual analysis
Up to know this paper has shown that uncertainty shocks have a substantial effect on
macroeconomic and financial variables. However, little has been said about the impor-
tance of such shocks from an economic perspective. We conclude this section with a
counterfactual exercise aiming to provide a model-based narrative on the historical role
played by uncertainty shocks in shaping the GDP growth fluctuations. The question of
interest is how different would have been the GDP growth in the absence of uncertainty
shocks?17
The analysis involves three steps. First, we reconstruct the historical series of structural
shocks. This step involves solving numerically for the entire matrix R, which links the
reduced form residuals to the structural shocks; we impose a recursive structure for the
remaining shocks18. We then replace the sequence of structural uncertainty shocks with
zero and we recompute the reduced form residuals accordingly. Finally we simulate the
evolution of GDP growth under this new sequence of residuals.19
Figure 4.7 illustrates the results. For each country we report the difference in the GDP
growth under the counterfactual assumption of no uncertainty shocks and the actual data.
Our estimates suggest that without uncertainty shocks the GDP growth would have been
more than 2% higher during the global financial crisis for almost all countries in the sample.
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that according to our model, all European countries
in the sample experienced recessionary effects during the European debt crisis which can
be attributed to uncertainty shocks. Our results also reveal that in the early 2000s when
15Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, 2013 show that following an uncertainty shock in EMEs the drop in
investment is around -4% while the decrease in consumption is around -1.2%. Bloom et al. 2018 report
a negative reaction in investment and consumption of - 30 and respectively -2% following an uncertainty
shock combined with a first moment productivity shock .
16The same regressors are significant in both specifications with opposite sign.
17For ease of exposition in this exercise we focus on GDP growth rather than levels.
18In order to identify the 6x6 R matrix we need to impose ten additional restrictions to the five restrictions
obtained using the instrumental variable approach. We impose a recursive structure for the remaining
shocks in a way that we do not restrict the contemporaneous response of uncertainty to the other shocks,
as if uncertainty had been ordered last in the model.
19Since we do not change the values of the parameters, this exercise is not subject to the Lucas’ critique
as per Benati, 2010
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Figure 4.7: Counterfactual scenario. The figure shows the difference between the GDP growth
series generated under the counterfactual assumption of no uncertainty shocks and the actual data.
The gray bands identify the global financial crisis, the Euro debt crisis for European countries and
some selected recessionary episodes. 68 HPDI bands are reported.
internet bubble burst, uncertainty shocks had particularly detrimental effects in countries
with pre-existing vulnerabilities, such as Singapore and Philippines (which were recovering
from the Asian crisis) and Peru (which experienced a credit crunch in 1999). Finally, we
signal also the 2000-2002 recession in Poland which can be partly explained by uncertainty
shocks.
Summing up, the counterfactual analysis shows that uncertainty shocks were an im-
portant driver of the GDP fluctuations in EMEs; our results provide evidence on the
relevance of the uncertainty shocks in emerging markets from an economic point of view,
strengthening the usefulness of our findings.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
We perform an additional sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results. We
provide a summary description in this section; detailed results are available in the appendix.
First we test the sensitivity of our findings to the proxy employed in the VAR exercise.
To this end, we re-estimate the model using two alternative proxies, specifically the resid-
uals from an AR(2) and an AR(1) regressions of VIX and respectively EPU.20 Figure 4.8
shows the posterior median of the impulse responses across the three specifications of the
instrument. We notice that results are fairly stable.
Additionally, we re-estimate the benchmark model with the following modifications:
20The length of the AR process is again chosen via AIC test and suggests an AR(2) model for VIX and
an AR(1) model for EPU.
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Figure 4.8: Posterior median impulse responses across different instrument specifications.
Average country results.
no linear trend; linear and quadratic trend; the world demand proxied by Kilian’s index
of global real economic activity instead of the OECD industrial production index. The
results are robust to these checks as well.
4.6 Summary
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of uncertainty shocks in emerging economies.
To this end we develop a novel Bayesian algorithm to estimate a model that combines a
panel VAR with random coefficients with a proxy SVAR approach. This model deals in an
efficient way with the lack of data availability for emerging markets while preserving the
advantages of a proxy SVAR approach.
In the empirical exercise we limit our attention to fifteen small EMEs. We construct
global and domestic uncertainty measures using the approach proposed by JLN. To identify
the uncertainty shock we use innovations in global uncertainty as a proxy for the domestic
uncertainty shock assuming that global uncertainty fluctuations are exogenous to business
cycle developments occurring in a particular country in the sample.
We show that positive uncertainty shocks generate a persistent drop in real GDP and
a severe decline in stock prices. The same shock causes a negative co-movement between
real GDP and CPI while the monetary authority reaction is ambiguous.
We then turn to the country specific results and find evidence of cross country het-
erogeneity in responses to uncertainty shocks. We examine further this variability in a
regression analysis. We notice the presence of statistically significant correlation between
heterogeneity in the magnitude of GDP impulse responses to uncertainty shocks and se-
lected cross country characteristics. In particular, countries that are wealthier, with higher
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share of manufacturing and with more efficient labor markets experience less recessionary
effects following uncertainty shocks; countries with more efficient goods market and with
a higher trade share are more affected by such shocks. Finally, a counterfactual exercise
reveals that uncertainty shocks were an important driver of the GDP growth fluctuations
in EMEs.
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
The aim of this thesis was to explore different aspects of the domestic and international
transmission of macroeconomic shocks from an empirical perspective. The methodology
employed consisted in structural VAR models estimated using a Bayesian approach which
allowed for more flexibility in dealing with non-linearities and models with a hierarchical
structure. A more detailed description of the chapters is given below:
Chapter 1 focused on the role of IMF programs on the external vulnerability of a
country. Even if one of the Fund‘s primary purposes consists in “advising member countries
on economic and financial policies that promote stability, reduce vulnerability to crises,
and encourage sustained growth and high living standards”1 very little empirical literature
analyzed the efficiency of the Fund in helping countries to reduce their vulnerability to
external shocks. Trying to fill part of this gap, the first chapter addressed this explicit,
although less often studied goal of the IMF programs. The methodology proposed was a
bilateral BVARmodel considered for 165 countries. From the variance decomposition of the
estimated VAR models, a measure of external exposure was then built as the average effect
of a set of external shocks on domestic variables. The BVAR results show that countries
under Fund-supported loans have a smaller sensitivity to external shocks compared to
countries without IMF program. The effect of participation in IMF programs on the
external exposure of a country was then further investigated in a cross section analysis.
Controlling for the potential endogeneity by instrumenting the IMF participation with the
size of the IMF quota, the final set of results convey that IMF participation significantly
decreases the external vulnerability of member countries.
Chapter 2 addressed the state dependency of a spillover index calculated for a group
of seven advanced economies. Using a nonlinear setting, the analysis focused on the asym-
metry of the connectedness index over the business cycle. The methodology employed
1www.imf.org
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consisted in the estimation of a Threshold VAR model. The results suggest that during
recession countries tend to be more connected and the estimated difference is large and
statistically significant. In addition, negative shocks are found to have higher impact on
the connectedness index compared to their positive counterparts. Moreover, financial and
inflation shocks are assessed to be important determinants of global connectedness, and
the connectedness indexes for these variables display a different behaviour compared to
the real activity ones. Specifically, both inflation and financial connectedness are large
and less state-dependent than the IP index. Financial shocks are important drivers of
the cross-country connectedness in real variables, especially during recessions, while the
opposite effect is not verified. These results reinforce the idea that movements in financial
markets could lead economic activity. Cross-country inflation connectedness is higher in
the long run, which is consistent with the shared long term objectives of monetary policy
makers. Among the analyzed countries, the US and Japan are the main “shock givers”
while European countries tend to be more shock “takers”. A counterfactual exercise illus-
trated how relevant connectedness was from an economic point of view and reinforced the
necessity to account for its state-dependent behaviour.
Chapter 3 aimed to asses and compare the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on
GDP growth in advanced and emerging economies Using panel VAR models with a hi-
erarchical structure, the results indicate that the effects of monetary policy on GDP are
similar across the two groups while the fiscal multipliers are higher in AEs compared to
EMEs. By means of a counterfactual analysis, the article then provided evidence that
global GDP growth benefited from substantial policy support during the global financial
crisis but policy tightening thereafter, particularly fiscal consolidation, acted as a signifi-
cant drag on the subsequent global recovery. In addition it is shown that the role of policy
has differed across countries. Specifically, in advanced economies, highly accommodative
monetary policy has been counteracted by strong fiscal consolidation. By contrast, in
EMEs, monetary policy has been less accommodative since the global recession. Finally,
the counterfactual scenarios emphasized the important interdependence of fiscal and mone-
tary policies in shaping each other. In particular, in United States, results show that in the
aftermath of the financial crisis fiscal consolidation has pushed continued accommodation
from monetary policy.
Chapter 4 examined the effects of uncertainty shocks in emerging economies. The em-
pirical model applied in this analysis combines a panel VAR with random coefficients with
a proxy SVAR approach. Such model deals in an efficient way with the lack of data avail-
ability for emerging markets while preserving the advantages of a proxy SVAR approach.
A novel Bayesian algorithm has been developed to estimate the proposed model. The
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empirical exercise focused on fifteen small EMEs. Global and domestic uncertainty mea-
sures were constructed using the approach proposed by JLN. To identify the uncertainty
shock, innovations in global uncertainty were used as a proxy for the domestic uncertainty
shock assuming that global uncertainty fluctuations are exogenous to business cycle de-
velopments occurring in a particular country in the sample. The estimates point out that
positive uncertainty shocks generate a persistent drop in real GDP and a severe decline in
stock prices. The same shock causes a negative co-movement between real GDP and CPI
while the monetary authority reaction is ambiguous. Turning to the country specific re-
sults, the analysis brought evidence in favor of cross country heterogeneity in responses to
uncertainty shocks. This variability was further examined in a regression analysis and the
findings indicate that countries that are wealthier, with higher share of manufacturing and
with more efficient labor markets experience less recessionary effects following uncertainty
shocks; countries with more efficient goods market and with a higher trade share are more
affected by such shocks. Finally, a counterfactual exercise revealed that uncertainty shocks
were an important driver of the GDP growth fluctuations in EMEs.
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Appendix Chapter 1
S1 Robustness checks
The validity of our results is further tested in two additional checks. In the first subsection,
we run a sensitivity analysis to the identification strategy. In the second subsection, we
use World variables (instead of US variables) to capture the external shocks.
S1.1 Sensitivity analysis
In order to preclude that our results derive from the identification strategy employed, we
consider a specification of the BVAR model in which both the external and domestic shocks
are identified through the Cholesky decomposition. In the baseline model the variance
decomposition of the most affected countries was between 9-18%, while when using the
Cholesky factor, the correspondent interval becomes 11-22%.
The results reported in Figure S1 are similar to the ones obtained using sign restriction
reinforcing the validity of our findings.
S1.2 World shocks robustness analysis
In this subsection, we test the appropriateness of using US variables to identify the external
shocks. We replace the US variables with World variables. Hence, instead of US GDP, US
CPI and US Interest rate we use World GDP, World CPI, and World Interest rate. All
world variables are obtained from the IFS database, at quarterly frequency since 1970. We
adjusted the database accordingly and dropped 10 additional countries. The results of the
BVAR analysis (Figure S2) support the hypothesis that countries under IMF program are
on average less sensitive to World shocks compared to countries not under IMF program.
At the country level, as expected (given the geographical proximity and trade links with
the US), the Latin American countries are slightly less sensitive to world shocks compared
to US shocks. The same effect is verified for the Middle East oil exporters if we consider
that US is one of the major oil importers. On the other side, China is highly vulnerable
to world shocks but not to US shocks. The regression analysis reinforce the negative and
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significant impact of participation into IMF programs on the exposure to adverse external
shocks.
Summing up, our results are robust to both the identification strategy and the model
heterogeneity while US variables are shown to be an appropriate choice for the external
block.
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Country-model list 
Country Model1 Country Model 
Afghanistan 3x 2  (CPI and X) Egypt 3x4 (CPI Trade Res X) 
Albania Complete. Only IMF period. El Salvador 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade RES).  No IMF period. 
Algeria Complete. Estonia Complete. 
Angola Complete. Ethiopia 3x3 (CPI Trade X) 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 3x3 ( CPI R RESERVE) Fiji 3x3 ( IP CPI RES) 
Argentina  Complete. Finland Complete. 
Armenia Complete. Only IMF period. France Complete. No IMF period. 
Australia Complete. Gabon 3x3 (CPI R RES) 
Austria Complete. No IMF period. Georgia Complete. Only IMF period 
Azerbaijan 3 x2 (UNEMPLOYMENT CPI). Only IMF period Germany Complete. No IMF period. 
Bahamas 3x3 domestic. No IMF period. Ghana 3x4 (CPI Trade R Res) 
Bahrain 3x4 domestic (CPI R RES X). No IMF period. Greece 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade RES) 
Bangladesh Complete. Only IMF period. Grenada 3x3 (CPI Trade RES) 
Barbados 3x4 (IP CPI TRADE  RESERVE) Guatemala Complete. No IMF period. 
Belarus 3x3(GDP CPI TRADE) Guinea 3x2 (CPI Trade).  Only IMF period 
Belgium Complete. No IMF period. Guinea-Bissau 3x3 (CPI Trade Res). Only IMF period 
Bhutan 3x3 (CPI RES X). NO IMF period. Guyana 3x3 (CPI RES X) 
Bolivia Complete. Haiti 3x4 (CPI Trade Res X). Only IMF period. period 
Bosnia Herzegovina 3x3 (R RES X) Honduras 3x2 (CPI RES).  Only IMF period 
Botswana 3x3 (CPI RES X). NO IMF period. Hungary Complete. 
Brunei 3x4 (GDP CPI RES X). No IMF period. Iceland Complete. 
Bulgaria Complete. India Complete. IP instead of GDP  
Burundi 3x4 (CPI TRADE RES X) Indonesia 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade R) 
Cape Verde 3x3 (CPI RES X) Iran 3x2 (GDP CPI).  No IMF period. 
Cambodia 3x3( CPI TRADE RES)  Ireland Complete. IP instead of GDP 
Cameroon 3x3(CPI TRADE RES) Israel Complete. 
Canada Complete. NO IMF period. Italy Complete. No IMF period. 
Chad 3x2 (CPI RES).  Only IMF period Jamaica Complete. 
Chile Complete. Unemployment instead of GDP Japan Complete. NO IMF period. 
China 3x3 (GDP CPI X) Jordan 3x3 (IP CPI Trade) 
Colombia Complete. No IMF period. Kazakhstan Complete. 
Comoros 3x3 (CPI RES X) Kenya Complete. Only IMF period 
Congo Democratic 3x2 (CPI Trade) 
Korea, Republic 
of 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade R) 
Congo Republic 3x2 (CPI TRADE RES).  Only IMF period Kuwait 3x2 (CPI Res) No IMF period..  
Costa Rica Complete. Kyrgyz Complete. Only IMF period 
Cote d'Ivoire 3x4 (IP CPI R RES) Lao 3x2 (CPI RES). Only IMF period 
Croatia Complete. Latvia 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade R) 
Cyprus 3x4 (IP CPI RES X) Lebanon 3x3  (Trade Res X) 
Czech Rep Complete. NO IMF period. Lesotho 3x4 (CPI R RES X).  Only IMF period 
Denmark Complete. NO IMF period. Liberia 3x4 (CPI R RES X).  Only IMF period 
Djibouti 3x2 (Trade Res). Only IMF period  Libya 3x4 (GDP Trade Res X).  No IMF period 
Ecuador 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade RES) Lithuania 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade R) 
                                                          
1 3x2 means the model has 3 external shocks and 2 domestic variables. Res = Reserve; R = Interest rate; X= 
Exchange rate; IP= Industrial production; 
Country-model list 
 
 
Country Model Country Model 
Luxembourg 3x4 (GDP CPI Trade X).  No IMF period. Serbia 3x2 (GDP CPI). Only IMF period 
Macedonia 3x3 (IP CPI RES) Seychelles 3x3 (CPI Res X) 
Madagascar 3x3 (CPI Trade Res).  Only IMF period. Sierra Leone 3x3 (CPI Trade Res) 
Malawi Complete. Only IMF period Singapore 3x4 (GDP CPI Res X). No IMF period. 
Malaysia  Complete. No IMF period Slovak Republic Complete. 
Maldives 3x3 (CPI Res X) Slovenia Complete. 
Mali 3x2 (CPI RES). Only IMF period Solomon Islands 3x3 (CPI R Res) 
Malta Complete. NO IMF period. South Africa Complete. 
Mauritania 3x2 (CPI X).  Only IMF period Spain Complete. 
Mauritius Complete. NO IMF period. Sri Lanka Complete. Only IMF period 
Mexico Complete. St Kitts and Nevis 3x2 (CPI Res).  Only IMF period 
Micronesia 3x2 (R RES).  No IMF period. St. Lucia 3x2 (CPI Res).  Only IMF period 
Moldova Complete. Only IMF period St. Vincent 3x2 (CPI Res).  Only IMF period 
Mongolia 3x4 (CPI Trade R Res).  Only IMF period Sudan 3x4 (CPI Trade Res X).  Only IMF period 
Morocco Complete. Suriname 3x4 (CPI Trade Res).  No IMF period. 
Mozambique 3x4 (CPI Trade Res X).  Only IMF period Swaziland 3x3 (CPI Res X) 
Myanmar 3x3 (CPI Trade Res) Sweden Complete. NO IMF period. 
Namibia Complete. NO IMF period. Switzerland Complete. NO IMF period. 
Nepal 3x3 (CPI Trade Res) Syria 3x2 (IP CPI). No IMF period. 
Netherlands Complete. No IMF period. Tajikistan 3x4 (CPI R RES X).  Only IMF period 
New Zealand Complete. No IMF period. Tanzania 3x4 (GDP CPI R Res).  Only IMF period 
Nicaragua Complete. Only IMF period Thailand Complete. 
Niger 3x2 (CPI Res). Only IMF period. The Gambia 3x4 (CPI Trade Res X) 
Nigeria Complete. NO IMF period. Timor-Leste 3x3 (CPI R Res).  No IMF period. 
Norway Complete. NO IMF period. Togo 3x2 (CPI Res).  Only IMF period 
Oman Complete. NO IMF period. Tonga 3x3 (CPI R Res). No IMF period. 
Pakistan Complete. Only IMF period Trinidad and Tobago 3x4 (IP CPI R X) 
Panama 3x3  (IP CPI Res) Tunisia Complete. 
Paraguay 3x3 (IP CPI Res). NO IMF period. Turkey Complete. 
Peru Complete. Uganda 3x4 (CPI Trade R Res).  Only IMF period 
Philippines Complete. Ukraine Complete. Only IMF period 
Poland Complete. United Arab Emirates 3x4 (IP Trade Res X).  No IMF period. 
Portugal Complete. United Kingdom Complete. 
Qatar 3x4 (IP CPI Trade X).  No IMF period. Uruguay Complete. 
Romania Complete. Only IMF period Vanuatu 3x4 (CPI R Res X).  No IMF period. 
Russia Complete. Venezuela 3x4  (IP CPI Trade X) 
Rwanda 3x2 (CPI RES).  Only IMF period Vietnam 3x3 (IP CPI R).  Only IMF period 
Samoa 3x3 (CPI Trade Res) Yemen 3x4 (CPI R Res X).  Only IMF period 
San Marino 3x2 (CPI RES).  NO IMF period. Zambia 3x3 (CPI Trade X).  Only IMF period 
Sao Tome and Principe 3x3 (CPI R Res).  Only IMF period 
Saudi Arabia Complete. No IMF period.  
Senegal 3x3 (IP CPI RES).  Only IMF period 
 
Figure S1: Vulnerability to external shocks and participation in IMF programs- Cholesky
decomposition
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Figure S2: Vulnerability to external shocks and participation into IMF programs- World
shocks
.
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Table S1: World IV results
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMF Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMF -0.908 -2.272 -2.135
(0.970) (1.541) (1.515)
KOpen -0.00353*** 0.00138 -0.00391 -0.00356
(0.000857) (0.00396) (0.00677) (0.00665)
logFDI 0.0824* 0.199* 0.302 0.297
(0.0445) (0.120) (0.224) (0.216)
logTrade 0.0243 -0.0656 0.0575 0.0493
(0.0376) (0.0553) (0.0922) (0.0887)
logGDP -0.0224 0.0377 -0.0527 -0.0533
(0.0313) (0.0488) (0.105) (0.101)
IMFquota -0.0668**
(0.0320)
Constant 0.649** -2.887*** -1.773* -1.873**
(0.274) (0.599) (0.955) (0.941)
Observations 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.173
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(First stage) (Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES IMFintensity Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMFintensity -0.684 -1.711** -1.607**
(0.564) (0.795) (0.793)
KOpen -0.00324*** 0.00237 -0.00144 -0.00124
(0.000715) (0.00228) (0.00389) (0.00387)
logFDI 0.0623 0.167** 0.222 0.221*
(0.0414) (0.0696) (0.136) (0.131)
logTrade 0.0547* -0.0502 0.0959 0.0855
(0.0312) (0.0496) (0.0942) (0.0922)
logGDP 0.0120 0.0662* 0.0188 0.0139
(0.0310) (0.0392) (0.0945) (0.0910)
IMFquota -0.0887***
(0.0254)
Constant 0.237 -3.315*** -2.842*** -2.877***
(0.223) (0.286) (0.565) (0.553)
Observations 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.240 0.171
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table S2: OLS results. Model heterogeneity
Real activity vulnerability
(Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES Real activity (log) Real activity (log) Real activity (log)
IMFIntensity -0.0716 -0.460* -0.466*
(0.215) (0.277) (0.249)
KOpen 0.00437 0.00137 0.00129
(0.00305) (0.00388) (0.00365)
logGDP 0.145* 0.117 0.0797
(0.0829) (0.106) (0.0964)
logTrade -0.0168 0.00496 0.00879
(0.0865) (0.0924) (0.0815)
logFDI 0.0331 -0.0283 0.0343
(0.0641) (0.0970) (0.0815)
Constant -3.366*** -2.571*** -2.775***
(0.465) (0.584) (0.523)
Observations 101 101 101
R-squared 0.069 0.052 0.055
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Complete model
(Q1) (Q8) (Q40)
VARIABLES Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
IMFIntensity -0.0599 -0.467* -0.489**
(0.116) (0.254) (0.245)
KOpen 0.00332** 0.00130 0.00132
(0.00164) (0.00364) (0.00355)
logGDP 0.0207 0.0933 0.0762
(0.0473) (0.0979) (0.0934)
logTrade -0.0684 0.00554 0.0101
(0.0428) (0.0830) (0.0789)
logFDI 0.0836** 0.00361 0.0437
(0.0370) (0.0823) (0.0813)
Constant -2.795*** -2.665*** -2.816***
(0.249) (0.521) (0.503)
Observations 101 101 101
R-squared 0.121 0.055 0.062
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Chapter 2
S2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we test the robustness of our results to the followings: the specification of
the transition function, the identification strategy, the real activity variable, the size of
shocks, the inflation variable, the threshold variable definition and the tightness of priors.
S2.1 Sensitivity to the transition across regimes function
It has been mentioned previously that TVAR imposes fairly stringent restrictions on the
relation between the threshold variable and transition across regimes since the threshold
variable is assumed to cause the shift across regimes in a deterministic way.
As an alternative to the TVAR, in this section we replicate the empirical exercise using a
Smooth Transition VAR (STVAR) defined as in (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10). We therefore relax
the assumption of a deterministic switch in regimes and we allow for a gradual transition
between good and bad times. However, we do not account for the heteroskedasticity as we
consider a unique covariance matrix.
The results of the STVAR model (Figures S4-S7) are similar to the TVAR results. The
difference in the global connectedness index over the business cycle phases is even more
pronounced than in the TVAR case, going from 20% in the benchmark specification to 30%
in the inflation specification. When only IP variables are considered, negative shocks are
found to trigger higher spillover effects than positive shocks. No sign asymmetry is detected
when we include financial variables. Overall, the results regarding the global connectedness
are qualitatively in line with to the ones obtained with the benchmark model, with some
variation mainly in the composition of the global index.
S2.2 Sensitivity to the identification strategy
The generalized identification used in the baseline analysis allows for correlated shocks; as
such, in order to validate our results in this section we repeat the empirical application
using the Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the system. With the recursive iden-
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tification, the order of the variables needs some additional consideration2. The ordering
of the variables across countries follows the same ranking used in defining the threshold
variable; we start with US followed by Japan, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. In
the two alternative specifications real variables come before financial variables while we
choose to put inflation before the real activity variable (Primiceri, 2005).
The results obtained with the Cholesky decomposition (Figures S8-S11) are qualita-
tively similar to the benchmark analysis, with a slightly smaller magnitude of the direc-
tional results.
S2.3 GDP connectedness
In this subsection we calculate the GDP connectedness for the seven countries analyzed.
We use year to year log growth rates of quarterly GDP (seasonal adjusted), from 1961 Q1
to 2015 Q4. We adjust the number of lags accordingly from 13 to 4 and we limit the values
of the delay parameter from 1 to 4 in order to be consistent with the benchmark approach.
The results of this alternative specification reported in Figure S12 are in line with the
findings of the baseline model confirming the robustness of the state-dependent behavior
of the global connectedness. Moreover, the difference in the GDP global connectedness
index over the business cycle phases is significantly higher than the one obtained for the
IP suggesting that the GDP variable is more connected than the IP.
S2.4 Sensitivity to the size of shocks
When measuring connectedness following big shocks, 10 standard deviation shocks were
employed. In order to test the sensitivity of our estimates to the size of the shock, in
Figure S16 results based on 5 standard deviation shocks are reported. Conclusions from
the baseline specifications are robust to this test.
S2.5 Sensitivity to the threshold variable definition
US has a largest weight in the threshold variable and this might raise concerns on the
sensitivity of results showing the importance of US as a shock transmitter. In order to check
whether the US dominance in the threshold variable has an influence on the robustness of
the directional results we run the following robustness analysis: we identify the states of
the economy solely based on Germany and then we estimate the directional results and the
importance of German shocks to US and US shocks to Germany. Figure S19 reports the
directional results based on this new definition of the threshold and shows that results are
2Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) claim that often total connectedness is robust to ordering, i.e the range of
the total connectedness estimates across orderings is quite small
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little affected by this adjustment in the threshold variable. Table S4 as expected, highlights
the little relevance of German shocks on US IP and the high importance of US shocks on
German IP regardless of the threshold variable definition.
S2.6 Alternative specification of the inflation variables.
S2.7 Model comparison via DIC
We carry out a model selection analysis via the Bayesian deviance information criterion
(hereafter DIC) and we compare the performance of the benchmark model against the
linear VAR and the STVAR.
Even if Bayes Factors have been considered for many years as the preferred way to
conduct Bayesian model comparison, they have come under increasing criticism (Gelfand,
1996). In particular, when the parameter space is large their estimation requires high-
dimensional integration which can pose a big computational challenge; moreover they are
not well defined when using improper priors and may exhibit problems connected with the
“Lindley paradox”. As mentioned in Gelfand (1996), if the prior is proper but sufficiently
diffuse, it can result in support for the reduced model in spite of the fact that data might
suggest its rejection. The Bayes factors tend to give too much weight on model parsimony.
That is relevant in our application for two reasons. First, our prior is weakly informative for
the threshold variable Z∗ and is flat for the delay parameter d. Gelfand (1996) recommends
against the use of Bayes factors in this case. Second, the TVAR is by far more complex than
the linear VAR3 and marginal likelihood methods might erroneously prefer the reduced
model even if data points to its rejection.
An alternative to the use of Bayes Factors are the penalized likelihood criteria, namely
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and DIC, which
penalizes the model complexity and rewards the fit to the data. DIC was introduced in
Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) and is a generalization of the AIC. DIC is defined as:
DIC = D¯ + pD (5.1)
The first term is D¯=E(-2lnL(Ψi))= 1MΣi(−2lnL(Ψi)) and L(Ψi) is the likelihood eval-
uated at the draws of all of the parameters Ψi in the MCMC chain. D¯ is the posterior
expectation of the deviation and it captures the fit of the model. The second term, known
as the effective number of parameters, measures the model complexity and is defined as
pD=D¯−D(Ψ¯). pD can be approximated by pD = 1MΣi(−2lnL(Ψi))-
(−2lnL( 1MΣiΨi)).
Hence, DIC estimation is straightforward and requires only the evaluation of the likeli-
3The number of parameters in TVAR is more than double compared to the linear VAR
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Table S3: Model comparison via DIC for linear VAR, STVAR and TVAR. Model with
smaller DIC is preferred
Model pD D¯ DIC
TVAR (benchmark model) 214 5607 6037
STVAR 164 5725 6055
VAR (linear) 148 5769 6065
hood function for each Gibbs-sampler saved draw and for the posterior mean.
It is worth mentioning that with prior distribution, the number of parameters (as in
AIC and BIC) do not necessary represent the model complexity. DIC avoids this problem
with the use of pD which is shown to asymptotically approximate the true number of
parameters (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).
Since we want models with good fit but also with a reasonable degree of parsimony, we
prefer models with smaller values of DIC. Moreover, DIC is scale-free, so as with AIC and
BIC, only differences in DIC across models are meaningful.4The simplicity, general appli-
cability and attractive interpretations, led to the broad use of DIC by the data analysts.
Table S3 presents the estimated DIC for the TVAR , STVAR and linear VAR models
and provides evidence that our benchmark model is preferred to the linear VAR and
the STVAR. As expected, the effective number of parameters increases with the model
complexity while for D¯, the goodness of fit term, we observe the opposite effect.
S2.8 Threshold vs Markov-switching models
TVAR, STVAR and Markov-switching VAR (hereafter MSVAR) are all regime-switching
models. The first two are “threshold” models while the MSVAR is part of the “Markov-
switching” models. The main difference between these two categories consists in how they
approach the evolution of the state variable St. If threshold models assume that regimes
switch is driven by the level of an observed variable in relation to an unobserved threshold
level, the MS models impose that regime-shifts evolve according to a Markov chain. In
particular a two regimes MSVAR can be defined as:
Yt = cSt +
P∑
j=1
Bj,StYt−j + Ω
1/2
St
et (5.2)
where et∼N(0,IN ) and St follows a first order Markov Chain, hence St depends only
on St−1. The estimation of 5.2 does not necessarily lead to identification of recessions
and expansions as regimes. Hence it is less appropriate to our aims. However, there
are several extensions of the MS models which have been used to identify the phases of
4pD does have a scale, i.e. the size of the effective number of parameters.
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the business cycle or to allow the probability of switching to depend on some underlying
economic fundamentals. In particular, Diebold, Lee, and Weinbach (1994) and Filardo
(1994) consider time-varying probabilities in Markov-switching models.
For example, in a two regimes MS model with only one leading indicator zt−1 (for
simplicity), the time-varying probabilities mechanism can be conveniently expressed with
the probit parameterisation as follows:
p(st = 1 | st−1 = i, yt−1, zt−1, θ) = p1j,t (5.3)
= φ(γ
′
izt−1) (5.4)
where φ refers to the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and γi measures the
sensitivity of probability pij,t with respect to the indicator variable zt−1.
Even if the model described in 5.2 - 5.4 can be easily adapted to the objectives of
our analysis, it has two main drawbacks. First, if the sample considered includes few
transitions across different regimes (which is the case in our application), the estimation
of the parameters determining the transition probabilities can be extremely problematic.
One solution to this issue is to impose very informative priors on these parameters at the
cost of obtaining posterior distributions not dominated by data evidence (Amisano and
Fagan, 2013). Second, the estimation of an MS model with time-varying probabilities is
highly complex.
Finally, threshold and Markov-switching approaches should be viewed as complemen-
tary and the “preferred” model is likely to be specific to the application itself. For the
reasons mentioned above, we consider the TVAR model to be more appropriate for our
application.
S3 Convergence of the Markow chain Monte Carlo algorithm
This appendix assesses the convergence of the Markow chain Monte Carlo algorithm in the
baseline application to the IP data. For the TVAR model estimation we employ 20,500
iterations of the Gibbs sampler discarding the first 20,000 as burn-in.5 In order to check the
convergence of the Gibbs sampler we follow Primiceri (2005) and we apply the Inefficiency
factors (IFs) for the posterior estimates of the parameters. The IF is the inverse of the
relative numerical efficiency measure proposed by Geweke‘s (1992). Specifically, the IF is
5We save only 500 draws becuase the Generalized Impulse Response Functions are computationally
intensive and time cosuming.
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an estimate of
(
1 + 2
∞∑
k=1
ρk
)
where
∑
ρk is the k-th autocorrelation of the chain. Values
of the IFs below or around twenty are considered satisfactory. Figure S17 presents the IFs
for the different sets of parameters. The IFs for the threshold level is 10.5 while for all
the other parameters the IFs are below 10. Therefore the convergence diagnostics seem
satisfactory.
S4 Mixed-variables model and aggregation of the connected-
ness table.
The results based on the mixed-variable model reported in section 5.2 rely on the intro-
duction of an intermediate level of aggregation in the spirit of Greenwood-Nimmo et al.,
(2015). The mixed specifications combine IP variables with financial or nominal variables;
therefore the final model features N=14 endogenous variables6. Given our interest in an-
alyzing the real, financial and nominal connectedness across business cycle phases, the
aggregation scheme we adopt is based on the type of variable and is well described by the
following steps:.
Step 1. Split the 14x14 forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) matrix in 4 as
follows:
C =
 RR FR
RF FF
 (5.5)
where each element of the C matrix is a 7x7 sub-matrix containing specific pieces of variance
decomposition. For example, RF is made up of the shares of the forecast error variation
in financial variables explained by shocks to real variables.
Step 2. Sum the elements of each sub-matrix and subtract its trace (sum of the elements
on the main diagonal). Note that the main diagonals of RR and FF coincide with the main
diagonal of the C matrix. In order to have a clean cross-countries spillover index, the traces
of RF and FR matrices are also subtracted since they account for effects of domestic shocks
on another domestic variables (for example the effect of US IP shock on US SPI variable).
Step 3. Divide by N the sub-indexes to restore the percentage interpretation.
Step 4. Report the global index as sum of the 4 sub-indexes.
6Given la large number of parameters in the mixed-variables model, the number of lags were reduced
to 8
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Table S4: Forecast error variance decomposition for US and Germany shocks with regimes
identified solely based on Germany.
Recession
Variable\Shock US Germany
US 1 Year 0.7958 0.0155
Germany 1 Year 0.1571 0.5021
US 5 Years 0.6922 0.0404
Germany 5 Years 0.1613 0.4114
Boom
Variable\Shock US Germany
US 1 Year 0.8356 0.007
Germany 1 Year 0.10 0.6355
US 5 Years 0.7624 0.0245
Germany 5 Years 0.1390 0.5134
To help fix ideas we report a simple example for a model with two countries (US and
UK) and two variables per country (IP and SPI). Suppose the FEVD matrix has the
following form:
Variable\Shock IP_US IP_UK SPI_US SPI_UK
IP_US d11 d12 d13 d14
IP_UK d21 d22 d23 d24
SPI_US d31 d32 d33 d34
SPI_UK d41 d42 d43 d44
where the element d11 shows how much of the forecast error variation in IP_ US is
explained by shocks in the IP_US variable.
The sub-matrices in 5.5 are then built as follows:
RR=
 d11 d12
d21 d22
; RF=
 d31 d32
d41 d42
;
FR=
 d13 d14
d23 d24
; FF=
 d33 d34
d43 d44
;
For each sub-matrix obtain a sub-index calculated as the sum of its off diagonal elements
divided by N. For example:
RRindex = 12(d21 + d12).
Finally, the global connectedness index is obtained as the sum of the four sub-indexes,
RR, RF, FR, FF.
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Figure S3: Median of the difference in global connectedness across regimes over the fore-
casting horizon. 68% credibility bands.
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Figure S4: STVAR. Median of the difference in global connectedness across regimes over
the forecasting horizon. 68% credibility bands.
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Figure S5: STVAR: IP connectedness
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Figure S6: STVAR: Financial and IP connectedness. R and B at the bottom of each bar
stays for recession and boom. The RR, RF, FR and FF in the legend indicate the nature
of the variables, i.e. real and financial. For example RF means the effects IP shocks have
on financial connectedness.
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Figure S7: STVAR: Inflation and IP connectedness.R and B at the bottom of each bar
stays for recession and boom.
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Figure S8: Cholesky decomposition. Median of the difference in global connectedness
across regimes over the forecasting horizon. 68% credibility bands.
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Figure S9: Cholesky decomposition. Global IP connectedness.
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Figure S10: Cholesky decomposition. Financial and IP connectedness. R and B at the
bottom of each bar stays for recession and boom. The RR, RF, FR and FF in the legend
indicate the nature of the variables, i.e. real and financial.
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Figure S11: Cholesky decomposition. Inflation and IP connectedness.R and B at the
bottom of each bar stays for recession and boom.
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Algorithm .1 TVAR model estimation. MH within Gibbs sampling algorithm.
Step 1. Given an initial value for Z∗and d, separate the data into two regimes (below and above the
threshold).
Step 2. Sample the VAR parameters Bi and Σi in each regime i=1,2:
P (Bi | Σi,Yt, Z∗) ∼ N(vec(B∗i ), Σi ⊗ (X∗′i X∗i )−1)
P (Σi | Bi, Yt, Z∗):IW (S∗i , T ∗i )
Step 3. Use a MH step to sample Z∗and then compute the acceptance probability α.
Z∗new = Z
∗
old + Φ
1/2e, e:N(0, 1)
α =
F (Y | Bi,Σi, di, Z∗new)p(Z∗new)
F (Y | Bi,Σi, di, Z∗old)p(Z∗old)
where F (Y | Bi,Σi, Z∗new)p(Z∗new) is the likelihood of the VAR computed as the product of the likelihoods
in the two regimes. We choose the scaling factor Φ to ensure that the acceptance rate remains between
20% and 40%.
Step 4. Draw the delay parameter d from the multinomial distribution with probability:
L(Y | d,Ψ)∑n
d=1 L(Y | d,Ψ)
where L (.) is likelihood function, Ψ denotes all the other parameters and n the maximum value d can
take.
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Figure S12: GDP global connectedness
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Figure S13: Directional IP results for different shock specifications and horizon
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Figure S14: Financial and IP directional connectedness
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Figure S15: Inflation and IP directional connectedness
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Algorithm .2 STVAR model estimation. MH within Gibbs sampling algorithm.
Step 1. Given an initial value for Z∗and d, separate the data into two regimes (1-pi ≶ 0.2 ).
Step 2. Sample the VAR parameters B1
H(B1 | Ω, Yt, Z∗, d) ∼ N(vec(B∗1 ),Ω⊗ (X∗1X∗1 )−1)
by transforming the model conditional on the parameters of the transition function and regime 2 as:
Y1t = B1Xt + εt,
where Y1t= Yt-[B2Xt]pi;
Y ∗1 = [Y1t;YD];X
∗
1 = [X1t;XD]
Step 3. Sample the VAR parameters B2
H(B2 | Ω, Yt, Z∗, d) ∼ N(vec(B∗2 ),Ω⊗ (X∗2X∗2 )−1)
Y2t = B2Xtpi + εt
where Y2t= Yt-[B1Xt];
Y ∗2 = [Y2t;YD];X
∗
2 = [X2t;XD]
Step 4. Sample the VAR parameters B2
H(Ω | B2, Yt, Z∗):IW (S∗, T ∗)
Step 5. Use MH to sample P= [Z∗;λ ] and then compute the acceptance probability α.
P = Pold + Φ
1/2e, e:N(0, 1)
α =
F (Y | Bi,Ω, di, Pnew)p(Pnew)
F (Y | Bi,Ω, di, Pold)p(Pold)
where F (Y | Bi,Ω, Pnew)p(Pnew) is the likelihood of the VAR computed as the product of the likelihoods
in the two regimes. We choose the scaling factor Φ to ensure that the acceptance rate remains between
20% and 40%.
Step 6. Draw the delay parameter d from the multinomial distribution with probability:
L(Y | d,Ψ)∑n
d=1 L(Y | d,Ψ)
where L (.) is likelihood function, Ψ denotes all the other parameters and n the maximum value d can
take.
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Figure S16: IP connectedness with big shocks of 5 SD
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Figure S17: Inefficiency factors.
Figure S18: Median of the difference in global connectedness across regimes over the fore-
casting horizon. 68, 95 and 99% credibility bands.
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Figure S19: Directional results with regimes identified solely based on Germany.
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Figure S20: CPI and IP connectedness.
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Figure S21: Global connectedness. Sensitivity to prior tightness.
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Appendix Chapter 3
Conditional forecast example
Imagine the policymaker wants to answer the following question:
What is the forecast of GDP conditioned on knowing that Federal Fund rate in the next 2
periods is 1%?
Step1. Define a simple 2 variables VAR as in 3.1 formed by GDP (Y) and Interest
rate (X). Yt
Xt
 =
 c1
c2
+
 B1 B2
B3 B4
 Yt−1
Xt−1
+
 A11
A21 A22
 e1t
e2t
 (6)
and define zijk as the IRF of j to K shock at horizon i and variable X is constrained to be 1 in the
next two periods.
R =
 z11,2 z1,22 0 0
z12,2 z
2
2,2 z
1
1,2 z
2
1,2
 (7)
r =
 1− X¯t+1
1− X¯t+2
 (8)
where X¯ denotes the unconditional forecast of X and r is the difference between the desired
path of the Federal Fund rate and its unconditional forecast.
Step2. Re-write the desired restriction in terms of structural shocks e and the matrix
of impulse responses R
Re = r (9)
As per Waggoner and Zha (1999) draw the restricted shock e from a distribution:
e ∼ N (R′(RR′)−1r, I −R′(RR′)−1R) (10)
If we restrict all structural shocks in 9 we get a reduced form solution. If instead we want to
attribute the desired path to a specific shock, for example the Monetary policy shock, we draw the
restricted shock e2 from 10 while the remaining shock is drawn from its own distribution which is
a N(0,1) in a recursive scenario.
S122
Figure S22: Inflation response to a 1% increase in interest rate. Mean model results
Inflation AEs Inflation EMEs
Data description
Data transformations:
• Government spending: Government consumption and government investment de-
flated by the GDP deflator - annual growth rates.
• Taxes: Current receipts minus transfers and interest payment deflated by the GDP
deflator – annual growth rates.
• Real GDP – annual growth rates.
• Inflation – annual growth in CPI
• VIX - CBOE Market Volatility Index – levels
• Commodity Price Index: All Commodities (C001CXAP@IFS) – annual growth rates
• World: Energy Index (C001CXE@IFS) – annual growth rates
• World GDP (GDP for world, weighted by PPP) minus country GDP - annual growth
rates
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Table S5: Monetary and Fiscal Data description (with HAVER codes, where applicable)
Table S6: Marginal likelihood/ Deviance Information criteria for single country VAR. Models
with higher marginal likelihood and smaller Deviance Information Criteria are preferred.
Lags US Jap UK EA China Brasil India Russia
Test MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC MLik/DIC
4 -145/1042 -223/926 -264/1129 -177/730 -299/1309 -316/1373 -376/1651 -405/1800
5 -239/1010 -219/907 -261/1113 -172/707 -294/1283 -311/1347 -370/1623 -398/1766
6 -235/992 -218.45/894 -257/1094 -170/699 -290/1265 -307/1325 -364/1598 -392/1738
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Figure S23: Interest rate and inflation response to a 1% increase in government spending.
Mean model results
Interest rate AEs Interest rate EMEs
Inflation AEs Inflation EMEs
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Figure S24: GDP response to fiscal and monetary shocks. Country results
Monetary policy AEs Fiscal policy AEs
Monetary policy EMEs Fiscal policy EMEs
Figure S25: Sensitivity analysis to the prior on λ.
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Figure S26: Sensitivity analysis to the number of lags for EMEs. Country results with 5
lags.
Monetary policy Fiscal policy
Figure S27: Monetary Policy Contribution in EMEs with M2 and R targeting
Figure S28: Sensitivity analysis to variables ordering for EMEs. Results with M2 ordered
last.
Monetary policy Fiscal policy
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Figure S29: Sensitivity analysis to using Krippner shadow rate
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Figure S30: Conditional forecast AEs. Overall policy scenarios. Bands are 68 HPDI
Figure S31: Conditional forecast EMEs. Overall policy scenarios. Bands are 68 HPDI
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Figure S32: Inefficiency factors
S129
Appendix Chapter 4
S1 Estimation
S1.1 Model
Ytc = Xtcβc + Ztθt + utc (11)
uitc = γicMt + ηitc (12)
uc ~ N(0,Σ) are the reduced form residuals for country c= 1,....,N, Xtc is the matrix of
endogenous variables for country c while Zt is a vector of exogenous variables common to
all countries which enter the VAR equation at time t. For simplicity define Φc = {βc, θ}
and Gc = {Xtc, Zt}
ηic ~ N(0,ω2) are the residuals of the measurement equation. uitc is the ith resid-
ual where i= 1,.....n, represents the number of endogenous variables per country, M is
the instrument for the structural shock of interest εi which is chosen to be the first for
convenience.7
The reduced form shocks can be related to the underlying structural shocks as follows:
εtc = Rcutc (13)
and we call ε1 the shock of interest and ε2 the remaining shocks. We aim at identifying
the first column of matrix R for country c.
Instrument validity assumptions.
E(ε1M) = α ; E(ε2M) = 0
These are the relevance and exogeneity conditions for the instrument. Under these
assumptions the first column of R is identified up to a scale as follows:
7Since we do not adopt a recursive identification the order of the variables has no implication for our
object of interest (Impulse response functions).
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R1c =

r11
r21
...
rn1
 = s

γ11
γ21
...
γn1
 where s is a scaling factor.
For ease of exposition we split the parameters Θ in two groups, the VAR parameters
and the IV parameters :
ΘV AR =
{
Φc, Σc, τ, Φ¯,
}
and ΘIV =
{
γ1c, γ¯, λ, ω
2
c , R
}
.
Define the joint likelihood of the VAR data (G) and the instrument data (M):
P (G,M | Θ) = P (G | ΘV AR)P (M | ΘIV ,ΘV AR) (14)
and combining the priors with (6) we re-write the posterior as in Rogers et al. (2016):
P (Θ | D) = P (ΘV AR | G)P (ΘIV | ΘV AR, G) (15)
where D contains both G and M.
The non closed form conditional posteriors are the Φ and Σ while the rest of the
parameters are standard with a known distribution to draw from.
S1.2 Priors
We assume a hierarchical prior for Φc and γic coefficients as below:
p
(
Φc | Φ¯, Oc, τ
)
= N
(
Φ¯, τOc
)
(16)
p (γ1c | γ¯,Ξc, λ) = N (γ¯,λΞc) (17)
where Oc is standard Minnesota prior and Ξc is an identity matrix.
We specify diffuse prior for Φ¯, γ¯,Σ and ω2 :
p (Σc) ∝ |Σ|−
1
2
(N+1) (18)
p(ω2c ) ∝ ω2c (19)
p(Φ¯) ∝ 1 (20)
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p (γ¯) ∝ 1 (21)
and a uniform Inverse Gamma prior for τ and λ with s0 and s∗0 = -1 and v0, v∗0 = 0
p (λ) = IG
(
s∗0
2
,
v∗0
2
)
(22)
p (τ) = IG(
s0
2
,
v0
2
) (23)
S1.3 Algorithm
1 Draw P (Φnewc | Θ) and P (Σnewc | Θ,Φnew) using an Independence MH step use
the proposal density for Φ and Σ with q(Φ) and q(Σ) defined as:
q(Φ) = N(M,V ) with
M = V
[((
Σi−1c
)−1)
Yi + (τOc)
−1 Φ¯
]
V =
[(
Σi−1c
)−1 ⊗G′cGc + (τOc)−1]−1
q(Σ) = IW (Sc, Tc)with
scale Sc= (Y c −GcΦc)
′
(Y c −GcΦc) and Tc degrees of freedom represented by the length
of the time series. Notice that T is country specific.
Accept the proposal with probability:
α = min
(
P (Φnewc , Σ
new
c , τ, Φ¯, γ1c, γ¯, λ, ωc)
P (Φoldc , Σ
old
c , τ, Φ¯, γ1c, γ¯, λ, ωc)
× q (Φ
old
c | Φnewc )
(Φnewc | Φoldc )
× q (Σ
old
c | Σnewc )
(Σnewc | Σoldc )
, 1
)
2. Draw γic from N(M∗, V ∗) with:
M∗ = V
[((
ω2c
)−1)
ui + (λΞc)
−1 γ¯
]
V ∗ =
[((
ω2c
)−1)×M ′cMc + (λΞc)−1]−1
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3. Draw ω2c from an inverse-Gamma distribution with scale parameter(uic −M cγic)
′
(uic −M cγic)
′
and Tc degrees of freedom for each i from 1 to n.
4. Draw Ric from N
(
γic, ω
2
c (M
′M)−1
)
, for i=1...n;
Run Steps (1)-(4) for each country c=1....N
5. Draw Φ¯ from N(Φcm, N−1τOc) with Φcm=N−1
∑N
c=1 Φc
6. Draw γ¯ from N(γcm, N−1λΞc) with γcm=N−1
∑N
c=1 γc
7. Draw τ from an inverse Gamma distribution ( s¯2 ,
v¯
2 ) with :
s¯=h+ s0 where h is the number of VAR coefficients to be estimated for all units.
v¯ = v0 +
∑N
c=1
{(
Φc − Φ¯
)′ (
Σ−1c
) (
Φc − Φ¯
)}
8. Draw λ from an inverse Gamma distribution ( s¯∗2 ,
v¯∗
2 ) with
s¯∗=h∗+s∗0 where h∗ is the number of IV coefficients to be estimated for all units.
v¯∗ = v∗0 +
∑N
c=1
{
(γc − γ¯)
′ (
ω2c
)−1
(γc − γ¯)
}
Steps 1-8 complete 1 draw.
S1.4 Monte-Carlo experiment
Artificial data is generated with the following characteristics: we generete 100 datasets.
Each dataset contains data for 10 countries with 3 endogenous variables per country with
the following coefficients:
Φ¯ =

0.7
0.1
−0.1
−0.1
0.7
0.1
−0.1
0.1
0.7

; γ¯ =

1
−0.5
−0.2

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Figure S33: Monte-Carlo results. The red line is the true response. The black line is the
median across the 100 datasets and the bands are 68 HPDI.
The sample length is set to 200 for each country and the first 100 observations are
discarded to remove the influence of initial conditions. The model is estimated using 5000
iterations for each of the 100 datasets generated. The last 1000 observations are used for
inference.
Figure S33 shows the comparison of the estimated and true impulse responses which
suggests that the algorithm performs well.
S1.5 Convergence
We use 35,000 iterations in the benchmark estimation. We discard 20,000 draws and save
15000 for inference. The low values of the inefficiency factors reported in Figures S34 and
S35 constitute evidence in favor of convergence.
S1.6 DIC test
DIC is a goodness of fit statistic. It was introduced in Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) and is
defined as:
DIC = D¯ + pD
The first term is D¯=E(-2lnL(Ψi))= 1MΣi(−2lnL(Ψi) and L(Ψi) is the likelihood eval-
uated at the draws of all of the parameters Ψi in the MCMC chain. D¯ is the posterior
expectation of the deviation and it captures the fit of the model. The second term mea-
sures the model complexity and is defined as pD=D¯−D(Ψ¯). pD can be approximated by
pD =
1
MΣi(−2lnL(Ψi))-
(−2lnL( 1MΣiΨi). Models with smaller DIC are preferred.
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Figure S34: Inefficiency factors. VAR coefficients
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Figure S35: Inefficiency factors. IV coefficients
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Table S7: Regression coefficients of the GDP residual on the instrument
Country γ21 95 HPDI Country γ21 95 HPDI
1 -0.03 (-0.09 0.05) 9 -0.04 (-0.14 0.03)
2 -0.01 (-0.07 0.07) 10 -0.03 (-0.12 0.05)
3 -0.03 (-0.11 0.04) 11 -0.05 (-0.15 0.03)
4 -0.03 (-0.11 0.05) 12 -0.02 (-0.09 0.07)
5 -0.03 (-0.10 0.05) 13 -0.02 (-0.09 0.08)
6 -0.04 (-0.11 0.04) 14 -0.03 (-0.12 0.05)
7 -0.03 (-0.11 0.05) 15 -0.04 (-0.14 0.03)
8 -0.03 (-0.11 0.04)
S2 Sensitivity analysis and additional results
In this section we report the results of the robustness checks performed. Specifically,
Table S8 reports the ranking of the regressors obtained using Spike and Slab algorithm for
variable selection. If we were to apply a rule of using regressors with a relevance higher
than 0.40 it would deliver almost the same specifications as in the benchmark case.
Figures S37 and S38 show the impulse responses for the average country obtained using
VIX and EPU as instrument for the uncertainty shock. In Figures S39-S41 we report the
impulse responses achieved using alternative specifications for the world demand proxy
and for the trend variables specification.
Additionally in Figures S42 and S43 we report median impulse responses and variance
decomposition across countries for all the variables in the model.
Finally, table S7 reports the regression coefficients of the GDP residual on the instru-
ment.
Table S8: Spike and Slab algorithm raking of regressors. Median of relevance parameter
in bracket
Variable IRF Variance decomposition
Trade 1 (0.67) 6 (0.50)
GDP pc 2 (0.57) 8 (0.43)
Dolarisation 3 (0.49) 7 (0.49)
Manufacturing 4 (0.46) 1 (0.63)
Goods mkt efficincy 5 (0.45) 2 (0.59)
Labor mkt mfficiency 6 (0.38) 4 (0.55)
Product diversification 7 (0.38) 3 (0.56)
Domestic credit 8 (0.37) 5 (0.53)
Product concerntration 9 (0.37) 9 (0.42)
S137
Figure S36: Cholesky vs proxy identification. Uncertainty ordered first.
Figure S37: Average country impulse responses. VIX used as proxy
Figure S38: Average country impulse responses. EPU used as proxy
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Figure S39: Average country impulse responses. World demand proxied by Kilian index
Figure S40: Average country impulse responses. No linear trend
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Figure S41: Average country impulse responses. Linear and quadratic trend
Figure S42: Impulse responses. Posterior median estimate for each country. The shock is
scaled to increase the domestic uncertainty by 1 unit.
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Figure S43: Variance decomposition. Posterior median estimate for each country.
S3 Data description
In this section we describe the data used in the empirical exercise.
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Mumtaz and Musso (2018)  OECD dataset
Countries Series Definition Sources
1 Germany 1 REAL GDP REAL GDP OECD
2 France 2 CPI CONSUMER PRICE INDEX OECD
3 Italy 3 STI SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE BIS, IMF, OECD
4 Spain 4 STP STOCK PRICES BIS, IMF, OECD
5 Netherlands 5 CREDIT CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR BIS, IMF, OECD
6 Belgium 6 LOANS BANK LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR BIS, IMF, OECD
7 Austria 7 HOUSEP HOUSE PRICES BIS, IMF, OECD
8 Finland 8 BROADM BROAD MONEY ECB, BIS, IMF, OECD
9 Greece 9 NARROWM NARROW MONEY ECB, BIS, IMF, OECD
10 Ireland 10 INDPROD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IMF, OECD
11 Portugal 11 RETSALES RETAIL SALES VOLUMES OECD, FED (FRED II)
12 United States 12 EMPL EMPLOYMENT BIS, OECD
13 United Kingdom 13 UR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OECD, EC (AMECO interp)
14 Japan 14 RGFCF REAL GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION OECD, BIS, EC (AMECO interp)
15 Canada 15 RPCON REAL PRIVATE CONSUMPTION OECD, BIS, EC (AMECO interp)
16 Australia 16 REXP REAL EXPORTS OECD, BIS, EC (AMECO interp)
17 South Korea 17 RIMP REAL IMPORTS OECD, BIS, EC (AMECO interp)
18 Nez Zealand 18 NEER NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE IMF, OECD
19 Norway 19 USDX US DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE IMF, OECD
20 Sweden 20 LTI LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE BIS, IMF, OECD
21 Switzerland 21-28 WORLD INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES WORLD BANK
22 Denmark 29-40 WORLD EMERGING ECONOMIES INDICATORS IMF, OECD
23 Specific international commodity prices (8) 
 12 emerging market economies indicators 
( 5 for South Africa, 4 for Mexico and 1 each for China, India and Turkey).
Cross section analysis data
Indicator Name Source
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) World Bank
Trade (% of GDP) World Bank
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) World Bank
Dollarization index Levy Yeyati  website
Labour market flexibility World Economic Forum Competitiveness Database- Pillar 7
Product market flexibility World Economic Forum Competitiveness Database- Pillar 6
 Herfindahl-Hirschman index UNCTAD
EMEs data description
Argentina Chile
RGDP RGDP
CPI  Consumer Price Index, All items
Deposit rate  Central Bank Minimum Interest Rate
REER REER
Buenos Aires SE General Index (IVBNG) Santiago SE Indice General de Precios de Acciones
Total Reserves excluding Gold Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars  Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
 Currency in Circulation National Currency per U.S. Dollar
 Export of Goods  Currency in Circulation
M1  Export of Goods
M3  Imports of Goods
 Imports of Goods  Industrial Production Volume SA
2003q4 to 2016q2 M1
 Unemployment Rate
1997q2 to 2016q4 
Colombia Croatia
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index, All items
 Bank of the Republic Intervention Rate Bank of Croatia  Discount Rate
REER REER
 IGBC General Index  Bourse Index (CROBEX)
Total Reserves excluding Gold Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars  Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
 National Currency per US Dollar  National Currency per US Dollar
 Export of Goods  Cental Bank Overnight Credit
 Imports of Goods  Imports of Goods
 Industrial Production Volume SA Croatia  Exports of Goods
 Unemployment Rate 2001q4 to 2016q4
M1
M2
M3
 Currency in Circulation
2000q2 to 2016q4
Czech rep Hungary 
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index, All items
 Central Bank Deposit Facility Bank of  Base Rate
REER REER
Prague SE PX Index Vienna OETEB  Traded Index (Forint)
Final Consumption Expenditure, Private Final Consumption Expenditure, Private 
Final Consumption Expenditure, Public Final Consumption Expenditure, Public
Gross Capital Formation Gross Capital Formation
Total Reserves excluding Gold Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars  Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
Unemployment Percentage change previous year Unemployment Percentage change period previous year
Unemployment, Percentage change, previous period Unemployment, Percentage change, previous period
National Bank 2 Week Repo Rate  Export of Goods
 Export of Goods  Imports of Goods
 Imports of Goods 1997q2 to 2016q4 
 Industrial Production Volume SA
1997q2 to 2016q4 
Peru Philippines
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index, All items
Central Bank of Peru Discount Rate Philippines Central Bank Discount Rate
REER REER
Lima S&P/BVL Peru General Index Manila SE Composite Index
Total Reserves excluding Gold Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars  Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
 National Currency per US Dollar Consumer Price Index Inflation Rate
 Export of Goods Export of Goods
 Imports of Goods Imports of Goods
 Industrial Production Volume SA Industrial Production Volume SA
1997q2 to 2016q4 Unemployment Rate
1997q2 to 2016q4 
Poland Romania
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index, All items
Bank of Poland Lombard Rate Romania NRC Structural Credit Rate
REER REER
Warsaw SE 20-Share Composite Bucharest SE Index in Lei
Final Consumption Expenditure, Private Financial, Interest Rates, Money Market, Percent per annum
Final Consumption Expenditure, Public Final Consumption Expenditure, Private 
Gross Capital Formation Final Consumption Expenditure, Public
Total Reserves excluding Gold Gross Capital Formation
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Central Bank Refinancing Rate  Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
 Export of Goods Unemployment Percentage change,  period previous year
 Imports of Goods Unemployment, Percentage change, previous period
 Industrial Production Volume SA  Currency in Circulation
1997q2 to 2016q4  Export of Goods
 Imports of Goods
 Industrial Production Volume SA
2001q2 to 2016q2
Singapore Slovenia
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index, All items
Repo rate Financial, Interest Rates, Lending Rate, Percent per annum
REER REER
Dow Jones Singapore Stock Index USD  SE SBITOP Blue Chip Index
 Imports of Goods Final Consumption Expenditure, Private 
Total Reserves excluding Gold Final Consumption Expenditure, Private 
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars Final Consumption Expenditure, Public
 National Currency per US Dollar Final Consumption Expenditure, Public
 Export of Goods Gross Capital Formation, Changes in Inventories, Nominal 
 FTSE Straits-Times Index  Currency in Circulation
 Industrial Production Volume SA  Export of Goods
1997q2 to 2016q4  Imports of Goods
 Industrial Production Volume SA
1997q2 to 2016q4 
South Africa Thailand
RGDP RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items  Consumer Price Index Inflation Rate
Central bank Interest rate Bank of Thailand Lending Facility Rate
REER REER
FTSE/JSE Finance and Industrials Top 30  SET General Index
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars  Currency in Circulation
 National Currency per US Dollar  Export of Goods
FTSE/JSE Top 40 Tradeable Stocks  Imports of Goods
 Export of Goods  Industrial Production Volume SA
 Imports of Goods M1
 Industrial Production Volume SA 2001q4 to 2016q4
 Currency in Circulation
 M1
M2
1997q2 to 2016q4 
Turkey
RGDP
 Consumer Price Index, All items
Turkey Central Bank Lending Rate
REER
Istanbul SE IMKB-100 Price Index
Final Consumption Expenditure, Private 
Final Consumption Expenditure, Public
Gross Capital Formation
Total Reserves excluding Gold
 Official Reserve Assets, US Dollars
 Central Bank Discount Rate
 Currency in Circulation
 Export of Goods
 Imports of Goods
 Industrial Production Volume SA
2004q2 to 2016q4
Data sources: IMF, Global Financial Data, BIS and country specific central bank websites for policy rates.
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